

Full Report

Antisemitism in Brazil

CURRENT OVERVIEW (2025) & TRENDS



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1. FOREWORD

The “new normal” of global antisemitism and the collective response of the Brazilian Jewish community

Addressing antisemitism is, above all, an imperative for the health of Brazilian democracy. If the 2024 Report served as a warning in the face of the “tsunami” of hatred triggered by the October 7 attacks, this 2025 edition records an even more challenging reality: the consolidation of this hatred at historically high levels. It is no longer a matter of an isolated peak, but of a “new normal” of hostility, which requires not only constant vigilance but also a systemic and professionalized strategy of community resilience.

This year confirmed the transnational and immediate nature of contemporary antisemitism. Data released by Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and by international organizations comparable to the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB) in monitoring and analyzing this phenomenon demonstrate that events in the Middle East or on American university campuses reverberate in real time across social media and city streets around the world and, unfortunately, in Brazil as well. The so-called “globalization of hatred” ignores borders and transforms the digital environment into the primary arena of dissemination, once again responsible for the majority of complaints received through our channels.

Confronting this scenario is not a solitary task. In a year marked by persistent global challenges and the complexity of the national context, the Brazilian Jewish community reaffirmed that its greatest strength lies in coordination, cooperation, and unity. This Annual Report on Antisemitism in Brazil 2025 goes beyond compiling statistical data; it embodies an unprecedented collective effort involving representative institutions from communities across the country, their leadership, professional teams, and, decisively, the dedication of volunteers.

As the national coordinating body, the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB) led the articulation of the community’s efforts to confront antisemitism. In partnership with all Jewish Federations and Associations across Brazil—from north to south, with particular emphasis on the Federation of the State of São Paulo (FISESP)—the Confederation consolidated a network of protection and coordination that transcends state boundaries. This reach made it possible, for the first time, to build a comprehensive picture of the reality experienced by Brazilian Jews,

encompassing both major urban centers and smaller communities, and ensuring that diverse voices were included.

The implementation of the survey Perceptions of the Jewish Community on Identity, Experience, and Antisemitism in Brazil—an unprecedented effort in the national context—demonstrates the mobilization capacity of the Brazilian Jewish community. The collection of more than 1,400 valid responses, encompassing a diversity of religious and professional profiles, shows that the federative structure has the political and operational capacity to coordinate large-scale initiatives. By integrating Community Security Departments with regional leadership and organizing and analyzing the resulting data with rigor and precision, the project transformed individual perceptions of insecurity into strategic input for collective protection.

The consistency of the diagnoses presented in this report stems from the integration of different areas of expertise. The partnership with StandWithUs Brazil and its Center for Data Studies and Analysis (CEAD) was essential for conducting, together with AtlasIntel, public opinion surveys that help to better understand perceptions within Brazilian society regarding Jews, antisemitism, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The combined analysis of these data with records of incidents and complaints, as well as with the intracommunity perception survey, provides more qualified tools to address contemporary polarization, aligned with international best practices.

Similarly, the consortium formed by the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB) with the Holocaust Museum of Curitiba, the Holocaust Memorial of São Paulo, and StandWithUs Brazil added an indispensable dimension of memory and education. By examining public knowledge about the Shoah through research conducted by Grupo ISPO, these institutions reaffirmed that historical education remains a central element in preventing intolerance. Progress was also made in examining the corporate environment: the work of the ECOA Initiative, by revealing the impacts of antisemitism in workplace relations, opened an important front in the field of Diversity and Inclusion, contributing to the promotion of respect for Jewish identity in professional settings.

The figures presented here are not abstract. They reflect the anxiety of university students, the discomfort of professionals in their workplaces, and the insecurity of families who, after decades, once again question the public display of symbols of faith and culture. At the same time, the data record consistent institutional responses. The year 2025 was marked by judicial decisions reaffirming that racism and hate speech are not protected under the pretext of freedom of expression, as well as by the proactive engagement of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB) with the media and with the Legislative and Executive branches, seeking allies and interlocutors for the consolidation of public policies aimed at protecting minorities.

This document reflects the competence and resilience of community institutions and, at the same time, constitutes an invitation to shared action. Addressing antisemitism is not the exclusive responsibility of the Jewish community; it is a commitment that involves civil society, public authorities, and all institutions dedicated to diversity and the rule of law.

I would like to express my gratitude to the executive boards, councils, professionals, and volunteers who dedicated themselves to the reporting channels, social media monitoring, victim support, youth education, and dialogue with society. The result is more than a report:

it is an instrument of democratic defense that places Brazil in dialogue with the leading initiatives for monitoring and analyzing antisemitism around the world. I hope that reading this report reinforces the understanding that protecting minorities—including the Jewish minority—means preserving the values of tolerance and coexistence that sustain Brazilian democracy. May this work encourage the continuation of the unity that made it possible and that remains a condition for a safe and dignified future for the Jewish community and for Brazilian society as a whole.

Claudio Lottenberg

President of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB)

2. INTRODUCTION

The Annual Report on Antisemitism in Brazil 2025: a multidimensional and integrated approach to the global scenario

Hatred against Jews, once confined to veiled jokes and obscure forums, now circulates openly across social media, universities, and even political spaces. Criticism that could be legitimate is transformed into unlawful rhetoric.

The result is tangible. Brazilian Jews feel apprehensive about wearing religious symbols, avoid mentioning Israel, or refrain from expressing their identity out of fear of hostility. This is not merely a community issue: it is a direct threat to the health of democracy itself.

To confront this scenario, it is necessary to decode antisemitism in order to disarm it—to make visible what is disguised. Education and the mapping of narratives are instruments as powerful as legal sanctions and are indispensable for the construction of a healthy public sphere.

Recent international reports indicate that the events of October 7, 2023, and their aftermath were accompanied by an intensification of hostility toward Jews in several countries. The phenomenon has taken on an increasingly transnational character, driven by the digital circulation of antisemitic narratives that connect, in real time, events in the Middle East to incidents recorded in urban centers across Europe, the Americas, and Oceania. In 2025, 20 deaths and dozens of injuries were recorded in antisemitic attacks in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

In this context, governments and civil society organizations have consolidated systems for monitoring and reporting, with exchanges of data, methodologies, and analytical categories. This movement contributes to greater standardization and international comparability in the documentation of antisemitism.

The Annual Report of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB), prepared in technical cooperation with Jewish Federations and Associations across Brazil, StandWithUs Brazil, the Holocaust Museum of Curitiba, the Holocaust Memorial of São Paulo, and the group Executives Against Antisemitism (ECO), is part of this effort. By systematizing quantitative and

qualitative data on the national context, the document contributes to the global monitoring and analysis of the phenomenon, enabling comparative readings between the Brazilian reality and that of other diaspora communities.

The 2025 edition introduces a structured methodological model aimed at replicability, annual comparability, and the consolidation of historical series, integrating formal records of complaints, proactive digital monitoring, and perception surveys conducted both within the Jewish community and across Brazilian society. The combination of sources seeks to reduce underreporting effects and capture both documented incidence and the broader social climate and its symbolic impacts, in line with international standards.

The recording of complaints has been conducted in Brazil since 2022 through integrated channels of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB), Jewish Federations and Associations, and their Community Security Departments (DSC). Similar initiatives are carried out internationally, among others, by the Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive in France, the Bundesverband RIAS in Germany, the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien (IKG) in Austria, the Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC) in Italy, and the Community Security Trust (CST) in the United Kingdom. In the United States, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) conducts an annual audit based on police records and direct reports; in Australia, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) maintains an equivalent system; in Argentina, the Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA) adopts a methodology similar to the Brazilian one.

Perception and lived-experience surveys are conducted by institutions such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the ADL—through the Global 100 survey, in partnership with Ipsos—and the Pew Research Center. In Europe, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) conducts surveys with Jewish populations on everyday experiences and reporting patterns; related studies are developed by EURISPES in Italy and supported by the CST in the United Kingdom.

The Brazilian report incorporates this dimension through the survey Perceptions of the Jewish Community on Identity, Experience, and Antisemitism in Brazil, conducted by the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB) in collaboration with Jewish Federations and Associations nationwide, aimed at understanding the subjective and behavioral impacts of anti-Jewish hostility. This survey is complemented by research commissioned by StandWithUs Brazil from AtlasIntel, designed to assess perceptions within Brazilian society and adherence to anti-Jewish beliefs and stereotypes.

Also included in the 2025 body of studies are Public Opinion on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in Brazil, commissioned by StandWithUs Brazil from AtlasIntel; Knowledge of the Holocaust in Brazil, developed through a consortium of the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB), StandWithUs Brazil, the Holocaust Museum of Curitiba, and the Holocaust Memorial of São Paulo; and the study Antisemitism in the Workplace, promoted by ECOA.

The document also incorporates digital monitoring and scanning tools, in line with initiatives such as Fighting Online Antisemitism (FOA), the Web Observatory of the Latin American Jewish Congress (CJLA), and the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities (SIG), which use social listening techniques to identify patterns in the dissemination of antisemitic content.

This alignment with international practices ensures that Brazilian data contribute to the

global effort to refine analytical categories and monitoring systems for antisemitism. In a context of digital radicalization and political polarization, the Report offers a comparative instrument between the national reality and that of countries such as France, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Argentina.

The work aims to raise awareness among public authorities and Brazilian civil society, with the objective of supporting policies for the prevention, protection, and confrontation of antisemitism, in line with the treatment afforded to other forms of racism within the national legal framework, while also informing international interlocutors about the issue in Brazil.

Antisemitism is the laboratory of hatred: where it prospers, democracy deteriorates. The lessons of the Holocaust remain urgent, and the first step to not repeating them is recognizing when there is a relativization of fundamental rights.

Combating antisemitism today is more than defending a community. It is about protecting the right to truth, memory, and democratic coexistence—values that, once eroded, are difficult to rebuild.

Rony Vainzof and Andrea Vainer

National Project to Combat Hate Speech, Extremism, and Antisemitism – CONIB

3. METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

This report adopts a methodology grounded in principles of data triangulation and in a human rights-oriented perspective, in line with the international guideline Human Rights-Based Approach to Data (HRBAD). The choice of a multidimensional and adaptive design seeks to address structural limitations in monitoring antisemitism, particularly in the Brazilian context.

Structural Constraints and Monitoring Challenges

The monitoring of antisemitic manifestations in Brazil is embedded within a set of structural constraints that directly impact data collection, quality, and interpretation. These limitations do not arise exclusively from methodological choices, but from demographic, psychosocial, institutional, and operational factors that shape the very environment in which the phenomenon is observed.

Such challenges are not unique to the Brazilian context. Reports from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the Community Security Trust (CST) recognize that Jewish communities in the diaspora frequently face underreporting, a low absolute population base, and a discrepancy between lived experience and formal records. Furthermore, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) points out that data on minority groups tend to be structurally incomplete when relying exclusively on state administrative or criminal systems.

In the Brazilian case, however, these challenges are amplified by additional factors, especially the lack of a structured state system focused on the specificities of monitoring antisemitism. Unlike some European countries that possess dedicated public mechanisms for collecting such data, the production of information on the subject in Brazil depends mostly on the initiative of the Jewish community itself and its representative institutions. Moreover, with a Jewish population representing less than 0.1% of the national demography and in the absence of a unified state system for collecting data on anti-Jewish hate, an exclusive reliance on official criminal and administrative records tends to produce a severe “statistical invisibility” of the phenomenon. Structural underreporting—driven by factors such as distrust in public institutions, fear of retaliation, and self-censorship—hides dynamics of symbolic violence and stigmatization that profoundly affect the community.

Consequently, a systematic study was conducted to map the gaps and challenges impacting the report’s ability to capture, interpret, and more assertively demonstrate the reality of antisemitism in Brazil. Based on this analysis, the gaps were organized into structured categories, and their respective mitigation strategies were incorporated into the report’s new methodological model.

The identified gaps were organized into the following categories:

DEMOGRAPHIC AND STATISTICAL CONSTRAINTS

The Brazilian Jewish community has a relatively small population, estimated at approximately 120,000 people. Within a country of more than 200 million inhabitants, this minority represents between 0.05% and 0.06% of the national population. Due to this scale, even when serious and significant increases in hostility occur, the absolute number of incidents tends to remain statistically modest, which may create the misleading perception that antisemitism is negligible or nonexistent.

In light of this context, the adopted methodological model prioritizes proportional and trend-based analyses, integrating quantitative and qualitative data, thereby preventing the community's limited demographic size and the challenges in accessing it from resulting in the statistical invisibility of the phenomenon.

PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSTRAINTS OF UNDERREPORTING AND STATISTICAL INVISIBILITY

Psychosocial factors also hinder the measurement of antisemitism in Brazil, as conspiracy narratives, stigmatization, and indirect hostility affect the community but often do not generate official records by authorities.

In addition, many incidents go unreported due to lack of awareness of reporting channels, institutional distrust, or fear of retaliation. International literature and the theory of stigma developed by Erving Goffman (1963) indicate that such silence constitutes an adaptive response to a hostile environment, potentially leading to self-censorship, identity withdrawal, and behavioral changes. Silence, therefore, is itself a relevant indicator.

Research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), particularly the report *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism – Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU* (2018), shows that a significant portion of European Jews who experienced antisemitic incidents chose not to report them. The Community Security Trust (CST) in the United Kingdom combines formal records with internal perception surveys precisely to compensate for underreporting bias. Studies by the Pew Research Center (2021) and the American Jewish Committee also demonstrate that fear, self-censorship, and perceived insecurity are central variables in the contemporary analysis of the phenomenon.

In response, a data triangulation approach was adopted (Denzin, 1978; Flick, 2004), combining formal records, informal reports, analysis of structural environments, and perception surveys within the Jewish community. This integration expands understanding beyond the raw volume of recorded incidents.

Furthermore, perception research enables the estimation of an underreporting index, identifying reasons for non-reporting and measuring the community's sense of security. Variables such as fear, institutional distrust, and self-censorship are treated as aggravating risk factors rather than mere externalities. Thus, the methodological focus shifts from volume to impact: a low incidence of physical aggression is not, in itself, reassuring when there is discursive intensification and symbolic normalization within socially influential spaces.

This reformulation seeks to directly address the invisibility produced by the combination of low demographic representation and structural underreporting, ensuring that the report captures not only formally recorded events but also the broader social environment that enables and sustains them.

OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS

Operational and technical limitations pose significant challenges to the contemporary monitoring of antisemitism, particularly in the digital environment. The use of social listening tools enhances tracking capacity but does not eliminate structural constraints. A central challenge lies in identifying the nuances of antisemitic discourse, such as coded language, irony, memes, double meanings, or implicit historical references. A substantial portion of contemporary discourse operates precisely through semantic ambiguity and symbolic layering, complicating automated detection.

International literature acknowledges these limitations. Studies by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Bartlett & Miller, 2010) demonstrate how conspiracy theories and coded language are central to the digital ecosystem of hate. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) continuously updates its database of antisemitic symbols and codes precisely because such expressions evolve over time. The FRA emphasizes that automated detection must always be complemented by specialized qualitative analysis.

Moreover, platform policies—such as those of Meta Platforms—restrict access to private accounts and closed groups, reducing the scope of monitoring. This limitation is not merely technical; it indicates that part of hostile discourse may migrate to closed environments, which itself constitutes a risk factor identified in FRA and ADL reports.

Additionally, given the relatively small size of the Brazilian Jewish community and the limited centrality of the issue in national public debate, the raw volume of content initially classified as potentially antisemitic in the digital environment may be numerically low (in previous reports, approximately 2% of total tracked content). This figure, in isolation, is not conclusive. Digital antisemitism often operates in symbolic layers of lower frequency but high potential for aggressiveness, radicalization, or virality. It may function as a “hate bridge,” providing conspiratorial narratives and binary moral frameworks that connect misogyny, racism, homophobia, and other forms of extremism. This connective function amplifies its potential for dissemination and intensifies its capacity to catalyze intergroup radicalization processes.

In light of these limitations and methodological challenges, the report adopts three core measures:

- (i) transparent acknowledgment of the logistical and technical constraints inherent to the platforms, tools, and approaches employed;
- (ii) triangulation between automated monitoring and specialized qualitative discourse analysis; and
- (iii) emphasis on the systematic presentation of examples drawn from case studies, complaints, and reports, in order to illustrate the concrete ways in which antisemitism manifests, including in instances marked by semantic ambiguity and the use of symbolic codes.

This strategy shifts the analytical focus from the mere quantification of occurrences to the assessment of their contextual severity and discursive meaning, allowing for a more precise and instructive understanding of the complexity of antisemitism in Brazil.

3.1 Report Design

COMPLAINTS AND INCIDENTS (CHAPTER 5)

This chapter is dedicated to the Complaints and Incidents Reporting Channel. Its primary role is to consolidate, quantify, and qualify formal records of anti-Jewish incidents—both online and offline—reported to the Brazilian Jewish Confederation (CONIB), Jewish Federations, and Community Security Departments (DSCs). In the absence of a unified and standardized public system for recording antisemitic hate crimes in Brazil, the Reporting Channel centralizes data from multiple representative entities. It establishes a standardized database, enabling the consolidation of a robust and comparable historical series.

Rather than limiting itself to statistical aggregation, the chapter implements a qualitative categorization system structured across two complementary analytical levels, distinguishing the nature of the event from the ideological vector of the aggression:

- **Classification of the Occurrence (“What happened?”)**: Identifies the material or legal form of the incident, organizing reports into categories of severity such as physical assault, verbal abuse, vandalism, incitement to hatred, and disinformation;
- **Classification of Antisemitic Content (“What was said or conveyed?”)**: Moves beyond legal typification to “decode” the symbolic dimension of the discourse, based on the IHRA definition and the taxonomy developed by the European project Decoding Antisemitism (Becker et al., 2024). This level identifies cumulative discursive categories such as essentializations, conspiratorial attributions of power, glorification of Nazism, and Antizionism. The use of a cumulative taxonomy allows for distinguishing political criticism from classical prejudices, revealing how antisemitic discourse mobilizes multiple forms of expression simultaneously, combining overt hate speech with purported political critique.

The chapter also includes sections dedicated to systematic Case Studies and to CONIB’s legal actions. By presenting concrete and literal examples of attacks (such as death threats, self-declared Nazism, and workplace harassment), it illustrates the ways in which hostility materializes in the lives of victims, making tangible the impact that raw numerical data alone cannot convey.

SURVEY “PERCEPTIONS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY ON IDENTITY, EXPERIENCE, AND ANTISEMITISM IN BRAZIL” (CHAPTER 6)

This chapter plays a complementary role to incident monitoring by shifting the analytical focus from the incident and its form of expression to the lived experiences and subjective perceptions of victims. Given the infeasibility of classical probabilistic sampling—due to the small size of the Jewish population in Brazil and the absence of a unified registry, motivated by legitimate historical concerns—a non-probabilistic convenience sampling strategy was adopted, structured through community federative networks. National coordination by CONIB, in cooperation with state Federations, mitigated territorial dispersion and enabled the organized participation of more than 1,400 respondents. The research instrument captures behavioral effects associated with perceived hostility and examines impacts on everyday decision-making.

Additionally, the chapter empirically demonstrates that the absence of formal reporting does

not equate to the absence of harm. The survey documents experiences that often escape official records, such as the breakdown of friendships or family relationships, isolation in academic environments, denial of services, and incidents of workplace harassment.

STANDWITHUS BRAZIL / ATLASINTEL SURVEY: THE PRESENCE OF ANTISEMITISM IN BRAZILIAN SOCIETY (CHAPTER 7)

The survey The Presence of Antisemitism in Brazilian Society, conducted by AtlasIntel at the request of StandWithUs Brazil, sought to map perceptions, attitudes, and ambiguities present in Brazilian public opinion regarding Jews, Israel, Zionism, and hate speech. The study examined both explicit manifestations of prejudice and more diffuse and socially normalized forms of hostility, using research techniques capable of capturing latent perceptions that are not always directly expressed by respondents.

The results reveal a complex picture: significant levels of interpersonal acceptance toward Jews coexist with substantial gaps in understanding contemporary antisemitism. The survey also identifies an interpretative gray zone in which narratives historically associated with antisemitic imaginaries are frequently perceived as legitimate opinions or political criticism, particularly when linked to debates about Israel and Zionism. This scenario illustrates how historical stereotypes, disinformation, and contemporary political disputes intersect within the Brazilian social environment.

Overall, the study suggests that antisemitism in Brazil tends to manifest less through direct hostility and more through processes of conceptual ambiguity, historical trivialization, and the symbolic displacement of prejudice into the political sphere. Narratives that delegitimize the connection between Jews, Israel, and Jewish national self-determination often function as contemporary vehicles for longstanding antisemitic tropes. At the same time, the findings indicate that Brazilian society remains in an interpretative dispute, with significant segments recognizing these narratives as prejudicial while others legitimize them as political positions. In this context, the study highlights the importance of public literacy on antisemitism—not only as a matter of the existence of prejudice, but also of its frequent social invisibility and difficulty of recognition.

MACRO-ENVIRONMENTAL EXPANSION: MONITORING OF SOCIAL SUPERSTRUCTURES (CHAPTER 8)

In line with a human rights-based approach to data (Human Rights-Based Approach to Data), the analysis of violence directed at a demographically small minority requires investigation of the broader social ecosystem in which such violence occurs. Digital platform monitoring conducted by CONIB, along with research carried out by StandWithUs Brazil in partnership with AtlasIntel, by the ECOA group, and by the consortium involving CONIB, the Holocaust Museum, the Holocaust Memorial, and Grupo ISPO, expands the analytical scope of the report by shifting the focus from isolated incidents to the social structures that condition their emergence, circulation, and normalization.

These studies complement incident monitoring and perception surveys, enabling the empirical contextualization of perceptions of fear, self-censorship, and institutional distrust identified within the Jewish community. By examining media, corporate environments, and education, they address the structural determinants previously identified.

Digital Platform Monitoring, conducted by CONIB, constitutes an analytical tool aimed at identifying the circulation of antisemitic discourse in environments that escape both formal reporting channels and the spatial limitations of victims. The initiative tracks the daily evolution of mentions related to antisemitic discourse within the Brazilian digital ecosystem, including social networks, news portals, and blogs.

The adopted methodology combines large-scale automated tracking with specialized qualitative review. Filter-generated results are systematically analyzed by human reviewers, who contextualize content, interpret implicit meanings, and ensure greater classificatory accuracy. This hybrid model seeks to expand detection capacity while maintaining the analytical rigor required to interpret complex forms of discourse.

The survey **Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Brazil**, conducted by StandWithUs Brazil in partnership with AtlasIntel, analyzes perceptions, moral framings, and levels of knowledge within Brazilian society regarding the conflict. The study identifies patterns of ideological polarization and assesses the role of social media as primary sources of information and engagement.

The survey **Knowledge of the Holocaust in Brazil**, conducted by a consortium including CONIB, the Holocaust Museum, the Holocaust Memorial, StandWithUs Brazil, and Grupo ISPO, evaluates the population's level of historical knowledge—both self-declared and factual—about the Shoah, examining its distribution across socioeconomic and educational indicators and identifying primary sources of information. The study addresses the structural challenge of disinformation and the circulation of conspiracy theories by highlighting conceptual weaknesses and distance from formal sources of historical memory. Methodologically, these findings help explain the cognitive vulnerability that enables the circulation of narratives such as denialism, trivialization of Nazism, or distorted analogies in the public sphere, providing an explanatory basis for content identified through the Reporting Channel.

The study **Antisemitism in the Workplace**, conducted by ECOA, investigates the incidence, forms, and impacts of antisemitism in the Brazilian labor market. The research measures the frequency of discriminatory situations and examines the role of corporate leadership, as well as the presence—or absence—of explicit policies addressing antisemitism within Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs. By documenting patterns of normalization of everyday hostility and institutional gaps in organizational responses, the study provides evidence of dynamics of silencing and symbolic violence in corporate environments. In this sense, it contributes to understanding identity-based self-censorship as an adaptive strategy in contexts perceived as unresponsive, extending the analysis of institutional distrust beyond the State to include the private sector.

Taken together, these studies expand the analytical scope of the report by integrating the incidence of events with the analysis of the sociopolitical, educational, and corporate structures that influence their occurrence and social reception. This macro-environmental expansion advances the understanding of antisemitism not merely as a series of isolated episodes, but as a phenomenon embedded within broader structural dynamics.

4. THE WORKING DEFINITIONS OF ANTISEMITISM, ITS CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES

In the complex political and social landscape of the twenty-first century, the task of identifying and combating anti-Jewish hatred has moved beyond the sphere of classical religious or racial prejudice and into the center of an intense global debate. The central question dividing scholars, legislators, and activists is no longer simply whether antisemitism should be confronted, but how it should be defined, especially when manifestations of hostility become intertwined with criticism of the State of Israel and of Zionism.

The IHRA Working Definition

The first operational formulation of a working definition of antisemitism emerged in 2005 within the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), and was later adopted and institutionalized by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. The definition was developed in response to the empirical need for a common language to guide the monitoring of antisemitic incidents in a context marked by a significant increase in attacks against Jewish targets in the early twenty-first century and by institutional difficulties in identifying when hostility toward Israel or Zionism constituted antisemitism (Baker; Berger; Whine, 2021).

After more than a decade of collective elaboration by Jewish communities, intellectuals, and European institutions, it was subsequently adopted by the IHRA at its plenary session of May 26, 2016, while preserving its original structure and illustrative examples. The IHRA formulation thus consolidated more than a decade of institutional efforts to understand antisemitism in its contemporary forms.

An important feature of the IHRA examples is that it does not state that they are antisemitism, but rather that they could be, “taking into account the overall context.” The definition calls for judgment: who said it, how it was said, and with what intent.

Debate surrounding its adoption stimulated the emergence of other conceptual proposals, such as the Nexus Document and the Jerusalem Declaration.

The Nexus Definition

The Nexus definition was developed by a specialized academic working group, the Nexus Task Force, created in 2019 with the objective of examining the intersection between antisemitism, Israel, and Zionism in the North American political context (Nelson, 2024). Initially linked to the Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College, the initiative opted for a specialist-based drafting model, unlike documents grounded in large-scale signature campaigns (Nelson, 2021). After the publication of a White Paper in December 2020, The Nexus Document was released in February 2021 as an analytical instrument aimed at policymakers, educators, and community leaders.

The proposal was often interpreted as a “complement” to the IHRA definition, seeking to clarify ambiguities in the boundary between legitimate political criticism and antisemitic manifestations, especially in debates about Israel (Nelson, 2021; Nelson, 2024). The document defines antisemitism as “anti-Jewish beliefs, attitudes, actions or systemic conditions,” including discriminatory practices that significantly impede Jews’ ability to participate as equals in social and political life (Nexus Task Force, 2024, p. 1).

In 2024, it underwent changes. In addition to moving to the University of Southern California (USC), it received updates in the context of rising antisemitic incidents and transformations in public debate, which some analysts viewed as an expansion of its distance from the IHRA.

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA)

The JDA, published in March 2021, emerged as an international academic initiative associated with the Van Leer Institute, bringing together more than 200 scholars in Jewish studies, Holocaust studies, Middle Eastern studies, and related fields (JDA, 2021). Unlike the IHRA definition, which has been adopted by governments and intergovernmental organizations, the JDA presented itself as an academic document on the relationship between antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document was created as a direct response to the IHRA Working Definition, adopted in 2016, presenting itself as an alternative intended either to replace it or to guide its interpretation (JDA, 2021; Nelson, 2021).

The stated motivation of the JDA’s authors was the perception that the IHRA definition is “unclear in key respects and widely open to different interpretations,” which, in their view, was causing confusion, generating controversy, and consequently weakening the struggle against antisemitism (JDA, 2021). The drafters of the JDA argued that the IHRA placed an “undue emphasis” on a single arena, given that 7 of the 11 examples in the IHRA document focus on the State of Israel (JDA, 2021).

On the Convergences Among the Definitions

Amid the heated debate over the boundaries of political discourse regarding Israel, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that there is a fundamental consensus among the IHRA, the JDA, and Nexus on what constitutes the core of hatred against Jews. Although they diverge in important respects, the three definitions converge on several significant elements.

- **The rejection of classical tropes and conspiracy theories:** all three definitions agree that the use of traditional antisemitic stereotypes, myths, and images constitutes hate speech, regardless of political context, including when used to describe the actions or essence of the State of Israel.
- **Collective responsibility:** all definitions explicitly stipulate that it is antisemitic to hold Jews, whether as a people or as individuals, responsible for the actions and policies of the State of Israel. This seeks to combat the tendency to require Jews in the diaspora to publicly “condemn” Israel as a precondition for being accepted in progressive social or political spaces, a practice specifically listed as antisemitic by the JDA.
- **Holocaust denial and distortion:** there is no divergence regarding the historicity of the Nazi genocide. Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms, or intentionality of the Holocaust is classified as antisemitism both by the IHRA and by the JDA.
- **Direct violence and discrimination:** although the definitions debate “speech,” they are unanimous with regard to physical acts and material discrimination.
- **Physical attacks:** attacking, assaulting, or physically harming Jews, or people perceived as such, is unquestionably antisemitic.
- **Attacks on institutions:** damaging Jewish schools, synagogues, or cemeteries is classified as an antisemitic act in all the guidelines.
- **Discrimination:** denying services, employment, or opportunities to someone because they are Jewish is the baseline definition of antisemitic discrimination in all these documents.
- **The application of old tropes to Israel:** there is convergence in recognizing that criticizing Israel through classical antisemitic tropes is unacceptable. For example, portraying Israel or Israelis through hooked-nose caricatures, associating them with avarice, greed, or the “murder of children” (echoing the blood libel), an essentially parasitic and exploitative impulse, an inherently sectarian or racist essence, imputations of a plot to dominate the media, governments, finance, culture, or simply the whole world, and the direct association of Jews with the “forces of evil,” are considered antisemitic by all three definitions.

The **IHRA** definition is categorical in identifying myths of a “world Jewish conspiracy” and allegations regarding the collective power of Jews—such as control of the media or the economy—as central markers of antisemitism, regardless of political context (IHRA, 2016).

Likewise, the **Nexus** document classifies as antisemitic the promotion of myths about Israel derived from classical tropes, specifically the characterization of the State as part of a “sinister world conspiracy of Jewish control” (Nexus Task Force, 2024, p. 1).

As for the **JDA**, although the document is often criticized for shielding antisemitic anti-Zionist rhetoric, it does not diminish the seriousness of classical conspiratorial hatred. In Guideline 2, the JDA defines as antisemitic the idea that “Jews are linked to the forces of evil,” while Guideline 6 condemns the application of such symbols and stereotypes to the State of Israel (JDA, 2021).

From Divergences to Critiques of Accommodation of Contemporary Antisemitism

Conceptualization of Antisemitism

IHRA: understands antisemitism as “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews” (IHRA, 2016, p. 1).

This formulation—“a certain perception”—is fundamental to understanding the analytical utility of the definition, because it shifts the focus from isolated acts to the cognitive structure that motivates them. The choice of the term “perception” indicates that antisemitism should not be understood merely as a passing emotion, but as a specific way of interpreting social and political reality. Harrison and Klaff (2021) argue that limiting antisemitism exclusively to hostility or hatred conceived as a mere “mental state” is insufficient. For these authors, the phenomenon also encompasses a “cultural artifact” or a “pseudo-explanatory political theory,” capable of offering apparently coherent interpretations of complex social events.

From this perspective, “a certain perception” refers to the tendency to project onto Jews responsibility for crises, conflicts, and social transformations perceived as threatening. Antisemitism thus often operates as a conspiratorial structure of thought: when international politics, the economy, or the social order do not correspond to the expectations of certain groups, causality is attributed to a supposed hidden Jewish influence. By emphasizing the perceptive dimension of the phenomenon, the IHRA definition makes it possible to identify antisemitic manifestations even where there are no direct insults or immediate physical violence, but where discourse and narratives begin to represent Jews—or, in certain contexts, the State of Israel conceived as a Jewish collective—as a malevolent, manipulative, or conspiratorial force.

The phrase “which may be expressed as hatred” is another crucial point. Critics argue that this vagueness complicates legal application, since it would require proof of hateful intent (Harrison; Klaff, 2021). Supporters of the IHRA, however, argue that this flexibility is necessary precisely because modern antisemitism often disguises itself. Antisemitic “perception” need not amount to conscious visceral hatred. It may instead consist in the reproduction of stereotypes, or tropes, regarding Jewish power, greed, or bloodlust, applied to new contexts.

Nexus: broadens the interpretive scope by characterizing antisemitism as “anti-Jewish beliefs, attitudes, actions, or systemic conditions,” including situations that “discriminate against Jews and significantly impede their ability to participate as equals in political, religious, cultural, economic, or social life” (Nexus Task Force, 2024, p. 1).

JDA: defines the phenomenon as “discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)” (JDA, 2021, p. 2).

Although apparently clear, the formulation “Jews as Jews” has been pointed to by critics as potentially reductionist and anachronistic, for failing fully to capture the ideological mutations of contemporary antisemitism. The main criticism is that defining the phenomenon strictly as hostility against “Jews as Jews” tends to identify it only as a mental state or emotional

disposition, leaving structural, discursive, and ideological dimensions of modern antisemitism in the background.

From this perspective, contemporary antisemitism often operates as a cultural artifact or a pseudo-explanatory political theory: the antisemitic actor need not necessarily express personal hatred toward the concrete Jewish individual, but may instead direct hostility toward a supposed conspiracy or structure of power projected onto the Jewish collective. By requiring that hostility be explicitly directed at the Jew as such, the JDA formula may create a difficult evidentiary barrier of intentionality, potentially failing to recognize discourses that mobilize antisemitic tropes without declaring explicit hatred of Jewish identity, which is particularly troubling.

It is also important to recall that antisemitism has historically shown great plasticity, adapting itself to the political and cultural languages of each era. Anti-Jewish hatred has often been expressed through substitute categories: Jews have been attacked not “as Jews,” but as “killers of Christ,” “killers of children,” “usurers,” “bankers,” “capitalists,” or “communists.” In the contemporary context, one frequently observes the substitution of the term “Jew” by “Zionist,” allowing traditional antisemitic representations to be reproduced without direct reference to Jewish identity.

In this sense, a formulation centered on “Jews as Jews” may leave the definition vulnerable to illicit discourses of the type: “we have nothing against Jews as Jews, only against Zionists,” or “against certain power structures,” even when such discourses mobilize antisemitic repertoires. By concentrating on the essence of identity (“as Jews”), the JDA risks failing fully to capture contemporary forms of hostility projected onto Zionism or onto the State of Israel as a Jewish state, especially when these forms do not explicitly name Jews as the direct target.

Moreover, the insistence on the formula “Jews as Jews” raises relevant questions about the possibility of antisemitic attacks directed against the State of Israel, which, as a Jewish national state, may become the object of accusations reproducing historical patterns of collective demonization.

Whereas the IHRA definition and the Nexus definition explicitly recognize this possibility—albeit conditioned on context—the JDA tends to establish a more rigid separation between the political and the ethno-religious, which, according to its critics, may make it more difficult to identify certain contemporary manifestations of the phenomenon.

The JDA speaks of antisemitism against “Jews as Jews” and “Jewish institutions as Jewish,” but does not conceive of the possibility that Zionism may be attacked “as Jewish nationalism” and Israel as a “Jewish state.”

Israel, Zionism, and Antizionism

This is the area in which the definitions diverge most sharply, especially regarding what constitutes legitimate discourse as opposed to hate speech.

IHRA: considers that denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination may be antisemitic.

When analyzing this example, caution is necessary, since it is sometimes cited incompletely. Critics claim that the IHRA defines as antisemitic simply “[claiming] that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.” The full sentence in the definition reads: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.”

What is at issue here is not criticism of particular state policies, but an essentialist reading of the political self-determination of the Jewish people, something not applied to any other people. In this sense, the example in the definition seeks to indicate that denying the collective right of self-determination specifically to Jews, when this denial is not applied to other peoples, may constitute a pattern of political discrimination akin to contemporary forms of antisemitism.

Historically, antisemitism has portrayed Jews as agents and disseminators of evil. When Zionism is demonized, that demonization functions as an instrument for normalizing hostility against Jews on account of their cultural, emotional, or spiritual connection to Zionism, regardless of how plural and diverse that movement may be. This phenomenon occurs especially when contemporary Jewish identity is reduced to a supposedly homogeneous political essence, transforming the relationship of Jewish individuals or collectivities to Israel into a criterion for collective suspicion.

In this way, the IHRA definition does not serve—and should not serve—to silence criticism of Israel, unless such criticism is conditional upon denying Jewish-Israeli self-determination. Indeed, the IHRA itself states that “...criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

Moreover, and as already noted, the definition does not say that its examples are antisemitism, but that they could be, and that one must take “into account the overall context,” making a judgment as to who said it, how it was said, under what circumstances, and with what intention. Thus, the document functions less as an automatic normative instrument and more as an interpretive guide meant to orient contextualized analysis and well-grounded institutional decisions.

Finally, the IHRA definition does not use the words “Zionism” or “anti-Zionism” in its core text or illustrative examples. By avoiding these political labels, the document does not seek to police ideological identities, but rather to describe specific behaviors and rhetorical forms.

JDA: states that criticizing or opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism is not antisemitic. It explicitly asserts that support for institutional arrangements in which the Jewish state would cease to exist is not antisemitic, without mentioning the word self-determination.

The JDA approach deliberately avoids the political term “self-determination” and replaces it with a formulation centered on human flourishing. In Guideline 10, the JDA classifies as antisemitic the denial of the right of “Jews in the State of Israel” to “exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews, in accordance with the principle of equality” (JDA, 2021). For critics of this formulation, the choice of the verb “flourish” instead of “self-determination” is a calculated omission. Nelson argues that the JDA legitimizes the denial of the right to self-determination “under the pretense of offering multiple constitutional options,” characterizing as a “disguised

or illusory fantasy” the premise that Jews could genuinely exist and flourish in safety as a minority deprived of national power in the Middle East (Nelson, 2021). Historian Jeffrey Herf (2021) reinforces this view by observing that the JDA ignores the fact that dismantling the State of Israel in favor of alternative arrangements would run up against insurmountable political realities—such as the existential antagonism of Hamas and Hezbollah—and would endorse policies likely to lead to the “death and expulsion of perhaps millions of Jews.”

Nexus: occupies an intermediate position, though it leans toward permissiveness. It states that opposition to Zionism does not necessarily reflect anti-Jewish animus and may instead be motivated by anti-nationalism or personal experiences of conflict. However, it regards as antisemitic the denial of the right to self-determination exclusively to Jews, or the advocacy of solutions that would deny Jews physical security.

Comparisons with Nazism

IHRA: explicitly identifies as an example of antisemitism “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”

The classification of comparisons between contemporary Israeli policy and Nazism as antisemitic is one of the most contested and, at the same time, essential aspects of the IHRA Working Definition. The principal reason why the comparison between Israel and Nazism is considered antisemitic lies in the concept of “Holocaust inversion.” Calling Israel the “new Third Reich” or Israelis the “new Nazis” constitutes a moral mechanism that frames Israel as the absolute evil of its time, a demonizing rhetoric. It implicitly demands the destruction of the Jewish state on the pretext that it represents a common evil of humanity, just as the Nazis did in the 1940s, thereby equating it with the perpetrators of the genocide of the Jewish people (Johnson, 2021).

From a historical perspective, this analogy entails a substantial distortion of the nature of Nazism. Hitler’s regime constituted a totalitarian system grounded in a genocidal racial ideology, which organized in a planned and industrial manner the extermination of millions of Jews through a state apparatus specifically directed toward the systematic destruction of the Jewish people (cf. Jäckel, 1972; Postone, 2021).

Equating the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict—marked by territorial, national, and security disputes—with the project of total extermination of the Jewish people establishes a false moral equivalence. Dave Rich (2021) and other authors argue that this type of comparison also operates as a form of provocation directed at Jews. The use of symbols such as the swastika or terminology associated with Nazism is described as a strategy intended to “inflict maximum pain,” mobilizing deep historical traumas not to qualify political debate, but to provoke emotional reaction and strike at Jewish identity (Rich, 2021; Johnson, 2021).

This discursive operation corresponds to what the literature on contemporary antisemitism terms “demonization,” understood as the transformation of the political adversary into the embodiment of absolute evil. Nelson (2021) observes that this comparison seeks to establish an artificial moral equivalence that may imply, implicitly, the legitimization of the elimination of the State of Israel, since a regime qualified as “Nazi” would not be conceived as open to reform, but only to destruction. By shifting the conflict from the political plane to the plane of metaphysical evil, this rhetoric tends to render negotiated solutions impossible, since it

starts from the premise that dialogue with what is presented as absolutely evil is inadmissible. In this sense, such accusations “do not contribute to serious political debate,” amounting instead to formulas of demonization and politically oriented defamation (Harrison; Klaff, 2021).

Throughout history, Jews have repeatedly been represented as the embodiment of absolute evil. In medieval Christendom, this demonization took the form of the accusation of deicide and the symbolic association of Jews with the devil, portraying them as spiritual enemies of humanity. In modernity, Nazi racial antisemitism secularized this logic, redefining Jews as biological enemies of civilization and justifying their extermination as a supposedly redemptive historical mission. In the contemporary context, it is not analytically irrelevant that the Jewish state is, in certain political discourses, described as the absolute evil of the international system and compared precisely to the regime responsible for the genocide of the Jewish people themselves. This recurrence suggests the persistence of the same symbolic pattern: the historical transfer of the figure of “absolute evil”—once attributed to the Jew as an individual or religious collective—to the contemporary Jewish collective, often represented in the form of the State of Israel.

JDA: states that comparing Israel with “other historical cases” (including implicitly Nazism and explicitly apartheid) is not, “in and of itself,” antisemitic, even if it is contentious.

The central criticism of the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism on this point lies in its refusal to establish an explicit red line against equating Israel with Nazism. Cary Nelson (2021) argues that this choice produces an interpretive ambiguity that can function as a “signaling obfuscation,” insofar as it avoids direct condemnation of analogies frequently associated with the phenomenon of “Holocaust inversion.”

Although the JDA maintains that historical comparisons are not antisemitic per se and that political discourse need not be “reasonable” in order to be protected, critics argue that this formulation may permit the normalization of extreme analogies, such as the trope “Zionist = Nazi,” by failing to recognize clearly enough the role such comparisons play in contemporary processes of demonizing the Jewish state and in transforming the historical victims of genocide into their own imagined executioners.

Moreover, the JDA has been criticized for its maximalist view of freedom of expression. By establishing in Guideline 15 that speech need not be “measured, proportional, moderate or reasonable to be protected” and that “excessive or contentious” criticism is not in itself antisemitic (JDA, 2021), the JDA disregards the legal and moral principle that defamation and racism are not protected by guarantees of freedom of expression (Klaff; Spitz, 2021).

Ironically, by adopting this permissive posture, the JDA ends up aligning itself with the maximalist conception of freedom of expression embraced by right-wing extremists, who frequently invoke it in order to normalize the use of Nazi symbolism in public discourse and to spread prejudice (Nelson, 2021). This equivalence demonstrates the danger of an approach that exempts extreme discourse from responsibility: by tolerating intemperate and “unfair” rhetoric against the Jewish state in the name of free debate, including the mobilization of Nazi symbolism, the JDA fails to protect minorities and endorses the same argumentative tactic historically used by racist movements to legitimize intolerance under the veneer of individual liberty (Harrison; Klaff, 2021; Nelson, 2021).

Nexus: does not explicitly list comparisons with Nazis as antisemitic in its main examples of “what is antisemitic,” focusing instead on not treating Israel differently solely because it is Jewish.

Double Standards

The issue of “double standards” is one of the clearest dividing lines among the three definitions.

IHRA: is the strictest on this point, proceeding from the premise that treating the Jewish state differently from other democracies may be a modern manifestation of the discriminatory treatment historically directed against Jews as individuals.

The defense of this position holds that racism and antisemitism consist precisely in demanding from one group behavior that is not demanded from others. If Israel is singled out for boycotts or condemnation for actions that are ignored or tolerated in other democracies or autocracies engaging in equal or similar conduct, this may be viewed as an indication of anti-Jewish prejudice.

As already noted, the definition explicitly states that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” In other words, criticism is permitted, provided it is not applied exclusively to Israel in a discriminatory manner.

Nexus: seeks to refine the discussion by distinguishing between “disproportionate attention” (which may have legitimate political reasons) and “different treatment” based on Jewish identity.

Nexus states that “Paying disproportionate attention to Israel and treating Israel differently than other countries is not *prima facie* proof of antisemitism.” The document justifies this by pointing to possible non-racist reasons for such focus, such as the “special relationship with the United States” or the fact that Israel receives billions in American aid, which may generate greater scrutiny on the part of American taxpayers.

At the same time, Nexus draws a red line: “It is antisemitic to treat Israel differently solely because it is a Jewish state, using standards different from those applied to other countries.”

JDA: in order to protect freedom of expression and anti-Zionist activism (such as BDS), the JDA dissociates the concept of “double standards” from antisemitism.

Guideline 15 of the JDA states that “Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a ‘double standard,’ is not, in and of itself, antisemitic.”

The JDA argues that “political speech does not need to be measured, proportional, moderate or reasonable to be protected.” For its authors, it is natural for activists to focus on specific conflicts.

Critics point out that the JDA itself applies a double standard in its own text: in Guideline 11, it supports the Palestinian demand for “national rights,” but in Guideline 10, when referring to Jews, it omits the word “national,” mentioning only “collective” rights, thereby suggesting that denying Jewish national self-determination—but not Palestinian self-determination—is acceptable.

On the Presumed Convergences in the Application to Antisemitic Groups: Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis

The analysis of the classification of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis under the three principal definitions of antisemitism—IHRA, Nexus, and JDA—reveals another point of practical convergence, albeit grounded in distinct theoretical premises. Although academic and political debate tends to focus on the “gray areas” surrounding criticism of Israel, the ideological and operational nature of these extremist groups places them beyond the boundaries of protected political discourse in all three frameworks.

Genocidal Ideology and the Use of Violence

The **IHRA** explicitly classifies as antisemitic “calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion” (IHRA, 2016).

Nexus, in turn, defines as antisemitic “advocating a political solution that denies Jews the right to define themselves as a people... and/or denying them the right to physical security” (Nexus Task Force, 2024).

The **JDA**, for its part, establishes that it is antisemitic to “deny the right of Jews in the State of Israel to exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews, in accordance with the principle of equality” (JDA, 2021).

In sum, although the three definitions diverge on where to draw the line in cases involving university activists or critics of the Israeli government, they converge in the classification of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Under the **IHRA**, they are antisemitic because they mobilize classical demonological tropes, act in the name of a radical anti-Jewish ideology, and deny Jewish self-determination. Under the **JDA**, their classification derives from their denial of the basic right of Jews to “exist and flourish” (Guideline 10) and from their expression of hostility toward “Jews as Jews,” as evidenced, for example, by the curse invoked in the slogan displayed on the Houthi flag. Finally, under **Nexus**, condemnation follows from the direct threat to physical security and the advocacy of political solutions that deny rights on the basis of Jewish identity.

4.1 Definition and Categories of Antisemitism Employed in this Report

This report adopts the working definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA, 2016) as its primary normative reference. The definition states:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

The IHRA definition also provides a list of examples to guide classification (available via the QR code alongside and [HERE](#)).



At the methodological level, the report has been analytically structured in order to **expand areas of convergence with the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism** (JDA, 2021), particularly in recognizing that criticism of the State of Israel constitutes antisemitism when it is formulated on the basis of classical anti-Jewish stereotypes or discursive repertoires historically associated with hostility toward Jews (JDA Guideline 6).

With regard to the protection afforded by the JDA to the advocacy of “alternative constitutional arrangements” in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea—provided that the right of Jews “to exist and flourish, collectively and individually, as Jews” is preserved—this report understands that convergence between the two frameworks may be possible, depending on the interpretation attributed to the concept of “flourishing.” The position adopted here is that human flourishing presupposes that individuals and groups are not only able to develop their capacities, but also to orient that development **according to ends they recognize as their own. Self-determination, in this sense, constitutes a structural condition of flourishing:** without some degree of political self-direction, development remains heteronomous and incomplete (Rasmussen, 1999).

Accordingly, substantive compatibility between the JDA and the IHRA can be identified if the JDA’s notion of “exist and flourish” is interpreted as encompassing the right to Jewish self-determination; otherwise, a relevant normative divergence emerges.

There is, however, disagreement with the JDA regarding the protection it affords to imputations of genocide against the State of Israel and to the use of analogies with Nazism. This report aligns strictly with the IHRA definition, which classifies the comparison of Israel to the Nazi regime as an inherently antisemitic manifestation (IHRA, 2016).

Structured within this normative framework, **the typology of antisemitic manifestations** developed for this report is grounded in the analytical model proposed by the study *Decoding Antisemitism* (Becker et al., 2024). This model conceptualizes antisemitism as a discursive

phenomenon, based on the **systematic identification of recurring tropes, stereotypes, and analogies, as well as their interrelations, historical adaptations, and reconfigurations.**

The categories employed in this report to interpret a discourse or action as antisemitic are as follows.

Categories of Expression of Antisemitism:

1. Aggressive speech acts: Encompasses manifestations of verbal violence intended to offend, intimidate, or wish harm upon Jews—as well as Israelis or Zionists when identified as Jews or characterized through stereotypes typical of classical antisemitism. It includes five main modalities: (i) insults, aimed at disqualifying, humiliating, or dehumanizing the target; (ii) threats, characterized by announcements or warnings of future harm, whether physical or psychological; (iii) curses, understood as wishes of misfortune or suffering attributed to higher forces or fate; (iv) expressions of death wishes, explicit or implicit; and (v) endorsement or incitement to violence, when there is support for, justification of, or direct calls for physical aggression against Jews—or against Israelis and Zionists targeted on account of their Jewish identity or attributes traditionally mobilized by antisemitic discourse.

2. Essentializations and generalizations: Essentialization occurs when negative characteristics—typically greed, avarice, immorality, inhumanity, disloyalty or dual loyalty, sectarianism, repulsiveness, artificiality, or malice, among others—are attributed to Jews as innate, biological, or immutable cultural traits, rather than as individual or contextual behaviors. Generalization consists in extending real or imagined actions of a Jewish individual to all Jews, treating them as a homogeneous group and disregarding their internal diversity of identities, political positions, and experiences.

3. Conspiratorial attributions of power to Jews: Unlike other forms of racism that portray minority groups as inferior, antisemitism often depicts Jews as holders of excessive, omnipotent, and oppressive power. This category encompasses conspiracy theories according to which Jews control politics, the economy, the media, or international institutions for malicious purposes. Narratives such as the “Great Replacement,” the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, or the “Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG)” are recurrent examples of this type of discourse, which presents Jews as an existential threat to non-Jewish society, acting in a coordinated, hidden, and global manner.

4. Anti-Zionism: Refers to forms of antisemitism that manifest through attacks on Israel and Zionism in which symbols, images, and stereotypes typical of classical antisemitism are projected onto the State, such as associations with forces of evil, essentializing accusations of racism or sectarianism, impulses of exploitation, appropriation or parasitism, accusations of child murder as an expression of a supposed Jewish or Zionist nature, and global conspiracy narratives. It includes the explicit or implicit advocacy of constitutional arrangements alternative to the State of Israel in which Jews would not be able to exist or exercise self-determination as individuals or as a collective. It also encompasses the collective attribution of responsibility to Jews for the actions of the State of Israel, the treatment of Jewish individuals as agents of Israel on the basis of their Jewish identity, the use of the term “Zionist” as a euphemism or substitute for “Jew,” and the requirement that Jews publicly condemn Israel or Zionism as a condition for moral or political acceptance. Political slogans

such as “Free Palestine” are not antisemitic a priori, but may be considered as such when directed at Jewish individuals, groups, or institutions with the aim of intimidation. Criticism of Israeli government policies is not antisemitism.

5. Glorification and affirmation of antisemitic individuals and groups: Includes positive expressions regarding figures, groups, regimes, or ideologies historically associated with hatred against Jews, aimed at intimidation or aggression. This encompasses both extremist political organizations and religious fundamentalist groups whose ideology incorporates antisemitic elements. The glorification of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis falls within this category, as the ideological justification of their actions goes beyond political or territorial dispute and is grounded in a worldview in which “the Jew” is presented as an absolute enemy, associated with an inherent and irreconcilable evil, against which violence is legitimized and conceived as a moral or religious duty.

6. Glorification, affirmation, and instrumentalization of Nazism: This category encompasses all expressions that use references to Nazism or elements of its rhetoric with the explicit or implicit intent of aggression against Jews. It operates along two main lines. The first is Nazi analogy, which inverts the historical reality of the Holocaust by equating Jews or the State of Israel with Nazis, producing a reversal of victimhood that demonizes Israel and relativizes the crimes of Nazism. The second is the affirmation or glorification, whether direct or “coded,” of Nazism, characterized by the positive use of symbols, salutes, language, or ideology associated with the Third Reich with the aim of intimidating Jews or expressing support for or agreement with their extermination. It also includes Holocaust denial and trivialization (often expressed simultaneously with its glorification). In all these cases, the specific trauma of the attempted extermination of the Jewish people, justified by a worldview particularly hostile to Jews, is instrumentalized against its historical victims with the aim of causing maximum harm and offense.

5. REPORTS AND INCIDENTS

Reports of antisemitism are received through multiple channels and may be submitted by individuals or institutions. Available means include forms on the websites of CONIB, FISESP, FIERJ, FIRS, and other Federations; CONIB's Antisemitism Reporting Portal; telephone contacts and WhatsApp messages directed to Community Security Departments (DSCs); emails sent to representative Jewish organizations; and in-person reports made to their staff.

Upon receipt, each report is formally recorded and undergoes an initial assessment. Only incidents whose antisemitic character can be established based on the categories adopted in this report are included. Records falling outside this scope or identified as duplicates are archived—for example, criticism of the Government of Israel. Each incident is documented only once, including cases in which the same online content is reported by multiple individuals, thereby avoiding statistical distortions.

Following screening, incidents are classified according to **three main dimensions: environment (online or offline), classification of the occurrence (“what happened?”), and classification of antisemitic content (“what was said or implied?”)**. In offline cases, the location of the incident is recorded; in online cases, the platform or social network involved is identified and, where possible, the city of origin of the content or report. With regard to the type of occurrence, categories include **physical aggression or intent to cause harm; verbal aggression (oral or written); incitement to hatred; disinformation; vandalism; urban crime; and others**. As for antisemitic content, **the cumulative presence of the following is identified: aggressive speech acts; essentializations or generalizations; conspiratorial attributions of power to Jews; Antizionism; glorification or affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups; and glorification, affirmation, or instrumentalization of Nazism against Jews**.

Reports are then **processed and prioritized according to the level of risk identified**, ensuring prompt handling of the most sensitive cases. Measures adopted may include **review by CONIB's legal committee, referral to law enforcement authorities, and direction to victim support initiatives or to political and educational responses**.

This procedure seeks to ensure consistent responses to reported incidents while simultaneously enabling the systematic monitoring of antisemitism in Brazil.


Underreporting Data

Behavioral data from within the community itself help explain why not all cases reach reporting channels. According to the survey **“Perceptions of the Jewish Community on Identity, Lived Experience, and Antisemitism in Brazil”**, although there is a high level of trust in community institutions (such as CONIB and the DSCs), **many reactions remain in the private sphere even when incidents are witnessed**. In the face of an antisemitic episode, the most common response (reported by **59.21%** of respondents) is simply to **share the occurrence with family and friends**, meaning that the incident is not formally reported, not even within the community's internal structures.

The figures presented do **not correspond to the total number of incidents occurring in the country, but only to those reported to CONIB, the Federations, and the DSCs**. Not every incident involves identifiable victims or perpetrators, but there is always a reporting individual who considered the event relevant. The data therefore constitute a **non-exhaustive indicator of the perception of security within the Jewish community and of structural trends in the phenomenon, whose underreporting is also recognized in the international literature**.

Similarly, the **total number of online incidents reflects exclusively the reports received and does not encompass the broader circulation of antisemitic material on social media**. Even so, each report contributes to a more precise understanding of the nature and scale of antisemitism in Brazil and helps guide actions aimed at protecting and supporting Jewish life in the country.

5.1 Key figures



Historical series

Until September 2023, the volume of antisemitism reports remained relatively stable. During this period, the monthly number of records stayed below one hundred, ranging from a **minimum of 19 to a maximum of 73 reports per month**. **This pattern changed abruptly starting in October 2023, with a significant peak in November of the same year, when the highest number of reports in the historical series was recorded.**

The total number of reports in **2023** reached **1,410 records**, indicating a significant increase compared to 2022, though still below the escalation observed in 2024. In **2024**, a total of **1,788 antisemitism reports** were recorded, representing an **increase of approximately 35% compared to 2022** and consolidating the year as the most critical in the series in terms of absolute volume.

2025

In **2025**, a **reduction in extreme peaks of reports is observed compared to 2023 and 2024**. Nevertheless, levels **remain substantially higher than those recorded up to 2022**. Throughout 2025, a total of **1,428 reports or occurrences were recorded**, of which **989 were classified as containing expressions of antisemitism**, while 439 were dismissed after analysis. The volume of valid reports in 2025 represents a **decrease of 44.7% compared to 2024**, but an **increase of 149.1% compared to 2022**, the baseline year of the historical series.

On a monthly basis in 2025, the number of reports ranged from a **minimum of 46 to a maximum of 138 records per month**. The most significant increases were associated with critical events of international repercussion, such as the attacks involving Israel and Iran in June 2025, **suggesting a relationship between the volume of reports and high-tension geopolitical contexts**.

Year	Annual Total	Daily Average
2022	397	1.9
2023	1,410	3.86
2024	1,788	4.90
2025	989	2.71

The growth in the volume of reports throughout the historical series is reflected in the daily average of records. **In 2022, the average was 1.09 reports per day. In 2023, this figure increased to 3.86 daily reports, reaching 4.90 in 2024. In 2025, the daily average of valid reports was 2.71, remaining 149% above the levels observed at the beginning of the series, but 44.7% lower than in the previous year.**

A New Normal?
The Comparative International Experience

International data available up to the closing of this report indicate that **the sharp rise in antisemitic incidents after 2023 did not constitute a temporary phenomenon, but rather the consolidation of a new structural baseline**. In **Australia**, 1,654 incidents were recorded in 2025, representing a 19.7% decrease compared to 2024, yet still at a level approximately three times higher than that observed prior to the war (ECAJ, 2025). In **France**, 1,320 recorded acts—an average exceeding 3.5 per day—confirm the persistence of the critical plateau reached in the previous two years, moving away from the “mere hundreds” recorded annually until 2022 (Crif, 2026). The **United Kingdom** recorded 3,700 incidents in 2025, a 4% increase compared to 2024 and more than double the 2022 figure, with a monthly average of 308 cases (CST, 2026). **Italy** shows a continuous upward trajectory, rising from 241 incidents in 2022 to 963 in 2025, nearly quadrupling its pre-conflict levels (CDEC, 2026).

In **Brazil**, although 2025 recorded a decline compared to the peak observed in 2024, the


volume of reports remains significantly higher than 2022 levels, indicating a similar trend of an elevated baseline. Taken together, **the data suggest that the initial surge in incidents has given way to a scenario of stabilization at a higher level, characterizing a “new normal” marked by the structural persistence of antisemitism.**

Discarded Reports

Comparative Table of Discarded Reports (2022–2025)

Year	Reports Received	Reports Discarded	Reports Considered	% Discarded
2022	490	93	397	18.98%
2023	2,113	703	1,410	33.27%
2024	3,167	1,379	1,788	43.55%
2025	1,428	439	989	30.74%

The **439 reports discarded in 2025** were excluded for different reasons: duplication of records (141 cases), absence of identifiable antisemitic content (216 cases), insufficient information regarding the reported event or discourse (68 cases), and inconclusive assessments (14 cases).



Hypotheses for the Decline in the Number of Reports

The reduction in the number of reports in 2025 may be interpreted in light of complementary and non-exhaustive factors. First, there was a decrease in the peaks associated with periods of heightened geopolitical tension in 2023 and 2024. Although the overall volume declined, it remained 149.1% above the 2022 baseline, indicating a possible stabilization at an elevated level—a “new normal.”


Second, data from the survey **“Perceptions of the Jewish Community on Identity, Lived Experience, and Antisemitism in Brazil”** help to explain the impact of underreporting and what may be described as “reporting fatigue.” Only 32.58% of respondents reported incidents

to support organizations when witnessing an episode, while 59.21% chose to keep the matter within the private sphere. The survey further indicates that 19.27% considered the incident “not serious enough” to report, 14.01% declared a lack of trust in the effectiveness of reporting, 11.84% did not know where to report, 8.05% feared social exposure, and 6.65% reported fear of retaliation. These findings suggest that the recurrence of hostility may raise the subjective threshold of tolerance and discourage the formalization of complaints, particularly in academic and professional environments.

Finally, part of the decline reflects the normalization of information flows following the emergency period. In 2024, 43.55% of the 3,167 raw reports were discarded; in 2025, 1,428 reports were received, with a discard rate of 30.74%. The reduction in duplicate records or reports driven by the crisis environment contributed to the lower final validated volume, without necessarily implying a proportional decrease in the number of incidents experienced.

Incidents by State

In 2025, reports of antisemitism exhibited a significant geographic concentration. São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul together accounted for more than 40% of incidents with an identified location. This distribution reflects, in part, higher population density, the more substantial presence of Jewish communities, and the greater volume of monitored activities in these states.



The territorial classification of reports follows a hierarchical criterion. **Priority is given to the location where the event or discourse effectively occurred.** In the absence of this information—a frequent situation in reports involving online content—the location of the reporting individual is considered, when provided. Only when neither of these references is available is the incident recorded as “no state.”


In 2025, 462 records (46.71%) were classified as “no state,” a proportion largely associated with

incidents in the digital environment, in which the content is not linked to a specific territory and the reporting individual does not provide their location. Among identified states, **São Paulo accounted for 24.06% of reports (238 records), followed by Rio de Janeiro (10.11%; 100 records) and Rio Grande do Sul (6.37%; 63 records).** All other states individually represented less than 4%.

The distribution observed in 2025 follows a pattern similar to that of 2024. In that year, the “no state” category represented 50.34% of reports, followed by São Paulo (24.61%), Rio de Janeiro (9.51%), and Rio Grande do Sul (8.17%), while the remaining states together accounted for 7.37%.

This pattern simultaneously demonstrates the regional concentration of reports and the presence of the phenomenon across the national territory, albeit with lower incidence in several states. The high proportion of records without a defined location underscores **the centrality of the digital environment in the dissemination of antisemitic content and indicates the need for continuous improvement of geographic classification criteria applied to online incidents.**


Reporting Channels used



In 2025, digital channels predominated as the primary means for reporting antisemitic incidents. **WhatsApp was the most frequently used channel (297 reports), followed by the CONIB Antisemitism Reporting Portal (258) and the CONIB website form (248),** which together accounted for a significant share of all submissions. The **FISESP website form (88)** and reports sent by **email to the Community Security Departments (71)** also registered notable volumes.

Other channels were used only residually: forms on affiliated organizations’ websites (17), telephone calls (5), Telegram (3), and in-person reports (2).

The strong concentration in digital channels highlights their central role as the primary gateway for reporting and monitoring incidents in the country, underscoring the need for the continued maintenance and improvement of these tools, both in technological and analytical terms.



In 2025, the majority of reports classified as containing expressions of antisemitism were associated with the online environment. Of the 989 validated incidents, **800 refer to content disseminated on digital platforms**, particularly social media, while **189 relate to events, actions, or discourse occurring offline**. These include physical and verbal assaults against members of the Jewish community, as well as acts of vandalism targeting community buildings, commercial establishments, and private residences.

The historical series from 2022 to 2025 demonstrates the consolidation of this trend. In 2022, 202 online and 195 offline incidents were recorded (total of 397). In 2023, online records reached 1,049 and offline incidents 363 (total of 1,412). In 2024, 1,310 online incidents and 478 offline incidents were recorded (total of 1,788). In 2025, these figures declined to 800 online and 189 offline (total of 989).


The growth observed between 2022 and 2024 was driven primarily by the increase in reports in the digital environment. In 2023, online records grew by 419% compared to 2022, while offline incidents increased by 86% in the same period. In 2024, both environments maintained an upward trajectory, with growth of 25% online and 32% offline.

In 2025, the digital environment remains the primary space for the manifestation of antisemitism monitored through reporting channels. The persistence of offline incidents, in turn, underscores the need for continued attention to episodes involving direct contact, physical risk, and material damage, given their potential severity and immediate impact on the security of the community.

Online environment – Main platforms

In 2025, reports of antisemitism in the online environment were primarily concentrated on major social media platforms. Of the 800 recorded incidents, **Instagram led with 297 cases (37.13%)**, followed by **Twitter/X (111; 13.88%)** and **Facebook (93; 11.63%)**.

Other platforms also registered a relevant share, including **YouTube (54; 6.75%)** and **WhatsApp (33; 4.13%)**. Platforms such as Threads (27; 3.38%), TikTok (15; 1.88%), Telegram (12; 1.50%), Bluesky (5; 0.63%), and Discord (2; 0.25%) indicate **the presence of the phenomenon across emerging networks and diverse digital environments**.



The category “Uncategorized,” which comprises 151 reports (18.88%), includes cases in which it was not possible to identify the originating platform, as well as content published outside social media, such as websites, blogs, forums, and emails. This proportion reflects inherent limitations in monitoring incidents in the digital environment and points to the need for continuous improvement in registration and classification processes.

5.2 Categorization of Reports

The categorization of reports is structured across **two complementary analytical levels**, each guided by a distinct question. The first concerns the classification of the incident and seeks to answer the question **“what happened?”** The second corresponds to the classification of the identified antisemitic content and addresses the question **“what was said, expressed, or implied?”**.

These levels are related but not identical. **A single incident**—for example, a verbal assault—**may contain multiple categories of antisemitic content**, such as essentializations, dehumanization, attributions of power, or references associated with Nazism. Conversely, **the same type of discourse may manifest across different forms of occurrence**, whether in online or offline environments, including episodes of vandalism, incitement, or direct aggression.

The classification systems are neither mutually exclusive nor interchangeable, as they operate on distinct dimensions of the same record. **The classification of the incident is exclusive:** each report is assigned to a single primary category, determined based on the criterion of greatest severity. By contrast, **the classification of content is cumulative**, allowing a single case to be simultaneously associated with multiple discursive categories.


Classification of Incidents (What Happened?)

Typology

The typology of incidents organizes records according to the nature of the reported event, that is, the concrete form through which the episode manifests itself. At this level, the analysis focuses primarily on actions, situations, or events rather than on the specific ideological content they may involve. The guiding question is: what happened in the reported incident?

The categories, organized in order of severity, are as follows:


- **Physical aggression or threat (intent to cause harm or risk):** This category encompasses acts involving direct physical contact or a concrete threat to the bodily integrity of individuals, when motivated by antisemitism. It includes situations where there is intent to cause harm, intimidation, or physical risk, even in the absence of recorded injuries.
- **Verbal aggression (oral or written):** Refers to offenses, insults, threats, or derogatory expressions directed at individuals identified as Jewish, Jewish institutions, or groups associated with Judaism. These manifestations may occur through direct verbal interaction or through written records, posters, messages, or other material formats, with the identification of a specific target as a central element.
- **Vandalism:** Includes acts of damage, destruction, or graffiti affecting public or private property motivated by antisemitism. It encompasses attacks on religious, community, or institutional spaces, as well as symbols associated with Jewish identity, regardless of the material severity of the damage.
- **Incitement to hatred:** Encompasses manifestations that promote, legitimize, or encourage hostility, discrimination, or violence against Jews as a group, without the need for a specific individual target. It includes antisemitic discourse, messages, symbols, or acts aimed at disseminating or normalizing collective hatred.
- **Disinformation:** Covers the dissemination of false, distorted, or misleading information that defames Jews, whether as a collective or as individuals—Jewish or non-Jewish persons targeted due to their real or presumed association with Judaism. It also includes content that denies, relativizes, or trivializes antisemitism, the Holocaust, or other historical and contemporary forms of persecution of Jews.
- **Urban crime:** Refers to incidents occurring in public spaces classified as common crimes, which do not in themselves constitute antisemitic offenses. They are included in this category when they occur in proximity to Jewish institutions or events and target members of the community or participants in such activities, being monitored by the Community Security Department due to the potential risk involved.
- **Other:** A residual category encompassing reports or records of incidents related to suspicious behavior, objects, or individuals when associated with contexts, locations, or circumstances that suggest a possible antisemitic motivation, even in the absence of confirmation or clear classification within the other categories.



The overall classification of incidents (online and offline) indicates that **incitement to hatred was the most frequent category, with 451 records, followed by misinformation (308) and verbal aggression, oral or written (125)**. The remaining categories showed lower incidence: **vandalism (36), threats with intent to cause harm or risk (15), urban crime (3), undefined (4), and other (41)**. This pattern reveals the predominance of discursive manifestations, in which antisemitism is expressed through hostile narratives, collective accusations, or threats, without necessarily involving direct physical violence.

In Section 5.3 of this Report, we present a selection of reported cases, organized by date, category/type, and location of occurrence.

In the subset restricted to the offline environment, the distribution presents relevant differences. **Incitement to hatred remains the most frequent category (58 cases), followed by misinformation (37) and verbal aggression (30)**. However, categories associated with material damage or concrete risk gain greater relative weight, such as **vandalism (36) and physical aggression (6)**. **Urban crime (3), undefined (1), and other (18)** complete the picture.



Classification of antisemitic content (what was said, expressed, or meant?)

The classification of antisemitic content focuses on the symbolic, discursive, and ideological dimensions of the recorded reports. It is grounded in the working definition of antisemitism of the **International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)** and in the analytical framework of Decoding Antisemitism (Becker et al., 2024). Its purpose is to identify how antisemitism is expressed at the level of discourse, regardless of the concrete form of the incident.

At this level, the central question is not “what happened?”, but rather **“what type of antisemitism was expressed?”** The analysis centers on the meaning of the communicated content—whether in a message, discourse, symbol, or narrative. The categories are as follows: **(i) aggressive speech acts; (ii) essentializations and generalizations; (iii) conspiratorial attributions of power to Jews; (iv) Antizionism; (v) endorsement and affirmation of antisemitic individuals and groups; (vi) endorsement, affirmation, and instrumentalization of Nazism.**

The classification is cumulative: a single record may be simultaneously associated with multiple discursive categories. For illustrative purposes, consider a hypothetical, “ideal-typical” example in which all categories are combined within a single statement:


“I hope Hamas finishes what the Austrian painter could not, since Jews control the media, the banks, and governments through secret bonds of loyalty among themselves linked to ‘Israel’.”

This statement brings together all the categories of antisemitism adopted in this report. Real cases may combine between one and six categories of antisemitic expression.

This approach makes it possible to understand not only the frequency of reports, but also the quality and structure of the antisemitism expressed, providing elements for an analysis of antisemitic discourse.

Antisemitic content identified in the reports

The graph presented illustrates the **incidence of the different categories of antisemitic content identified in the reported cases.**



The analysis indicates that **Antizionism constitutes the most recurrent category, present in 696 records (70.8% of the sample).** It is followed by **essentializations and generalizations**—which attribute homogeneous and negative characteristics to Jews as a group—with **512 records (52.1%)**, and **aggressive speech acts**, including insults, threats, and direct incitement to violence, with **504 records (51.3%)**. **References or affirmations related to Nazism** also show significant incidence, with **337 cases (34.3%)**, whether through distorted historical analogies or explicit glorification of Nazi symbols or ideologies.

In Section 5.3 of this Report, we present a selection of reported cases, organized by date, category/ type, and location of occurrence.

Other categories also maintain a significant presence, such as conspiratorial attributions of power to Jews (232; 23.6%), portraying them as hidden agents of political, economic, or media control, and the endorsement of antisemitic individuals or groups (208; 21.2%), indicating the persistence of structured ideological narratives.

Antisemitism as a “grand narrative” about Jews

The analyzed data converge with the characterization proposed by Becker et al. (2024) in *Decoding Antisemitism*, according to which antisemitic discourse is not configured as a set of isolated, episodic offenses, but rather as a network of interconnected stereotypes that, when articulated together, form a “grand narrative” about Jews. Within this cognitive structure, accusations rarely appear independently; instead, they are organized in constellations in which one stereotype serves as the basis for activating others. Imputations such as greed, lust for power, deception, conspiracy, and global domination are linked in ways that produce an appearance of logical coherence, through false connections and paralogisms that simulate rationality and evidence.

In the same sense, anti-Zionist discourse and accusations directed at the State of Israel often operate within this expanded network of stereotypes, in which “Israel” and “Zionism” function as codes for the reactivation of traditional antisemitic tropes. Political criticism becomes associated with narratives that mobilize historical accusations—such as the imputation of ritual child murder or the representation of Jews as the embodiment of absolute evil—as well as conspiratorial theories about global control of governments and the media, and comparisons of the Jewish state to the regime responsible for the Holocaust. The overlap of these elements generates a totalizing narrative that goes beyond criticism of specific government policies and comes to question the very legitimacy of the State of Israel, often affecting Jews more broadly. The aggregation of categories reinforces the internal coherence of the narrative and amplifies its mobilizing potential, by reducing complex conflicts to binary moral schemes and constructing an essentialized and decontextualized representation in which different symbolic elements mutually reinforce one another in a process of demonization.

5.3 Study of Reported Cases

January 5, 2025


THREAT IN MESSAGING APP

Description: An individual participating in a messaging app group (Telegram), received a private message stating that he would be “shot in the face” for being Jewish.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Physical assault (intent) - A written message containing insults and an explicit threat of death directed at an individual for his or her Jewish identity.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts - Presence of insults and direct threat of physical violence (“shooting”), with the aim of intimidating; Essentializations and generalizations - Use of the term “Jew” as a derogatory marker, reducing the target to Jewish identity.




HATE SPEECH ON TWITTER

Description: One profile replied to a tweet stating that “Good Jew is killed.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred - Public statement that promotes the elimination of Jews as a group, with no defined individual target.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts - An ex-licit expression of a death wish directed at Jews as a collectivity.



January 6, 2025

RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE COMMENT ON FACEBOOK

Description: A user posted a text blaming Jews for Jesus’ death, calling them “social corrupters,” associating the founding of Israel with “socialist Jews,” and claiming that defending Jews is “spitting in the face of Jesus.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred - Public comment that promotes hostility against Jews as a group, based on religious, moral, and political accusations, without a defined individual target.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations - Attribution of negative moral characteristics (“social corruptors”) to Jews as a collectivity; Antizionism - Association of the existence of the State of Israel with a Jewish ideological conspiracy, with delegitimization of Jewish self-determination; Attributions of power to Jews - Construction of a conspiratorial narrative that presents Jews as collective agents responsible for global historical and political events.

January 20, 2025

ATTACKS ON WHATSAPP OF THE JEWISH-THEMED RADIO PROGRAM IN PORTO ALEGRE

Description: A listener sent this message threatening the radio broadcasters of the program “Hora Israelita”, in Rio Grande do Sul

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression - Message sent to a Jewish-themed radio program containing intimidation and hostility directed at communicators identified with the Jewish community.

Antisemitic Content: Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups - Use of armed imagery and complimentary language associated with extremist groups hostile to Jews, with an implicit threatening tone.



January 24, 2025

DEMONIZATION IN STORIES

Description: An Instagram account shared AI-generated images depicting religious Jews eating meals hugging demons.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred - Publication that promotes hostility against Jews as a group through dehumanizing and defamatory symbolic representation.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations - Re- portrayal of religious Jews as intrinsically associated with evil, reducing the group to a fixed, collective negative characteristic.




AFFIRMATION OF A NEW HOLOCAUST

Description: In a post about a book related to Holocaust, a user commented that “in the future the dose will be doubled” in relation to deaths.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression - A public comment that ridicules the Holocaust and expresses a veiled threat of a repetition of genocidal violence against Jews.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts - mockery and implied threat of future violence directed at Jews as a group; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism - Relativization and normalization of the Nazi genocide, with positive reference to the repetition of historical violence.



January 25, 2025

VERBAL AGGRESSION ON PUBLIC ROADS

Description: A couple was approached on the street in São Paulo by a man who shouted that “Jews are child murderers” and blamed all Jews for what happens in Palestine.

Environment: Offline

Type: Verbal aggression - Approach on a public road with collective accusations directed at Jews as a group, however, aimed at specific individuals.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations - Collective attribution of crimes (“child murderers”) to all Jews, treated as a homogeneous group; Antizionism - Collective responsibility of Jews for actions attributed to the State of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

January 27, 2025


HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND DISTORTION

Description: In a post about the memory of the Holocaust, a user commented that the genocide would have been perpetrated by the Jews themselves and that it would be justifiable according to their holy book.

Environment: Online

Type: Incitement to hatred - Public commentary that denies and distorts the Holocaust, attributing the genocide to the Jews themselves and legitimizing violence against them.

Antisemitic content: Misinformation (trivialization/denial) — Denial and reversal of historical responsibility for the Holocaust; Essentializations and generalizations - Collective attribution of blame to the Jews as a homogeneous group; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism - Relativization of the Nazi genocide through its justification or discursive naturalization.



January 28, 2025

VANDALISM IN JEWISH CEMETERY IN PORTO ALEGRE

Description: Pig carcasses were left in front of the door of a Jewish cemetery, directly hitting a religious and community space.

Environment: Offline

Type: Vandalism — Symbolic and material desecration of Jewish religious space, with intimidating and offensive potential to the community.

Antisemitic content: Verbal Aggression (symbolic) — Use of a symbol considered impure in Jewish tradition as a form of collective disrespect for religious identity; Exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups — Employment of a recurrent practice in historical repertoires of antisemitic intimidation and hostility against Jewish spaces.



January 31, 2025

NAZI SALUTE IN AN INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT – MANAUS

Description: A public company employee was photographed performing a gesture similar to the Nazi salute (“Sieg Heil”), later claiming that it was a “joke”.

Environment: Offline

Type: Incitement to hatred — Public use of a symbol associated with the Nazi regime, with the potential for intimidation and normalization of Antisemitic ideology.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Use of a symbolic gesture of the Third Reich, historically associated with the persecution and genocide of Jews.



February 4, 2025

HARASSMENT OF RABBI

Description: Rabbi reported persecution by an individual who gave hostile speeches to Judaism and threats directed at him.

Environment: Offline

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Persecution and threats directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with an intimidating character.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Presence of threats and intimidation motivated by religious identity; Essentializations and generalizations—Hostility directed at the rabbi as representative of Judaism.

February 7, 2025

SELF-SUMMONING TO TERRORIST GROUP

Description: A man sent a WhatsApp message to a Jewish organization providing his personal data and declaring himself “self-summoned” as a Hamas fighter to fight against Israeli and American soldiers.

Environment: Online

Type: Incitement to hatred — Declaration of voluntary adherence to a terrorist group with an Antisemitic ideology, directed at a Jewish organization, with intimidating potential.


Antisemitic content: Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Positive manifestation and engagement with an organization recognized for Antisemitic ideology and practices; Aggressive speech acts — Speech that legitimizes and calls for armed violence against Jews and associates.

LINGUISTIC AND RELIGIOUS OFFENSE

Description: In a public comment on a Hebrew course, a user associated the language with Jews as “those who killed Je-sus” and described it as “the language of pigs, dirty animals”.

Environment: Online

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — A public offense with derogatory and dehumanizing content directed at Jews as a religious group.



Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of religious guilt (“they killed Jesus”) to the Jews as a homogeneous group; Aggressive speech acts — Use of insulting and dehumanizing language (“pigs,” “dirty animals”) for offensive purposes.

ATTACK VIA INSTAGRAM


Description: A rabbi received direct messages (DMs) in response to his stories containing phrases such as “Heil Hitler” and “Auschwitz”, accompanied by emojis of the German flag.

Environment: Online

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Private messages with intimidating and offensive content directed at an individual identified as Jewish.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Explicit use of slogans and symbolic references to the Nazi regime as a form of intimidation and glorification of genocidal ideology.

February 8, 2025



THREAT OF EXTERMINATION AND DEHUMANIZATION


Description: A Twitter profile published a message calling Jews “vermin”, classifying synagogues as “satanic centers” and stating that they would be “destroyed at the base of the bullet”, in addition to declaring that the Jewish community would be reduced to a “pile of bodies buried in mass graves”.

Environment: Online

Type: Hate speech — Public speech that promotes dehumanization, threatens armed violence, and collective extermination against Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit threat of extreme violence and collective physical elimination.

Essentializations and generalizations — Dehumanization of Jews (“vermin”) and treatment of the Jewish community as a homogeneous target; Symbolic exaltation of Antisemitic violence — Discursive legitimization of the destruction of religious spaces and mass murder.



February 10, 2025

NAZI SYMBOL AT UNIVERSITY GRADUATION

Description: A young man attended a university graduation in Porto Alegre with a swastika drawn on his face. Despite claiming to be an “Indian symbol”, the choice of music associated with neo-Nazi circuits reinforces the intentionality of the gesture.

Environment: Offline

Type: Incitement to hatred — Public display of a symbol associated with the Nazi regime in an institutional context, with the potential for intimidation and normalization of Antisemitic ideology.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Explicit use of a Nazi symbol, historically linked to the persecution and genocide of Jews, in a context that reinforces its ideological connotation.



February 11, 2025

OFFENSES AND INTIMIDATION OF RABBI ON SOCIAL MEDIA


Description: User published texts calling a rabbi a “demon in disguise” and insinuating that episodes of extreme violence could occur in a neighborhood with a large concentration of Jewish population.

Environment: Online

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Direct offenses and intimidation directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with a veiled suggestion of collective violence.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Insults, dehumanization, and the implied threat of violence.

Essentializations and generalizations—Portrayal of the rabbi as a demonized representation of Judaism.




February 14, 2025

COMMENTARY ON CULTURAL “APPROPRIATION”

Description: In a public comment on a post from a Jewish restaurant, a user accused Jews of having appropriated cultures “at the cost of many lives.”

Environment: Online



Type: Incitement to hatred — Public statement that assigns collective blame and promotes hostility against Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of exploitative and violent practices to Jews as a homogeneous group; Attributions of power to the Jews — A narrative that suggests domination or cultural appropriation exercised in a structural way by the Jews.

February 16, 2025

DEATH THREAT TO RABBI (MANAUS)

Description: A religious leader received violent and disjointed messages, using biblical passages and messianic statements (“I AM YHWH”), containing threats of collective murder and reference to plans of extreme violence.

Environment: Online

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Explicit death threats directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with intimidating language and potential for concrete risk.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Direct threats of lethal violence and extermination; Essentializations and generalizations—Hostility directed at Jews as a group, with language of collective condemnation.

February 24, 2025

APOLOGY FOR HITLER IN WHATSAPP GROUP

Description: In a WhatsApp group with the participation of members linked to integralist groups and political parties, a member published the message “Mustache killed was little”, in reference to Adolf Hitler. The administrator removed the message, but kept the author in the group.

Environment: Online

Type: Incitement to hatred — A public demonstration in a group that legitimizes and minimizes the genocide perpetrated by the Nazi regime.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Indirect exaltation of Adolf Hitler and positive relativization of genocidal violence against Jews.

March 2, 2025

PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRORISM AGAINST TEENAGERS

Description: A 17-year-old Jewish teenager received private messages with explicit videos of the massacre perpetrated by Hamas on 07/10/2023, accompanied by texts stating that she too would die.

Environment: Online

Type: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Direct intimidation and explicit threat of death directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with the use of violent material to cause fear and psychological suffering.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Direct threat of lethal violence and extreme intimidation; Glorification and affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups — The use of propaganda material from an antisemitic terrorist group to threaten and terrorize the victim.

March 6, 2025

HARASSMENT IN A MEDICAL ENVIRONMENT

Description: In an obstetric center, a nurse shouted at her co-worker “What is this Jew hiding?” without prior provocation, according to the victim’s account.

Environment: Offline (Hospital/Obstetric Center)

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Direct and embarrassing offense directed at an individual identified as Jewish in a professional environment.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — The association of Jewish identity with suspicion and moral distrust; Aggressive speech acts — Hostile and intimidating language used gratuitously.

March 11, 2025

PERSECUTION ON PUBLIC ROADS

Description: An employee of the Israeli Federation was followed by two men on her way out of work, who pointed at her saying “we saw that you left there”, leading the victim to run away.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Stalking

and intimidation directed at an individual identified by his Jewish institutional affiliation, with the generation of concrete fear.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Verbal intimidation with coercive and threatening effect; Essentializations and generalizations — Target identified and harassed because of its association with a Jewish institution.

GRAFFITI WITH BLOOD LIBEL

Description: Siding of a construction company with a Jewish name was sprayed with an arrow pointing to the name and the phrase “eat babies”, as well as a caricature accompanied by the phrase “I’m going to privatize you”.



Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism - Damage and desecration of property with a symbolic Antisemitic message directed at a Jewish identity.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Re-activation of the blood libel by associating Jews with the murder and consumption of children; Attribution of power to the Jews — Insinuation of occult and morally monstrous practices attributed to the Jews as a group.

March 21, 2025

ATTEMPTED HIT-AND-RUN

Description: In Joaçaba (SC), a man wearing a kippah and a T-shirt with writings in Hebrew was the target of an attempt to run over on purpose while crossing the crosswalk, being forced to jump to avoid the impact.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Physical assault (intent to cause injury or risk) — Deliberate action with a vehicle aimed at causing physical harm to an individual identified by his or her Jewish identity.

Antisemitic Content: Essentializations and Generalizations — Selection of the target because of visible markers of Jewish identity.

March 22, 2025

VERBAL AGGRESSION IN A GROUP OF FORMER COLLEAGUES


Description: In a WhatsApp group of former schoolmates, an

a member directed offenses at the Jewish woman, calling her a “Zionist of shit”, “genocidal” and “cow”, stating that they “did worse than the Holocaust” and uttering the threat “you will burn”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Repeated offenses and threats directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with intimidating and dehumanizing language.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Insults, humiliation and explicit threats; Antizionism — Use of the term “Zionist” as an insult and absolute moral responsibility associated with Israel; Mentions or statements of Nazism — Distorted comparison and trivialization of the Holocaust as a form of attack and intimidation.



March 24, 2025


TERRORISM AND NAZISM GROUP

Description: Identification of a WhatsApp channel that claimed Nazi and Antisemitic content, including incentives and tutorials for making homemade weapons for the purpose of carrying out attacks against Jews.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Organization and systematic dissemination of speech and instructions aimed at terrorist violence against Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups — Promotion of Nazi ideology and antisemitic extremist groups; Aggressive speech acts — Direct encouragement of gun violence and the murder of Jews; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Explicit diffusion of Nazi symbols, references, and ideology.



April 7, 2025

ABANDONMENT AND DISCRIMINATION OF TOURISTS

Description: Local guides in Jericoacoara (CE) abandoned a group of young Israelis trapped in a river flood, removing the keys to the vehicles and recording the situation in selfies before leaving them in physical danger.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Physical aggression (intent to cause injury or risk)
— Deliberate conduct that exposed individuals to danger from the crowd, with discriminatory motivation linked to the Israeli/Jewish identity.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations—Discriminatory treatment directed at the group on the basis of its national origin and identity association.

April 24, 2025

POSTERS AT THE FACULTY OF LAW

Description: Posters were posted at the USP Law School with the phrase “Zionist is not a professor”, seeking to prevent or delegitimize teaching activity based on political identity associated with Jewish identity.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public demonstration that promotes exclusion and collective discrimination against Jews in an institutional space.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Use of the term “Zionist” as a criterion for professional and political exclusion, associated with Jewish identity; Essentializations and generalizations — Treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group incompatible with the exercise of teaching.

April 27, 2025


HATE SPEECH AT BIRTHDAY PARTY

Description: During a party, a man publicly declared that he hated “all Jews”, calling them the “worst race there is” and stating that they “always want to steal”. When confronted by a Jewish woman present, he reiterated his statements.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression - A public verbal manifestation that promotes hostility and discrimination against Jews as a group, but aimed at a specific target.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of negative moral characteristics (“worst race”, “want to steal”) to Jews as a homogeneous group; Aggressive speech acts — Explicit statements of hatred directed at Jews as a collectivity.



April 29, 2025


LETTER THREATENING YOUTH MOVEMENT

Description: Letter left at the headquarters of a Jewish youth movement in Porto Alegre with accusations that Jews were repeating “what Nazism did in the past” and with an intimidating tone (“history will condemn you”).

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression — A written message directed at a Jewish institution, promoting collective hostility and symbolic intimidation.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Distorted analogies that reverse the historical responsibility of Nazism, comparing Jews to perpetrators of genocide; Antizionism — Collective demonization of Jews through the association between Israel/Jews and Nazi crimes; Essentializations and generalizations—Collective attribution of historical guilt to the Jews as a homogeneous group.



April 30, 2025

POSTERS IN PUBLIC AGENCY

Description: Poster posted in a medical center associating “zionism”, “Faria Lima” and “imperialism” with the exploitation and oppression of workers. The union responsible refused to remove the material.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public manifestation that spreads collective hostility and political stigmatization associated with Jewish identity in an institutional space.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Use of the term “zionism” as a negative and conspiratorial moral category, unrelated to legitimate political criticism; Attributions of power to the Jews — The implicit association of Jews with structures of economic and political domination.



PERSECUTION ON PAULISTA AVENUE

Description: A man wearing a kippah was followed on the street by members of a group that distributed newspapers. During the chase, a woman shouted “Long live Hamas” and “Jewish murderers” in her direction.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression - Approach in a public space with hostility directed at Jews as a group, but directed at a specific target, accompanied by exaltation of a terrorist organization.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective murder of Jews (“Jewish murderers”); Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Expression in support of Hamas, a group with Antisemitic ideology and practices.

May 1, 2025


THREATS ON FACEBOOK

Description: A user posted comments on Facebook stating “I’m watching the end of you,” calling interlocutors “despicable Nazis” and declaring that “they’re going to pay the bill.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal Aggression - Public messages with intimidating and threatening content directed at individuals identified as Jews.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Veiled threats and intimidating language that suggests future punishment; Mentions or statements of Nazism — Distorted use of the term “Nazi” as a form of attack and rhetorical reversal directed at Jews.



May 3, 2025

ASSAULT IN A BAR

Description: In Porto Velho (RO), a woman pulled the Star of David pendant from a young man and uttered phrases such as “I hate all Jews”, “I wish you would die” and “I am a Hamas soldier”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Physical aggression (intent to cause injury or risk) — Deliberate physical contact associated with explicit threats and hostility directed at an individual identified as Jewish.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit

statements of hatred and death wishes against Jews; Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Self-declaration of alignment with Hamas, a group with an Antisemitic ideology.

May 11, 2025


JOKES ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST

Description: On a humor page on Instagram, a user commented asking how to put Jews in a taxi, responding to himself with “just take an ashtray”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public comment that trivializes and ridicules the extermination of Jews, promoting hostility against the group.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Direct reference to the cremation of Jews in the death camps, with a mocking character; Aggressive speech acts — Offensive and dehumanizing language directed at Jews as a collectivity.




May 12, 2025

CONIB'S ASSOCIATION WITH NAZISM

Description: A Twitter post referred to the Jewish entity as “Conib: Israeli Nazi Confederation of Brazil.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Aggressive speech acts - Public statement that demonizes a Jewish institution through a defamatory association with Nazism.



Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of Nazi analogy to attack and delegitimize Jewish institution; Essentializations and generalizations — Implicit attribution of “dual loyalty” and foreign identity to the Brazilian Jewish organization, treating it as inherently linked to external interests; Antizionism — Demonization of an entity associated with the representation of the Jewish community, making it responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.

May 14, 2025

NAZI SALUTE AT SCHOOL

Description: In a school in Rio de Janeiro, students made montages of photos of a Jewish classmate with references to apology for Nazism and made the salute “Sieg Heil” inside the classroom.

Environment: Hybrid (Offline Act / Online Assemblies)

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Hostility and intimidation directed at an individual identified as Jewish in a school environment, with the use of Nazi symbols and gestures.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Explicit use of symbols, greetings, and references to the Nazi regime; Aggressive speech acts — Intimidation and humiliation directed at a colleague identified as Jewish.

May 15, 2025

GRAFFITI AT BUS STOP

Description: The structure of a bus stop on Avenida Rebouças (SP) was graffitied with the phrase “Nazi Israel”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Damage to public property accompanied by a message of hostility and demonization associated with Israel and Jews.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Analogies that invert historical reality by associating Israel with Nazism; Antizionism — Demonization of Israel through extreme comparison that goes beyond legitimate political criticism.

May 21, 2025


UNIVERSITY PAMPHLET WITH CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Description: A pamphlet distributed at a university called for a demonstration against “Nazi-Zionists” and stated that an individual arrested would be a “political prisoner of the FBI and Mossad”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Material distributed in a public space that spreads collective hostility and conspiracy narratives associated with Jews and Zionism.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Use of the term “Nazi-Zionists” to demonize Israel and Zionism by means of extreme analogy; Attributions of power to Jews — Conspiracy theory that



associates intelligence services and global power structures with an alleged Jewish coordinated action; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Use of reference to Nazism as an instrument of defamation and historical inversion.

May 23, 2025

POSTER IN COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENT

Description: Hamburger restaurant in São Paulo exhibited, on the counter, a drawing with the phrase “BURN ZIONISM TO THE GROUND”, accompanied by the image of a flag of Israel in flames.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public display of a message that legitimizes the symbolic destruction of Israel, with the potential to foment hostility against Jews associated with the state.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Demonization of Israel and Zionism through language that calls for destruction, going beyond legitimate political criticism; Aggressive speech acts — Use of language that incites symbolic violence and collective hostility.



May 24, 2025


HITLER'S JUSTIFICATION

Description: A user of the social network Bluesky published a text stating that, in view of what she sees about Gaza, “perhaps Hitler was right”, acknowledging the serious nature of the statement, but validating the Nazi ideology as a response to current events.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A public statement that retrospectively legitimizes Nazi violence against Jews by promoting collective hostility.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Explicit justification of Hitler’s action and relativization of the Nazi genocide; Antizionism — Use of current events involving Israel to retrospectively legitimize violence against Jews.



POST ABOUT VICTIM GUILT

Description: A social media post stating that “a people persecuted 2,000 years ago must have done something,” attributing to the Jews the historical responsibility for the

persecutions they suffered.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A public statement that legitimizes the persecution of Jews by collectively blaming the victims.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Attribution of collective blame to Jews as a homogeneous group; Disinformation (trivialization/denial) — Historical distortion that relativizes and justifies Antisemitic persecution over time.

May 26, 2025

DISCRIMINATION IN LITERARY ASSOCIATION

Description: A Jewish woman, upon taking office as a literary association, was the target of a public comment accusing her of being a “supporter of genocide” and requesting that the institution take a stand against her presence, holding her responsible for the war in Gaza.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public manifestation that seeks to delegitimize and exclude an individual from institutional space based on identity associated with Judaism.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Holding a Jewish individual accountable for actions attributed to the State of Israel and using this association to justify his or her exclusion; Essentializations and generalizations—Treatment of the person as a homogeneous representative of a collectivity, regardless of his or her individual positions.

June 1, 2025


GRAFFITI IN FRONT OF THE JEWISH INSTITUTION

Description: A couple was caught painting a Palestinian flag and the phrase “Palestine Alive” on a pole located directly in front of a synagogue and the headquarters of a Jewish youth movement in Porto Alegre.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Intervention in a public space with a political message directed at a place of worship and Jewish institution, with the potential for symbolic intimidation.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Although the phrase alone is



a legitimate political manifestation, the act of delicately marking the front of a Jewish institution is intended to intimidate the local community by blaming them for external conflict.

June 5, 2025

STICKERS IN FRONT OF THE SYNAGOGUE

Description: Stickers were pasted in front of a synagogue in Rio de Janeiro containing a Star of David with a skull in the center and the phrase “This product supports genocide in Gaza”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Fixing material in a religious space with an accusatory message and hostile symbology directed at the Jewish community.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Collective accountability of Jews for actions attributed to the State of Israel and use of this association to stigmatize religious institutions; Aggressive speech acts — Use of accusatory language and intimacy symbology (Star of David associated with death).



June 9, 2025

BOMB THREAT AND ALLIANCE WITH HEZBOLLAH

Description: A person who had been suffering attacks on Twitter for being Jewish had his phone number disclosed, starting to receive messages with direct threats and mentions of a “potential alliance with the Hezbollah group” to carry out a bomb attack in Brazil.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Direct threats of extreme violence directed at an individual identified as Jewish, with repeated intimidation and exposure of personal data.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit threats of attack and lethal violence; Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Positive reference and instrumentalization of an organization with Antisemitic ideology as a means of threat; Essentializations and generalizations — A target selected and harassed because of his Jewish identity.

DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE ISRAELI FEDERATION OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL

Description: A demonstration held in front of the institution’s

headquarters. The protest was registered on Monday (9), in Porto Alegre, by demonstrators with posters and banners. The demonstrators chanted “from the river to the sea, free Palestine now”, in reference to the destruction of the State of Israel, and held a sign reading “Long live the Palestinian Resistance”, with an image of a Hamas terrorist.

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public demonstration in front of a Jewish institution with exaltation of an Antisemitic organization, producing symbolic intimidation directed at the community.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Transfer of conflict involving Israel to a local Jewish institution, responsibility to the community for the actions of a state or military actor; Exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups — Praise for Hamas, an organization whose ideology and practice include Antisemitic elements.



June 10, 2025

DISCRIMINATION BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

Description: A psychologist linked to the Institute of Psychiatry of the Hospitals of the Clinics (USP) announced on social networks that, due to a “professional decision”, she would no longer serve people from the Jewish community. The post included an Israeli flag, indicating that the decision was associated with events in the Middle East.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public statement that promotes exclusion and collective discrimination in access to services based on Jewish identity, associating individuals with an inter-national conflict.



Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Refusal to provide care to Jews as a homogeneous group, regardless of individual positions; Antizionism — Collective accountability of Brazilian Jews for political events involving Israel, using them as an exclusion criterion.

June 16, 2025

INCITEMENT TO “SET FIRE” AT JEWS

Description: A user posted a message on Facebook asking if there were “jihadist Muslim friends” willing to “play cat and mouse with Zionists”, stating that he would provide data on his own family and concluding with the phrase “Let’s set fire to these guys!”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A publication that calls on third parties to violence against people identified as Jews or Syrians, with explicit encouragement to physical aggression.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Direct incitement to physical violence and attack against individuals; Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Appeal to “jihadists” as desired agents of violence. Antizionism — Use of the term “Zionists” as a collective target of violence, transferring political conflict to individuals identified with Judaism.

June 20, 2025

NAZI ITEM AUCTION

Description: An auction site has put up for sale a decorative porcelain plate containing a Nazi swastika stamped, normalizing the sale of items in support of the regime.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Commercialization and dissemination of a symbol linked to the Nazi regime, contributing to its normalization in the public space.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Use and circulation of an official symbol of the Third Reich, historically associated with the persecution and genocide of Jews, outside the educational/museological context, configures the affirmation and propagation of Nazi symbology.

June 22, 2025

DEHUMANIZING OFFENSES (“WORMS”)

Description: A user posted on Facebook a text calling Jews a “subspecies of worms”, “kikes” (a pejorative term), “waste of oxygen” and wishing that they would be “extirpated from the face of the Earth in the cruelest way”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred—A public statement that dehumanizes Jews as a group and explicitly advocates their physical elimination.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Insults, dehumanization, and direct call for extermination; Essentializations and Generalizations—Characterization of Jews as a homogeneous group with degrading and subhuman attributes.

July 5, 2025

BLOOD LIBEL ON WALL

Description: A graffiti was made on the wall of a school with the phrase “ISRAEL KILLS BABIES IN THE NAME OF GOD #SioNazi”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Damage to public property accompanied by a message of hostility and collective accusation directed at Jews and Israel.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Re-activation of the blood libel by associating Jews with the ritual murder of children in the name of their religion; Antizionism — Demonization of Israel through absolute and morally extreme accusations that go beyond legitimate political criticism; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Use of the term “Zionist” as an analogy that associates Jews or Israel with Nazism, producing historical inversion and collective demonization.

July 9, 2025

RECRUITMENT FOR NEO-NAZI FACTION

Description: Complaint about the recruitment of teenagers via Discord to a faction called “Misanthropic Division”, led by an individual in São Paulo. The group’s objective would be to attack synagogues in RJ, SP and SC.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Organization and

recruitment aimed at the practice of violence against Jewish institutions, with planning of attacks.

Antisemitic content: Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Promotion and organization of an extreme neo-Nazi group; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Explicit reference to neo-Nazi ideology and symbology; Aggressive speech acts—Incitement and planning of violent attacks against synagogues.

July 21, 2025

ATTACK ON THE SYNAGOGUE IN RIO DE JANEIRO

Description: An individual went to a synagogue in Rio de Janeiro, shouted Antisemitic slogans and kicked the outer gate of the institution.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — An act of aggression against the property of a religious institution, accompanied by hostile demonstrations directed at the Jewish community.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Uttering hostile and intimidating slogans; Essentializations and generalizations — Hostility directed at the institution as a representation of the Jewish collectivity.

July 29, 2025

DESIRE FOR ELIMINATION


Description: A user replied to a post by a Jewish woman claiming that “the world will eliminate the Jews” and expressed the wish for this to happen “with suffering.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — A message addressed to an individual identified as a Jew containing an explicit desire for collective extermination.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit desire for death and suffering; Essentializations and generalizations—Treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group and a legitimate target of elimination.

August 8, 2025



GAME “CITIZEN OF SP SIMULATOR”


Description: A journalist has released a game in which the player, pretending to be a newspaper editor, must please different groups of power, among them “Israel”. The content suggests disproportionate influence on the media and presents fictitious headlines of an accusatory nature in an ironic tone.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Disinformation (trivialization/denial)

— Dissemination of a distorted narrative that presents Israel or Jews as media carriers, with no factual basis.

Antisemitic content: Attribution of power to Jews — Reproduction of classic stereotype of disproportionate control of the media; Antizionism — Depiction of Israel as a conspiratorial and manipulative actor, extrapolating legitimate political criticism.



August 11, 2025

STICKERS IN SUPERMARKET

Description: Supposedly Israeli products in a supermarket in Vila Madalena, in São Paulo, were marked with stickers simulating nutritional seals with the words “HIGH IN PALESTINIAN BLOOD”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Posting public messages that collectively associate Israelis or Jews with violent crimes, promoting stigmatization and hostility.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Demonization of Israel through absolute and morally extreme accusation, extrapolating legitimate political criticism; Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of responsibility for violence to Israelis or Jews, treated as a homogeneous group; Aggressive speech acts — Accusatory language and symbology intended to publicly embarrass and harass.



August 15, 2025

VANDALISM AT THE ISRAELI CEMETERY IN BELO HORIZONTE

Description: An individual sprayed graffiti on the side and front walls of the cemetery with Nazi swastikas, phrases such as “genocidal Israel” and “baby killers”, in addition to comparing the Star of David to the swastika. After the graffiti, he threw cans of spray paint into the place. Part of the action was recorded by security cameras.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Damage to and desecration of Jewish burial space accompanied by messages and symbols of Antisemitic hostility.

Antisemitic Content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of swastikas and direct comparison between the Star of David and Nazi symbology; Antizionism — Demonization of Israel through absolute accusations and extreme analogies and collective responsibility of the Jews of Belo Horizonte for the actions of the State of Israel.



August 23, 2025

SALE OF “PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION”

Description: A publisher or online store was denounced for marketing the book The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, with a cover containing offensive Jewish jokes and references to the supposed “control of the world”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Commercialization and dissemination of work historically associated with Antisemitic propaganda and the dissemination of conspiracy theories about Jews.

Antisemitic content: Attribution of power to Jews — Diffusion of a conspiratorial narrative that presents Jews as controllers of politics, the economy or the world; Essentializations and generalizations — Representation of Jews as a homogeneous group endowed with negative and conspiratorial characteristics.



August 24, 2025

ACCUSATION OF SACRIFICE TO MOLOCH

Description: User sent private messages calling the victim a “monster” and “inhuman”. At the same time, a profile on the X network published an old engraving accusing Jews of “killing

children as sacrifices to Moloch”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Direct and dehumanizing offenses directed at an individual identified as Jewish, associated with the public dissemination of historical accusations against the Jewish community.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Insults and dehumanization directed at the victim; Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of monstrous practices to Jews as a homogeneous group.

August 26, 2025

“HITLER WON” AND EXTERMINATION

Description: In comments on Instagram, one user wrote that “In the end Adolf Hitler won,” while another user explicitly stated that “Zionists should be literally exterminated.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public comments that exude Nazism and explicitly advocate the physical elimination of a group.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Positive reference to Adolf Hitler and normalization of Nazi violence; Aggressive speech acts — Explicit advocacy of the extermination of people identified as Zionists; Antizionism — Use of the term “Zionists” as a collective target of violence, associated with Jewish identity.

August 27, 2025

ENCOURAGEMENT TO BURN CHILDREN

Description: A user posted on X justifying violence, stating: “He could have even raped the children and then burned them alive... So FIRE ON THE JEWISH CHILDREN.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A publication that explicitly advocates extreme violence and extermination directed at Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Direct incitement to lethal violence and the killing of children; Essentializations and

generalizations: Treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group and a legitimate target of extreme violence.

August 29, 2025

SWASTIKAS IN RIBEIRÃO PRETO

Description: During the night, swastikas were sprayed on the walls of four properties on the same street in Ribeirão Preto (SP), in an action caught by security cameras.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Damage to property by means of symbols associated with Nazi ideology, with the potential to intimidate and disseminate Antisemitic propaganda.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of swastikas, a symbol historically linked to the persecution and genocide of Jews, as a form of intimidation and ideological exaltation.



September 2, 2025


CALL TO BURN SYNAGOGUES

Description: A user published on the social network X (formerly Twitter) a message stating that “cursed be every Jewish believer” and explicitly inciting violence with the phrase: “We need to start setting fire to synagogues in Brazil and kick this Jewry far away”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A publication that curses Jews as a group and directly calls for attacks against synagogues and expulsion of people identified as Jewish.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Curse, insufficiency and direct incitement to physical violence and collective expulsion; Essentializations and generalizations: Treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group and a legitimate target of violence.



September 8, 2025

ANTISEMITIC ATTACKS IN COLÉGIO (RJ)

Description: Mother reported that her daughter has been suffering constant attacks at a school in Rio de Janeiro. Between episodes, colleagues performed the Nazi salute (“Sieg Heil”) in his direction, and a priest of the institution said in a speech that it

would be necessary to “get rid of the Jews”, classifying them as a “violent and dirty race”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Repeated manifestations of hostility and defense of the exclusion or elimination of Jews, directed at a student identified as Jewish in a school environment.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of Nazi salute as a form of intimidation;

Aggressive speech acts — Insults, dehumanization, and advocacy of the expulsion or elimination of Jews; Essentializations and generalizations—Characterization of the Jews as a homogeneous group endowed with negative attributes (“violent and dirty race”).

September 22, 2025

BIOLOGICAL DEHUMANIZATION (“CANCER OF THE WORLD”)

Description: A user published on the X network the phrase: “Jew and North American are the cancers of the world”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred—A public statement that dehumanizes Jews as a group, presenting them as a biological threat to be eliminated.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Characterization of Jews as a homogeneous group endowed with essential negative attribution (“cancer”); Aggressive speech acts — Dehumanizing language that legitimizes extreme hostility toward the group.

September 25, 2025

VANDALISM IN BEIT CHABAD (ITACARÉ)

Description: The Beít Chabad Jewish center in Itacaré (BA) was vandalized with a red graffiti on the windows with the words “Free Palestine”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Vandalism — Damage to a Jewish religious institution with a political message directed at the site, producing symbolic intimidation.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Transfer of conflict involving Israel to a local Jewish institution, treated as representative of the state or its policy.



September 30, 2025

THREAT OF EXTERMINATION

Description: A user replied to a comment on Instagram saying: “the time to exterminate your disgust is coming, relax”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — A message addressed to interlocutors identified as Jews containing an explicit threat of extermination and dehumanizing language.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Direct threat of deletion and use of degrading (“disgusting”) language; Essentializations and generalizations—Treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group and a legitimate target of violence.

October 1, 2025

MOCKERY OF THE STAR OF DAVID

Description: One user posted on Facebook claiming that Star of David is an “eternal and profound mockery” meaning the “crown of thorns of Christ” and called Jews “Psychopaths” and “horrible people.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A publication that spreads collective hostility and moral disqualification directed at Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Attribution of negative moral characteristics to Jews as a collectivity; Aggressive speech acts — Insults and derogatory language directed at Jews as a group.

October 3, 2025

DESIRE FOR ATOMIC ANNIHILATION

Description: In the Threads app, a user explicitly suggested the “destruction of the State of Israel by atomic annihilation” in response to a victim.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Explicit defense of the violent destruction of a state associated with Jewish self-determination, in the context of interaction directed at an interlocutor identified as Jewish.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Advocacy of the violent elimination of the State of Israel, bypassing political criticism and denying the right to collective existence.

October 4, 2025

NAZI SELF-DECLARATION AND THREAT

Description: A user sent direct messages stating, “I’m a Nazi friend... one day you will hear my name in something very great in relation to Israel... Our cell is growing... Israel will burn very soon.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Private messages with threats of violence and intimidation directed at an interlocutor identified with Israel or Judaism.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Self-declaration of adherence to Nazism; Aggressive speech acts — Threats of future violence and intimidation; Antizionism — Defense of the violent destruction of Israel and threat directed at a Jewish interlocutor.

October 7, 2025

CELEBRATION OF MASSACRE

Description: A demonstration/event was organized by a political party to “celebrate” the anniversary of the October 7 massacre, characterizing the action as a “war of resistance”.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A public event that legitimizes and celebrates a violent attack against Israeli civilians perpetrated by an Antisemitic group, contributing to the normalization of violence against Jews.

Antisemitic content: Exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic individuals or groups — Legitimization and celebration of action perpetrated by Hamas, an organization whose ideology and practice include antisemitic elements; Antizionism — Justification of extreme violence against civilians associated with the State of Israel as a legitimate form of political action.



October 10, 2025

SWASTIKA DIRECTED AT A STUDENT

Description: In a high school classroom, a swastika was drawn on

the blackboard next to the name of a Jewish student, directing the symbol specifically to him.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Intimidation directed at an individual identified as Jewish by means of a symbol associated with the Nazi genocide.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of Nazi symbol for intimidatory purposes; Aggressive speech acts — A symbolic act of intimidation and hostility directed at a specific student; Essentializations and generalizations—Selection of the target on the basis of its Jewish identity.

October 12, 2025

COMPARISON TO “MICE”

Description: User replied to a post on the X network stating that “fake Jews do not deserve any sympathy” and that they would be “the rats of society and the cancer of the world”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A public statement that dehumanizes Jews as a group, legitimizing collective hostility.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Characterization of Jews as a homogeneous group endowed with degrading and negative biological attributes; Aggressive Speech acts — Insulting and dehumanizing language (“rats”, “cancer of the world”).

October 19, 2025

REFERENCE TO AUSCHWITZ

Description: A user commented on the victim’s social media profile: “She would look beautiful in Auschwitz”, suggesting that the person’s place would be in an extermination camp.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — A direct comment to an individual identified as Jewish, with a veiled threat of extermination and intimidation with reference to a Nazi camp.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Reference to Auschwitz as an instrument of intimidation and symbolic normalization of genocide; Aggressive speech acts — Implicit threat of death and extreme violence directed at the

victim.

October 30, 2025

INCITEMENT ON DISCORD

Description: Incitement to hatred — Public statements that attribute universal guilt to Jews and explicitly advocate their elimination.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of responsibility for all evils to Jews as a homogeneous group; Aggressive Speech Acts —Explicit advocacy of the physical elimination of Jews.

October 31, 2025

BLOOD LIBEL (“KILL ANY BABY”)

Description: Facebook post stating that “Demonic Jews are willing to kill ANY BABY THAT IS NOT A JEW,” warning that “tomorrow it could be ours.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A publication that spreads extreme collective accusation and promotes fear and hostility against Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of monstrous practices to Jews, treated as a homogeneous group; Aggressive speech acts — Dehumanization (“demonic”) language and alarmist narrative construction intended to incite hostility.

November 13, 2025

HOSTILITY AT THE COP (CLIMATE CONFERENCE)

Description: A rabbi was harassed at the COP when he sought to put tefillin (religious artifact) on Jewish participants, being treated and repelled as if it were a “representative of Israel” or the Israeli government by pro-Palestinian protesters.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Harassment and embarrassment directed at an individual identified as a Jew



due to his religious identity and political associations attributed to him.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — The transfer of political hostility directed at Israel to a Jewish individual in a religious context.

November 9, 2025

HITLER’S VALIDATION (“MUSTACHE WAS RIGHT”)

Description: In comments on Instagram, users wrote: “Every day that passes I am more convinced that the mustache [Hi-tler] was right” and “Little by little we are discovering the truth about the Jews and Germany.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public comments that legitimize Nazi ideology and spread hostility toward Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Positive reference to Adolf Hitler and implicit validation of his ideology; Essentializations and generalizations—Suggestion that there is a collective negative “truth” about Jews, treated as a homogeneous group.

November 20, 2025

DISCRIMINATORY DISMISSAL

Description: In Santa Rita, an employer fired her factory and stopped hiring her husband explicitly because they are Jewish, justifying the action with “the events in Palestine.”

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) – Discriminatory act accompanied by an explicit manifestation of hostility based on Jewish identity, resulting in professional damage.

Antisemitic content: Antizionism — Transfer of hostility directed at Israel towards Jewish people, used as a target because of their identity.

November 22, 2025

REFERENCE TO CREMATORIA (“TURNED TO ASHES”)

Description: A user commented on social media: “I have a preference for your people who turned gray you big-nosed goblin.”

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — A comment directed at a person identified as Jewish, with racial slurs and derogatory reference to extermination in Nazi camps.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Reference to Jewish victims reduced to “ashes”, evoking the crematoria of the extermination camps as a form of derision; Aggressive speech acts — Insults and degrading language directed at the victim; Essentializations and generalizations: Use of physical stereotypes and treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group.

November 25, 2025


SWASTIKA IN COMPANY LOGO

Description: A framing company in Santa Catarina has been denounced for using a logo that geometrically corresponds to a black Nazi swastika.

Environment: Offline (Visual/Commercial)

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public and ostentatious use of a symbol associated with Nazism in visual identity with the potential to disseminate and normalize Antisemitic ideology.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Use of a symbol historically linked to the Nazi regime and the persecution of Jews.



November 28, 2025

RECRUITMENT FOR “FOURTH REICH”

Description: A user created WhatsApp groups, such as the “31st Division of Volunteer Grenadiers”, with the aim of recruiting people for the “return of Nazism” and preaching the death of Jews.

Environment: Online (WhatsApp)

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Organization and recruitment in groups with explicit defense of Nazism and violence against Jews.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Defense of the resumption of Nazism and use of nomenclature inspired by military units of the Third Reich; Aggressive speech acts

— Explicit defense of the death of Jews; Exaltation and affirmation of Antisemitic individuals or groups — Promotion and attempted organization of a group inspired by Nazi ideology.

November 29, 2025


LEAKED AUDIO OF INFLUENCER

Description: Audio released on social networks records the influencer stating that he “would love to see Zionists in concentration camps”, referring to “disgraced Jews” and declaring that, in an eventual government of his, there would be “gulag and concentration camp for Jews and Zionists”.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to Hatred — Public statements that call for the mass arrest and confinement of Jews and Zionists in camps, legitimizing extreme violence and collective persecution.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit advocacy of confinement and violent persecution of Jews, accompanied by insults; Mentions or affirmations of Nazism — Positive reference to the idea of concentration camps as a desirable instrument against Jews; Antizionism — Use of the term “Zionists” as a collective target of violence, and collective accountability of Jews for Israel’s actions.



December 5, 2025

AGGRESSION IN A SHELTER

Description: A Jewish man on the street suffered physical and psychological violence in a shelter in São Paulo. The attacks were described as having “corrective purposes” motivated by the war Israeli-Hamas.

Environment: Offline

Type of Action: Physical assault — Bodily violence and intimidation directed at an individual identified as Jewish, accompanied by justification based on collective hostility.

Antisemitic content: Essentializations and generalizations — Responsibility of a Jewish individual for political events and treatment of the victim as a representative of a homogeneous group; Antizionism — The transfer of hostility directed at Israel to a Jewish individual, used as a justification for violence

December 24, 2025

ASSOCIATION WITH FECES AND ANIMALS

Description: A user sent private messages responding to stories of a Jewish person with the word “Zionists” followed by emojis of the Israeli flag, pig, mouse, feces, fly, and vomit.

Environment: Online (Direct Messages)

Type of Action: Verbal aggression (oral or written) — Private messages with dehumanizing and insulting symbolic language directed at a person identified as Jewish.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Insults and dehumanization through animal associations, filth, and decomposition; Essentializations and generalizations — Use of the term “Zionists” as a degraded collective category, applied to the victim by reason of his Jewish identity; Antizionism — The use of political hostility directed at Israel to dehumanize a Jewish individual.

December 25, 2025

OBLIGATION TO HATE

Description: A user posted on X the phrase “hating Jews is an obligation”, responding to a claim that Jews would have impunity for crimes.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — A public statement that legitimizes and encourages hostility against Jews as a group.

Antisemitic content: Aggressive speech acts — Explicit advocacy of hatred directed at Jews. Essentializations and generalizations — Collective attribution of negative characteristics and treatment of Jews as a homogeneous group.



THREAT OF “BACK TO THE OVEN”

Description: One user commented on X: “Until they return them back to the oven...”, clearly alluding to the gas chambers and crematoriums.

Environment: Online

Type of Action: Incitement to hatred — Public comment that evokes and normalizes the extermination of Jews as a desirable outcome.

Antisemitic content: Mentions or statements of Nazism — Direct reference to Nazi methods of extermination as a form of mockery or threat; Aggressive speech acts — Implicit desire for death and extreme violence against Jews.

Essentializations and generalizations—Treatment of Jews as a collective group whose elimination is presented as legitimate.

5.4 Examples of disregarded reports

Group 1: Complaints about algorithms and social media moderation

These reports concern frustrations with the moderation policies of technology platforms and do not constitute acts of hatred or discrimination perpetrated by third parties against the Jewish community.

- A user complaining about losing reach and followers on a social media platform after posting about Israel.
- A profile requesting assistance from a community organization, claiming that a platform repeatedly suspended their account due to posts about Israel and the war in Gaza.
- A complaint about automatic restrictions on a social media platform after posting scenes from a historical film about concentration camps.
- A user claiming that a social media platform “silenced” their account, where they post content in support of Israel.
- A user alleging “persecution” on a social media platform after being silenced for congratulating Donald Trump on his inauguration as President of the United States.
- A personal complaint from a user about lack of algorithmic engagement on a post about geopolitics: “28 minutes after posting, no views.”
- A report against an online gossip page for publishing false news about the death of Donald Trump, which violates platform guidelines but does not constitute antisemitism.
- A user expressing indignation because a social media platform allowed a humor influencer to go viral while limiting her pro-Israel videos.
- A user offended by internet “trolls” who mocked her religious way of writing the word “G-d,” ironically calling her “non-binary.”
- A generic report simply stating that the technology company that owns a social media platform “does not respond to reports.”

Group 2: Political criticism, activism, and pro-Palestinian demonstrations

Actions in support of Palestinians, calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, or the display of the Palestinian flag are protected as legitimate political speech under IHRA criteria, provided they do not incorporate antisemitic tropes or violence.

- A post by a Brazilian public figure expressing humanitarian concern about food deprivation in the Gaza Strip.
- A call by a left-leaning news website for political demonstrations against an alleged plan to expel Palestinians from Gaza.
- A fundraising campaign by an international activist NGO to send seeds and fund civilian networks and ambulances in Gaza.
- The circulation of an email promoting a grassroots pacifist movement (bringing together Jews and Arabs in Israel) calling for an end to the occupation and the war.
- The display of a Palestinian flag on the façade of a commercial bar.
- Graffiti with the political slogan “Free Palestine” on a newsstand.
- A digital advertising panel displaying the message “FREE PALESTINE” on a busy avenue in a capital city.
- The organization of peaceful public pro-Palestinian demonstrations on beaches and in public squares in a city in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
- A social media video covering a pro-Palestinian demonstration at a well-known national tourist site.
- A video featuring various local actors and artists chanting the slogan “Free Palestine.”
- A post by a federal deputy on social media criticizing deaths in Gaza as a “massacre” and using the hashtag #FreePalestine.
- An informal conversation among employees of a government research institute, in the workplace, containing political criticism of the President of the United States (Joe Biden) and the Prime Minister of Israel (Benjamin Netanyahu).
- The sale, in a bookstore chain, of a book presenting the conflict from the perspective of the Palestinian population.

Group 3: Editorial line, media bias, and journalistic errors

Complaints about press coverage, lack of opposing viewpoints, or editorial errors do not constitute antisemitism, except when they reproduce classic antisemitic tropes.

- Complaint that the editorial line of a major broadcast television network has an unfavorable bias and “portrays Israel as the aggressor,” omitting Hamas attacks.
- A listener’s complaint that a radio program was “biased” and “victimist” for not presenting counterpoints regarding Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields.
- A report alleging that a major subscription-based news channel refused to interview the military spokesperson of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for Portuguese-speaking countries.
- An editorial error by a television broadcaster that mistakenly used a photo of Israeli

rescue teams to illustrate a report about a hospital hit in Iran.

- A writing error in a major newspaper that published incorrect information in the lead of a report on the exchange of Palestinian prisoners and Israeli hostages.

Group 4: Urban security, everyday issues, and personal disputes

Street incidents, common crimes, or interpersonal disputes without motivation related to bias against Jewish identity.

- Report of a community institution's door found unlocked, with no signs of intrusion or theft.
- A passerby taking casual photos of himself in front of a Jewish institution.
- An individual who attempted to look through the entrance of an institution and left upon noticing security.
- A person who rang the intercom of a community organization asking for water.
- A woman searching for a young acquaintance from a dating app at a Jewish school, with no discriminatory motivation.
- A taxi driver involved in a dispute over parking spaces in front of a daycare center.
- Receipt of a spam call originating from an unknown number in Pakistan.
- A police incident following a physical altercation at a private party resulting from a personal dispute.
- A message sent out of context containing only the phone number of a supporter group representative.
- A report by a former state bank employee alleging dismissal due to a "hacker conspiracy."
- A negative review left by a patient on a doctor's professional profile, under unverified suspicion of motivation related to the presence of a mezuzah in the office.

Group 5: Academic and union debates, and empty reports

University or union discussions related to the Middle East, matters unrelated to the institutional mandate, or reports lacking verifiable content.

- Organization of an academic debate at a federal university on the impacts of the conflict under the theme "The Health of the Population of Gaza."
- A report criticizing a community-based university that offers courses for refugees for receiving funding from left-wing parliamentarians.
- An intragroup theological dispute involving debate over the legitimacy of "Messianic Jews."
- Vague and unsubstantiated reports containing only generic phrases such as "I want to report a case of antisemitism I saw on social media" or messages such as "test".

6. PERCEPTIONS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY ON IDENTITY, LIVED EXPERIENCE, AND ANTISEMITISM IN BRAZIL

6.1 Methodological Note

The survey **Perceptions of the Jewish Community on Identity, Lived Experience, and Antisemitism in Brazil** constitutes a descriptive-exploratory study aimed at **mapping and understanding how Jewish individuals perceive their safety, their social and institutional belonging, and their experiences with antisemitic manifestations in the country.**

The initiative is grounded in the recognition that **monitoring antisemitism cannot be limited to formal records of incidents.** In contexts involving numerical minorities, exclusively quantitative data tend to underestimate reality, whether due to underreporting, the normalization of offenses and hostility, or the absence of consistent state monitoring mechanisms (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – FRA, 2020). Moreover, public debate is often shaped by processes that delegitimize both the status of Jews as a minority group and the recognition of antisemitism as a contemporary form of prejudice. Absolute figures, already proportionally small, are frequently mobilized to relativize concrete experiences of exclusion, fear, or self-censorship.

In this context, **the survey seeks to make visible dimensions that rarely appear in criminal statistics, particularly forms of symbolic violence,** as conceptualized by Pierre Bourdieu (1989; 1998), manifested in discourse, stigmatization, public constraints, and everyday identity pressures. Although many of these experiences are not classified as crimes, they produce relevant subjective impacts, influencing behavior, social ties, and feelings of belonging.

The combination of quantitative and qualitative data aligns with international guidelines for human rights data production. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2018), through the Human Rights-Based Approach to Data (HRBAD), emphasizes that data collection concerning minority groups should **incorporate lived experiences, structural contexts, and subjective perceptions, thereby avoiding processes of invisibilization.** Similarly, the FRA (2017) highlights the need to combine quantitative surveys with qualitative analyses, as official records do not fully capture symbolic impacts and psychosocial effects. Drawing on the FRA methodology (2023), **the survey adopts elements of the IHRA definition of antisemitism as a conceptual reference, without imposing a fixed definition on respondents, thereby allowing the capture of subjective perceptions of hostility and discrimination.** The methodological design also engages with practices

adopted by institutions such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and the Community Security Trust (CST), seeking alignment with international standards of monitoring and active listening.

Objectives

The survey has the following objectives:

- To assess perceptions of identity security, exposure to antisemitism, self-censorship, and belonging;
- To investigate the subjective, symbolic, and psychological effects of anti-Jewish hostility, even when not classified as a crime;
- To measure the underreporting of incidents and understand its causes;
- To capture perceptions regarding media coverage, the educational environment, and contemporary forms of antizionism as a possible expression of antisemitism;
- To produce data to support the formulation of public policies for the protection and recognition of the Jewish community as a minority group.

Target Population and Outreach Challenges

The target population consisted of individuals recognized as Jewish by institutions linked to the federative system of Jewish communal representation, residing in Brazil, aged 16 or older, with or without institutional affiliation to Jewish organizations.

The sampling design faced two **structural challenges**. The first concerns the **absence of a unified registry of Jewish individuals in Brazil**. Beyond being nonexistent, such a registry would raise historical and security concerns, given that centralized records of Jewish identification were instrumentalized for persecutory purposes in twentieth-century European contexts (cf. Arendt, 1999). **The absence of such a registry, however, complicates the use of classical probabilistic sampling strategies.**

The second challenge relates to **the need to ensure that the instrument remained restricted to the Jewish community**, preventing external interference that could compromise the integrity of the sample, particularly in the context of heightened public debate following the events of October 7, 2023.

Under these conditions, **a non-probabilistic convenience sampling approach was adopted, structured through existing community networks**. Considering an estimated population of approximately 120,000 Jews in the country, the empirically reachable universe was concentrated in the community-active segment, that is, individuals who attend synagogues, schools, clubs, youth movements, and other institutions. Estimates from the Community Security Departments indicate that, during the High Holidays of the Jewish calendar, approximately 50,000 individuals attend such spaces, corresponding to about 41% of the estimated population. This group provided the operational basis for data collection, without implying any claim of statistical representativeness of the overall Brazilian Jewish population.

Data Collection Strategy and Integrity Safeguards

Data collection was structured in two complementary phases.

FIRST PHASE (SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 2025)

The federative structure of Brazilian Jewish institutions was mobilized. The Brazilian Israelite Confederation organized the survey instrument, which was transmitted to 18 Federations and Israelite Associations, and subsequently forwarded to their affiliated entities (synagogues, schools, youth movements, and community groups). At this stage, 580 responses were obtained.

SECOND PHASE (NOVEMBER 2025 TO JANUARY 2026)

Efforts were made to expand the number of respondents in the three states that, according to estimates, concentrate approximately 95% of the Brazilian Jewish population: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul. The Federations of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul provided email lists of active members.

To preserve the integrity of the sample, **each email address received an individualized link with a unique numerical identifier, protected by multiple layers of encryption.** The system prevented any association between responses and participants' identities, ensuring full anonymity. The form recognized the corresponding identifier and **counted only the first response submitted from each link, disregarding subsequent entries resulting from unauthorized sharing.**

Nevertheless, a **data breach and coordinated attack on the instrument were recorded between January 6 and 9, 2026**, resulting in invalid entries that were subsequently detected and excluded through consistency and integrity verification procedures.

Data Collection Instrument

The instrument consisted of an online questionnaire, with an estimated completion time of 10 to 15 minutes, structured into the following sections:

- Sociodemographic profile;
- Identity, Jewishness, and Judaism;
- Personal and community experience in the past year;
- General perceptions of antisemitism;
- Trust in institutions and protective mechanisms;
- Perceptions of media coverage and educational environments;
- Perceptions and projections regarding the future.

Sample Size

A total of 1,595 responses were submitted. After integrity verification, including the exclusion of duplicates and fraudulent responses resulting from unauthorized external dissemination, the final analyzed sample comprises 1,427 valid responses, with 168 entries classified as invalid.

As this is a non-probabilistic convenience sample, no formal calculation of margin of error or statistical confidence level applies. The results should be interpreted as descriptive and exploratory, even though the number of respondents exceeds the sample size that would be required in a probabilistic design for a finite population estimated at approximately 120,000 individuals.

Data Analysis

The quantitative data were processed using descriptive statistics, including the calculation of absolute and percentage frequencies, as well as means and standard deviations for perception scales.

Open-ended responses were examined through inductive thematic analysis, with the identification of recurring patterns and the categorization of reported experiences.

Among the potential methodological biases, the following stand out:

- Greater participation of institutionally engaged individuals;
- Underrepresentation of groups more distant from community life.

Ethics and Confidentiality

Participation was voluntary and anonymous. All respondents were informed about the objectives of the survey, and no personally identifiable data were collected. The technical mechanisms adopted sought to reconcile anonymity with data integrity.

The survey acknowledges the emotional sensitivity of the topics addressed, particularly in the context following the events of October 7, 2023, which had a significant impact on the global Jewish community.

Conclusion

The combination of these methodological choices—convenience sampling anchored in community networks, the integration of quantitative and qualitative data, and technical safeguards for anonymization and integrity control—defines both the scope and the limits of the study. Although it does not allow for statistical generalizations to the entirety of the Brazilian Jewish population, it provides a systematized overview of perceptions, experiences, and internal trends within the community, contributing to public debate and to the formulation of evidence-based policies.

6.2 Data analysis

Sociodemographic Profile

GENDER

57.5%
820 men



42.4%
605 women

0.1% 2 people preferred
not to answer

SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Heterosexual	Homosexual	Bisexual	Prefer not to answer	Other
1,373	20	15	13	6

AGE

16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-70	70+
5.0%	8.7%	10.0%	29.4%	28.2%	18.8%
72	124	142	419	402	268


RACE/ETHNICITY

White	Mixed	Prefer not to answer	Black
1,349	58	13	7

MARITAL STATUS

Married	Single	Divorced or separated	In a stable union	Widowed
888	219	161	109	50

POLITICAL POSITIONING



STATE

São Paulo (SP)	936	Rio Grande do Norte (RN)	16
Rio Grande do Sul (RS)	96	Goiás (GO)	14
Minas Gerais (MG)	78	Espírito Santo (ES)	13
Distrito Federal (DF)	49	Sergipe (SE)	5
Bahia (BA)	33	Amapá (AP)	4
Paraná (PR)	28	Maranhão (MA)	1
Ceará (CE)	28	Piauí (PI)	1
Pará (PA)	27	Amazonas (AM)	1
Santa Catarina (SC)	26	Alagoas (AL)	1
Pernambuco (PE)	24	Mato Grosso (MT)	1
Rio de Janeiro	23	Mato Grosso do Sul (MS)	1
Rondônia (RO)	21		

EDUCATION LEVEL

Completed undergraduate degree	Postgraduate degree	Master's degree	Incomplete undergraduate degree	Doctorate (PhD)	Postdoctoral studies
473	421	233	87	86	45
Completed high school	Completed elementary education	Technical degree	Incomplete high school		
39	20	12	11		

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Above 10 minimum wages	Prefer not to answer	6 to 10 minimum wages	4 to 5 minimum wages	2 to 3 minimum wages	Up to 2 minimum wages
820	225	215	84	53	30

FAMILY ORIGIN

Ashkenazi	Sephardi	Brazilian (without defined ancestral identification)	Do not know / Prefer not to answer	Beta Israel (Ethiopia)	Other
1,046	380	70	12	1	44

Are you a Holocaust survivor or a descendant of survivors?

733	I am neither a survivor nor a descendant.
340	Descendant of a survivor: second generation (grandchildren of survivors).
162	Descendant of a survivor: first generation (children of survivors).
155	Descendant of a survivor: third generation or more (great-grandchildren, etc.).
33	I do not know / Prefer not to answer.
4	I am a Holocaust survivor.

How often do you participate in Jewish community activities?

640	Frequently (more than 3 times per month)
367	Rarely (less than once per month)
367	Sometimes (1 to 3 times per month)
53	Never

Did you study/do you study in a Jewish school? If so, for how long?

530	Yes, 10 years or more.
517	No, I do not/did not study in a Jewish school.
143	Yes, between 4 and 6 years.
135	Yes, between 7 and 9 years.
92	Yes, between 1 and 3 years.
10	Prefer not to answer.

The survey included **1,427 valid respondents** and reveals a highly specific profile: a predominance of men (57%), mostly heterosexual, White (94.5%), and strongly concentrated in the state of São Paulo (66%). This is a largely mature population (over 75% are aged 45 or older), with high educational capital (a significant proportion holding postgraduate degrees, master's degrees, and doctorates) and income levels above 10 minimum wages. There is a predominance of Ashkenazi origin (73%) and a significant presence of descendants of Holocaust survivors (nearly half of the sample across different generations). Community engagement is notable, with most respondents participating in Jewish activities at least once per month, and there is a marked political inclination toward the center-right and right.

Given that this is a convenience sample, the findings cannot be considered representative of the entire Brazilian Jewish population—estimated at approximately 100,000 to 120,000 individuals—although they are relevant for identifying certain trends. The strong geographic concentration in São Paulo, the high socioeconomic profile, the elevated level of education,

the limited participation of younger individuals and racially diverse groups, as well as the overrepresentation of men, impose important analytical limitations. **The results therefore primarily reflect a segment that is institutionally engaged, older, and endowed with greater economic and cultural capital, which should be taken into account when interpreting the perceptions, positions, and trends identified throughout the analysis.**

Block 1 - Identity, Jewishness and Judaism

How do you define yourself/express your Jewish identity? Check all the options that apply.

1,296	Through Jewish values and education.
1,221	By celebrating important dates and Jewish holidays.
1,067	By attending synagogue on specific occasions.
1,046	Through zionism (support and/or connection with Israel).
902	Through Jewish religiosity.
758	By participating in community organizations.
627	Through volunteer work and social action (within the community and broader society).
498	Through Jewish cuisine and gastronomy.
321	Through cultural activities (art, dance, music).
267	By participating in Jewish youth movements and collectives.
246	Other.
0	None of the above.

How do you identify in relation to Jewish religiosity?

353	Traditional
305	Liberal
234	Secular
200	Conservative
148	Reform
95	Orthodox
60	I do not identify with any denomination
6	Ultra-Orthodox
27	Other

1. IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION OF JEWISHNESS

The analysis of Jewish identity among respondents reveals a **multifaceted profile** in which **ethical and cultural dimensions prevail over strict religious practice**. For the vast majority of the sample, **Jewishness is expressed primarily through Jewish values and education (cited by nearly all of the 1,427 respondents)**, which aligns with the high educational capital identified in the sociodemographic profile.

The main axes of identification are as follows:

- **Practical and Communal Identity:** The celebration of important dates and attendance at synagogue on specific occasions emerge as central forms of expression. This suggests a “calendar-based Jewishness,” common among institutionally engaged groups integrated into broader society.
- **The Pillar of Zionism:** The connection to the State of Israel and zionism appears as a fundamental component of identity for more than 70% of the sample. In the context of a survey on antisemitism, this is a critical finding: it indicates that antizionism is likely to be perceived by this group as a direct attack on their own identity.
- **Low Youth Engagement:** The limited relevance of youth movements within the sample corroborates the identified generational profile, with more than 75% of respondents aged over 45.

2. RELIGIOSITY PROFILE

With regard to religious practice, the sample is characterized by a **moderate and plural orientation**, with low representation of ultra-Orthodox sectors or of complete disengagement (atheism).

- **The Prevalence of Traditionalism:** The largest share of respondents identifies as “Traditional.” In the Brazilian context, this category generally refers to individuals who maintain respect for customs and traditions without necessarily adhering strictly to Orthodox Jewish law (Halacha) in everyday life.
- **Liberal-Secular Bloc:** When combined, the categories “Liberal,” “Secular,” and “Reform” constitute the majority of the sample. This reflects a group that reconciles Jewish identity with a modern and integrated worldview, consistent with the profile of high income and education in urban centers such as São Paulo.
- **Institutionalization:** The low proportion of respondents who “do not identify with any denomination” reinforces the institutionalized character of the sample, composed largely of individuals who circulate within and actively participate in community spaces.

BLOCK 2 - PERSONAL AND COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS

In the last 12 months, have you experienced or witnessed any antisemitic episode?
Select all that apply.¹

734	Yes, I heard/saw a comment or witnessed it indirectly.
396	I am not sure / Prefer not to answer.
373	Yes, I learned about an attack involving someone close (friend or family member)
269	Yes, I was a direct target.
168	Yes, I witnessed an attack against another person/group.

In the last 12 months, have you experienced or felt discrimination related to your Jewish identity in any of the following contexts? Select all that apply.

609	In online spaces (social media, forums, messages, etc.).
565	I have not experienced or felt discrimination related to my Jewish identity.
308	In non-Jewish social and/or community spaces.
260	In public spaces (streets, transportation, commercial establishments).
215	In the workplace/professional environment.
166	In educational environments (school, university, courses, etc.).
49	I do not know / Prefer not to answer.

EXPERIENCES AND EXPOSURE TO ANTISEMITISM (LAST 12 MONTHS)

The data indicate a **significant level of exposure to or perception of antisemitic episodes during the period analyzed**, with a predominance of **indirect experiences**, such as hearing comments or witnessing situations in a non-direct manner (734 mentions), followed by **reports of knowledge** of attacks involving people close to the respondent (373). A substantial number of respondents reported having been **direct targets** (269), in addition to those **who witnessed attacks against third parties** (168), indicating that the phenomenon also manifests in concrete personal experiences.

It is also noteworthy that 396 respondents selected the option **“Not sure / Prefer not to answer”**. **This result should be interpreted with caution**, however, since the question did not include a specific alternative to indicate the absence of any experience, which may have led some respondents without direct or indirect exposure to use this category as a residual

¹ An error was identified in the design of the question, which did not include an explicit response option corresponding to the absence of experience or witnessing of antisemitic episodes. As a result, some respondents who did not have such experiences may have selected the option “Not sure / Prefer not to answer” as a residual category. This limitation was taken into account in the interpretation of the data and will be corrected in subsequent versions of the instrument through the inclusion of a specific category that properly distinguishes between absence of experience, uncertainty, and refusal to respond.

option. Taking this limitation into account, the overall data nonetheless suggest that the circulation and perception of antisemitic episodes are present within the surveyed population, manifesting both through direct experiences and, above all, through indirect channels and networks of social proximity.

The 1,417 open-ended responses provide qualitative depth to this picture. There is a strong incidence of episodes occurring in online environments, with particular emphasis on antizionist discourse. Narratives of discomfort, fear, and tension in schools, universities, and workplaces are also frequent. Reports include direct verbal aggression—such as explicit insults and collective blame attributed to Jews for actions of the State of Israel—as well as attacks or hostility directed at identity symbols (such as the mezuzah, kippah, and Star of David).

The graph on contexts confirms this pattern: online spaces appear as the primary environment of discrimination (609), followed by interactions in non-Jewish social spaces, public spaces, and the professional environment. Although 565 respondents reported not having experienced discrimination, the data suggest that antisemitism—particularly mediated by digital environments and debates surrounding zionism—constitutes a relevant element in the recent identity experience of this segment. Given the non-representative and highly engaged profile of the sample, it is possible that there is greater sensitivity to and exposure to such episodes, **which should be taken into account when interpreting the results.**

ANTISEMITISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA

The “zoom-in” on social media reveals a digital environment that is deeply embedded in respondents’ daily lives: nearly all participants have accounts on digital platforms, with particular prominence of **WhatsApp (1,341), Instagram (1,216), and Facebook (1,060), and 1,322 report accessing them daily.** This finding is central for interpreting the previous results, as it indicates that exposure to online content is not episodic but structural in the group’s everyday experience.

Within this context of high connectivity, **824 respondents report having seen manifestations or attacks directed at others on social media, while 181 state that they themselves were direct targets.** In addition, there are frequent references to such **manifestations appearing in posts by Jewish organizations (807),** suggesting that perceived antisemitism does not circulate only in marginal spaces, but also within institutional environments and public pages associated with the community.

The frequency of exposure is also high: **749 respondents indicate encountering antisemitic content every day or almost every day, and a further 280 report exposure several times per week. Only 24 state that they have never seen such content.** In the perception of participants, Instagram concentrates the highest volume of antisemitic discourse (865 mentions), followed by Facebook and Twitter/X, which may reflect both the usage patterns of the sample and the algorithmic dynamics of these platforms.

Taken together, the data suggest that the digital environment operates as the primary contemporary vector for the circulation of hostile discourse, reinforcing the centrality of social media in the recent experience of antisemitism within this segment. However, given the highly connected, institutionally engaged, and politically attentive profile of the sample, there may be heightened sensitivity, monitoring, and perception of such manifestations, which should be taken into account in the analysis.

Do you have accounts on social networks/media platforms/messaging applications?

Select all that apply.

1,341	WhatsApp	372	Twitter/X
1,216	Instagram	349	Telegram
1,060	Facebook	95	Other ²
689	Youtube		

How often do you access social networks/use media platforms and messaging applications?

1,322	Every day.
53	About 3 times per week.
23	Rarely.
19	Once or twice per week.
8	I do not access social networks, media platforms, or messaging applications.
2	I do not know / Not applicable.

Have you seen or been the target of antisemitic manifestations on social media in the last 12 months? Select all that apply.


822	Yes, I saw manifestations and/or attacks against others.
807	Yes, in posts by Jewish organizations (CONIB, StandWithUs Brazil, Brazil-Israel Institute, others).
291	No.
181	Yes, I was directly targeted.
16	I do not know / Prefer not to answer.

In the last 12 months, how often have you encountered antisemitic manifestations, comments, and/or posts on social media?


405	Almost every day.
344	Every day.
280	Several times per week.
215	Several times per month.
136	Rarely.
24	Never.
23	I do not know / Not applicable.

² The "Other" category includes the following platforms mentioned by respondents: LinkedIn, TikTok, Threads, Reddit, and Discord.

Which platforms do you consider to have the highest volume of antisemitic discourse?
Select all that apply.



In the last 12 months, have you or someone you know refrained from saying they are Jewish in a conversation, social, or professional situation due to feeling unsafe?
Select all that apply.



The data on identity concealment reveal concrete impacts of the experiences and perceptions of antisemitism presented in the previous sections. Although 615 respondents state that they have never felt the need to hide their Jewish identity, more than half of the sample reports some form of direct or indirect experience of self-censorship: 320 have refrained from identifying as Jewish out of fear, 250 report having considered doing so, and 393 indicate that this has occurred with people close to them. In other words, even if concealment is not the majority behavior, it remains a real and present possibility within the repertoire of action of a significant portion of respondents.

When analyzed in light of the data from Block 2, which indicate high exposure to antisemitic manifestations—particularly in digital, educational, and political environments—this result suggests that the experience of antisemitism is not limited to an abstract perception of the phenomenon, but produces subjective and behavioral effects. **The need (or consideration) to conceal identity points to a sense of situational vulnerability, especially in social and professional contexts.**

Given the profile of the sample—predominantly adult, highly educated, high-income, and strongly engaged in community life—this finding is particularly significant. **It reflects a group with substantial social and cultural capital that nonetheless reports adopting strategies of identity-based self-protection.** This reinforces the hypothesis that a perceived hostile environment has direct repercussions on how Jewish identity is publicly expressed.

Block 3 – General Perceptions of Antisemitism

The perception that antisemitism constitutes a problem in Brazil is virtually unanimous among respondents: approximately **1,000 classify it as a serious problem** and another **380 as an existing, though not severe, issue**. Only a residual minority states that it is not a problem. This near consensus indicates that, for the surveyed segment, antisemitism is not perceived as a marginal or episodic phenomenon, but as a concrete and relevant issue in the national context.


This perception is reinforced by the temporal evaluation of the phenomenon: **the overwhelming majority of respondents report that antisemitism increased following the events of October 7, 2023**, with 1,231 stating that it “increased significantly” and another 145 that it “increased somewhat.” Perceptions of stability (29) or decrease (5 in total) are residual, as are those who were unable to assess (17). This pattern indicates not only recognition of the problem’s existence, but also the perception of a recent and significant intensification, suggesting a deterioration of the social climate and an increased sense of vulnerability during the period analyzed.

Regarding the spaces where antisemitism most frequently manifests, educational institutions (schools and universities) stand out, with approximately **1,058 mentions, followed by the political environment** (discourses and actions of public figures), with around 985 mentions. Social media also appears prominently, both in general terms and through specific references to platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and X/Twitter. Traditional media outlets, including television, newspapers, and radio, are likewise identified as recurring spaces of manifestation. This set of findings suggests that the phenomenon is perceived as transversal, cutting across institutional and formative spaces as well as digital and media environments, thereby reinforcing the sense of its social pervasiveness.


With respect to contemporary forms of antisemitism, **the most frequently cited are offensive comments on social media (approximately 1,200 mentions), antizionism (1,182), and denial or trivialization of the Holocaust (1,073)**. Conspiracy theories involving Jews are also prominent. Physical violence or vandalism is mentioned by a smaller, though still significant, number of respondents, indicating that while symbolic and discursive forms predominate, more explicit and material manifestations also form part of the perceived repertoire of experiences.

When asked about the groups or sectors most associated with antisemitism, the majority of respondents point to **far-left groups, academic/university sectors, and groups linked to anti-Israel causes, while far-right groups receive a substantially lower number of mentions**. **This pattern reveals a strongly politicized perception of the phenomenon, associating it primarily with specific ideological fields and with debates surrounding Israel.** Given the profile of the sample—predominantly older, highly educated, strongly engaged in community life, and inclined toward the center-right—it is possible that these attributions also reflect prior political orientations, which should be carefully considered in the analytical interpretation.

In your opinion, is antisemitism currently a problem in Brazil?




After October 7, 2023, do you think antisemitism in Brazil has...




Which forms of antisemitism do you perceive most frequently in Brazil today?

Select all that apply..



Multiple choice question, based on 1,427 responses.

Currently, do you perceive that manifestations of antisemitism are more frequently practiced by any specific social group in Brazil? If yes, which ones?
Select all that apply.³



CONTOURS AND CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM

In order to understand how respondents conceptually delimit antisemitism—particularly in its intersections with public debate about Israel—statements related both to the Jewish community and to the State of Israel were presented. For each statement, participants were asked to indicate whether they considered it antisemitic, not antisemitic, or whether the assessment would depend on context or the speaker. The aim was not to identify “correct” answers, but to map the perceptions, criteria, and symbolic boundaries mobilized by respondents themselves in classifying the phenomenon.

The results reveal important distinctions in how different types of statements are interpreted. **Phrases historically associated with classical stereotypes or with the idea of dual loyalty, such as “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country where they live,” are widely recognized as antisemitic** (975 classify it as antisemitic, compared to 140 who do not and 290 who indicate it depends on context). **The same applies to “Free Palestine from the river to the sea,” classified as antisemitic by a large majority (1,287), as well as the statement that “ Hamas is a legitimate political movement” (1,109) and the claim that “Israel is committing genocide in Gaza” (1,103),** although in the latter case there is a more significant presence of responses rejecting this classification (133) or considering it contextual (172). These data indicate a high sensitivity to statements perceived as forms of delegitimization or existential threat to the State of Israel.


By contrast, **formulations that constitute direct criticism of the Israeli government show a more balanced distribution.** The statement that “Israel does not do enough to protect civilians in Gaza” was classified as antisemitic by 483 respondents, while 411 state that it is not,

³ The political terms used in this question (such as “far-left” and “far-right”) were not previously defined and were interpreted by respondents according to their own perceptions and frames of reference. The responses therefore reflect subjective perceptions and may be subject to attribution and salience biases. The results should be interpreted as indicators of social perception, not as an objective measure of actual incidence by group or sector.

and 513 consider that it depends on context. Similarly, the statement that “The current Israeli government maintains the war to stay in power and avoid legal proceedings” was considered antisemitic by 438 respondents, but a majority classified it as not antisemitic (556), with 388 indicating that it depends on context. This pattern suggests that **a significant portion of the sample distinguishes, at least in part, between criticism of the Israeli government and antisemitic manifestations, recognizing intermediate interpretive zones.**

A particularly relevant point emerges in statements with apparently positive content, such as “Jews know how to make money” and “Jews always prosper wherever they go.” The former was classified as antisemitic by 895 respondents, while 389 indicated that it depends on context and 134 considered it not antisemitic. The latter was classified as antisemitic by 744 respondents, with 437 indicating that it depends on context and 232 stating that it is not. These results reveal sensitivity to the logic of essentializing stereotypes, even when formulated in seemingly complimentary terms. This pattern points to recognition of so-called philosemitism as part of the same symbolic matrix that underpins classical antisemitism, insofar as it attributes homogeneous and essentialized characteristics to a social group. The significant presence of the “depends on context” response in these statements indicates an awareness of ambiguity, but the predominance of classification as antisemitic suggests a relatively sophisticated understanding of contemporary symbolic mechanisms of othering and stigmatization.

Perception of Antisemitic Statements



CRITERIA FOR DISTINGUISHING HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION


When asked about their **ability to distinguish hate speech from the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression**, the vast majority of respondents report being able to make this distinction. Only 47 state that they have difficulty, and 24 indicate that they do not know or are unsure, suggesting that a perception of conceptual clarity predominates within the sample.

Among the criteria most frequently mentioned for categorizing something as hate speech are offensive or demonizing comparisons, such as **equating Israel with Nazism or the Holocaust** (1,295 mentions), followed by **denial, trivialization, or glorification of the Holocaust** (1,291), **collective blame attributed to Jews, zionists, or Israelis** (1,257), and **denial of Israel’s legitimacy or advocacy for its elimination** (1,243). **Incitement to violence or dehumanizing comments** also appear with high frequency (1,178), along with **harsh criticism of the Israeli government without clear distinction between government and people** (1,053), and **the use of conspiracy theories or stereotypes** (1,019).

Taken together, the responses indicate that **respondents tend to define hate speech primarily through elements of dehumanization, collective generalization, and denial of historical or political legitimacy**. It is noteworthy that the boundary is not limited to explicitly violent content, but also includes **the attribution of collective responsibility and the use of historical analogies considered offensive**. This pattern reinforces the centrality of Israel as an identity component and suggests that, for this segment, discourse is perceived as antisemitic when it moves beyond political criticism and assumes characteristics of essentialization, demonization, or denial of collective rights.

When faced with critical comments about Jews, zionism, or Israel, are you able to distinguish between hate speech and the exercise of freedom of expression?


If yes, which elements do you usually consider when categorizing something as hate speech?
Select all that apply.



BLOCK 4 – TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AND PROTECTION MECHANISMS

Assessment of the level of trust of the Jewish community in institutions and mechanisms for combating antisemitism in Brazil (analysis limited to Jewish organizations).


1. CONIB – BRAZILIAN ISRAELITE CONFEDERATION



Regarding the level of trust of the surveyed Jewish community in its federal-level representative institution, CONIB, the data indicate a pattern of confidence that is replicated in responses concerning the Community Security Departments and regional federations. Out of the 1,427 responses to this question, **1,060 report fully trusting the institution, while 276 state that they trust it partially. Levels of distrust are significantly low:** 57 indicate having little confidence, and only 16 report not trusting the institution. The option “do not know / no opinion” was selected by 18 participants.

These figures reveal a context of **high legitimacy and consolidated institutional capital within the community itself**. The strong predominance of full trust suggests broad recognition of CONIB as a legitimate representative body, capable of articulating collective interests and acting publicly in defense of the community.

2. DSC – COMMUNITY SECURITY DEPARTMENT




With regard to the perception and level of trust of the Jewish community in the Community Security Department (DSC), the data indicate a **high level of confidence, very similar to that observed for CONIB itself**. The option “fully trust” was selected by 955 respondents, while another 248 reported trusting partially. Levels of distrust are substantially low: 52 individuals indicated having little confidence, and only 24 stated that they do not trust the institution. Although relatively small, the share of “do not know / no opinion” responses may warrant attention, as it was selected by 148 respondents.

These results point to a context of **strong operational and institutional legitimacy of the DSC within the community**. The predominance of full trust suggests recognition of the department’s effectiveness, professionalism, and central role in community protection, particularly in a context in which security-related issues are highly sensitive. **The presence of respondents selecting “do not know / no opinion” may reflect limited direct contact with the department’s work, rather than active rejection.**

When compared to the data on the high level of trust observed in CONIB, the DSC displays a similarly robust pattern of confidence, with very low levels of explicit rejection. This suggests that, within the community, institutions directly associated with protection and security tend to concentrate higher levels of consensus and support, reflecting the centrality of security concerns in the contemporary experience of the surveyed population.

3. YOUR FEDERATION (FISESP, FIERJ, FIRS, OTHERS)



With regard to trust in the Federations, the data also indicate a **high level of institutional legitimacy**. A total of 1,009 respondents report fully trusting the Federations, while 265 state that they trust them partially. Levels of distrust remain low: 59 participants indicate having little confidence, and 31 report that they do not trust them. Another 63 respondents state that they do not know or have no opinion.

This pattern reveals a relevant level of trust in the community’s intermediate organizational bodies. **The predominance of full trust suggests recognition of the Federations’ role in regional coordination, local political representation, and the organization of community initiatives.**

Trust in Community Institutions

The high levels of trust observed in CONIB, the Community Security Departments (DSCs), and the state Federations should be interpreted in light of the study's methodological design and the profile of the surveyed population. In the absence of a unified registry of the Jewish population in Brazil, a non-probabilistic convenience sampling strategy was adopted, with the questionnaire distributed through the federative structure itself—from CONIB to the Federations, and from these to their affiliated institutions and active membership lists. As a result, the sample is concentrated in a segment already embedded in and engaged with community life. The organic proximity between respondents and the institutions evaluated helps explain the high levels of trust, which reflect recognition of these entities' roles in political representation, community coordination, and the promotion of security.

4. HAVE YOU EVER USED ANY OF THE OFFICIAL CHANNELS TO REPORT A CASE OF ANTISEMITISM?

Use of official channels for reporting antisemitism.

62.01%	885	No.
32.58%	465	Yes.
4.62%	66	I didn't know they existed..
0.77%	11	I prefer not to answer..

When asked whether they had ever used official channels to report a case of antisemitism, the data indicate that the majority of respondents have not made use of these mechanisms. A total of **885 participants reported not using official channels, while 465 stated that they had done so.** A smaller group of 66 respondents indicated that they were not aware of the existence of such channels, and a residual group preferred not to respond.


The results suggest a significant underutilization of formal reporting mechanisms, even though nearly one-third of the sample reports having used them. The predominance of negative responses may reflect different factors: absence of direct experiences with reportable incidents, perceptions of limited institutional effectiveness, lack of knowledge about reporting procedures, or symbolic and practical barriers to formalizing complaints. The fact that a portion of respondents was unaware of these channels reinforces the hypothesis of informational gaps.

Considering the high levels of trust observed in community institutions, particularly in CONIB and the DSC, **the data point to a possible disconnect between institutional trust and**

the effective use of formal reporting mechanisms. This suggests that, although these institutions enjoy legitimacy, there **may be a need for greater dissemination, simplification, or encouragement of the use of official channels as part of a systematic strategy to address antisemitism.**

5. THINKING ABOUT EPISODES OF ANTISEMITISM THAT YOU DID NOT REPORT, FOR WHAT REASONS DID YOU CHOOSE NOT TO REPORT IT? CHECK ALL THAT APPLY.

Why did you not report an episode of antisemitism, if experienced?



It should be noted that this question allowed respondents to select multiple factors or justifications for not reporting perceived antisemitic incidents. This possibility helps contextualize reporting behavior. **When a significant number of respondents state that they have never used official channels to report antisemitism, this should not be understood merely as individual inertia, but rather as indicative of an institutional environment perceived as limited in responsiveness or effectiveness.** Trust is a central factor in the willingness to activate formal mechanisms, and the data suggest fragility in this relationship.

Among the reasons for not reporting, **it is particularly noteworthy that 200 respondents explicitly indicate a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of reporting**—that is, they do not believe authorities will act or that the procedure will produce concrete results. This is a sensitive finding, as it points to a perceived problem of institutional legitimacy or of the processes following the submission of a report. It is therefore not only a matter of lack of awareness of reporting channels (11.84%), but also of active distrust in their effectiveness and reach among those who are aware of them.

In addition, **250 participants report preferring to handle the issue personally or within the community**, suggesting a shift of trust toward internal networks rather than public structures. While this may strengthen community cohesion, it also signals a gap in the

⁴ The question did not include the option “I did not report because there was never a need / I did not experience an incident,” including only “not applicable / I have already reported,” which may have grouped distinct situations into a single category. This limitation should be taken into account when interpreting the data. Nevertheless, the number of respondents who report not reporting due to fear or lack of confidence in the effectiveness of reporting is higher, highlighting the relevance of these barriers.

integration between the community and the formal justice system.

The most sensitive factors, however, are those related to subjective security. A total of **8.05% (115 responses) mention concern about social exposure or repercussions, and another 95 respondents report fear of retaliation or negative consequences.** Although these figures are proportionally smaller than other reported reasons, they are qualitatively significant. Fear of retaliation indicates a perception of real or symbolic risk, while concern about social exposure points to vulnerability in academic, professional, or digital environments. When combined with the lack of confidence in the effectiveness of reporting, these factors form a context in which **the perceived cost of reporting may outweigh its expected benefits.** Analytically, this suggests that policies aimed at encouraging reporting should not focus solely on the dissemination of reporting channels, but also on strengthening institutional trust, ensuring protection for complainants, and reducing the social stigma associated with reporting.

6. WHAT DO YOU USUALLY DO WHEN YOU EXPERIENCE OR WITNESS A SITUATION OF ANTISEMITISM?
SELECT ALL THAT APPLY

What do you do when experiencing/witnessing antisemitism?

59.21%	845	I share it with others (family members, friends from the Jewish community or outside it, social media).
50.38%	719	I inform a Jewish support or security organization.
27.82%	397	I try to distance myself or avoid the topic/situation (avoid discussing, minimize, avoid similar spaces).
26.20%	374	I react verbally or physically at the moment of the offense/aggression.
15.90%	227	I have never experienced or witnessed situations of antisemitism.
2.24%	32	Prefer not to answer.

This was a multiple-choice question. The data indicate that, in response to episodes of antisemitism, the predominant reaction is relational and community-based: **845 respondents (59.21%) report sharing the experience with others**, such as family members, friends, or on social media, and another **50.38% inform Jewish support or security organizations.** This pattern reinforces what has already been observed in previous sections: trust is strongly concentrated in community structures, while formal state channels are less frequently activated. The initial response to such episodes thus tends to be horizontal (based on networks of trust) and institutionally communal, rather than vertical (through the formal justice system). This finding is consistent with the high levels of trust observed in organizations such as CONIB, the DSC, and the Federations.

At the same time, **397 participants report choosing to distance themselves or avoid the topic or situation**, for instance by avoiding discussions or spaces where they might encounter potential aggressors. Conversely, more than **20% of respondents report reacting verbally or physically at the moment of the offense.** These two responses point to distinct but equally sensitive dynamics: on the one hand, strategies of self-protection and reduced exposure;

on the other, immediate and potentially emotional reactions, which may occur in contexts of vulnerability or absence of institutional mediation. Avoidance may reflect accumulated fatigue, **a perception of the futility of confrontation, or fear of escalation, whereas direct reaction suggests that, in many cases, the experience of antisemitism is sufficiently impactful to provoke immediate confrontation, even outside formal channels.**

A particularly relevant finding is that **227 individuals report never having experienced or witnessed antisemitic situations, implying that the vast majority of respondents have been exposed, directly or indirectly, to such occurrences.** When this figure is considered alongside previous results—especially the low use of official channels and the reasons associated with distrust in their effectiveness, fear of retaliation, and concern about social exposure—a structural pattern emerges: **the experience of antisemitism is widespread, but the institutional formalization of responses remains limited.** Responses occur predominantly within the private and community sphere, while the formal system remains a secondary recourse. From a strategic perspective, this suggests that policies aimed at strengthening reporting should integrate three simultaneous dimensions: institutional trust, effective protection of complainants, and more visible coordination between community structures and public authorities.

BLOCK 5 – PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA COVERAGE AND EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

In this section, questions were designed to assess how the Jewish community perceives the way media outlets and educational environments (schools and universities) portray issues related to antisemitism, antizionism, and the Jewish community, including potential biases, stigmatization, and silencing.

1. IN YOUR OPINION, HOW DOES THE BRAZILIAN MEDIA PORTRAY THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND CASES OF ANTISEMITISM?

Perception of Brazilian media coverage

40.71%	581	I do not feel it covers it adequately.
39.66%	566	It depends on the channel/outlet/media source.
16.11%	230	Sometimes it covers it adequately, sometimes not.
2.17%	31	I feel it covers it adequately.
1.33%	19	I am not sure / Prefer not to answer.

Regarding how the Brazilian media portrays the Jewish community and cases of antisemitism, the data indicate a **predominantly critical or conditional perception among the 1,427 respondents.** The most frequent responses fall into the categories **“it depends on the channel/outlet/media source” (39.66%, 566 responses)** and **“I do not feel it covers it adequately” (40.71%, 581 responses),** followed by “sometimes it covers it adequately, sometimes not” (230 responses). Taken together, these categories show that **the majority of the sample does not perceive media coverage as consistent, balanced, or satisfactory,**

suggesting evaluations marked by reservations, distrust, or perceptions of inadequacy.

The low incidence of the response “I feel it covers it adequately,” reported by only 31 respondents, reinforces the interpretation that positive perceptions of media coverage are residual. This finding is significant, as it points to a **fragility in the Jewish community’s trust in the media’s role as a responsible and informed mediator on issues related to antisemitism**. At the same time, the predominance of the conditional response—“it depends on the outlet”—indicates that this assessment is not homogeneous, but varies according to editorial lines, narrative approaches, and discursive choices adopted by different media organizations.

More broadly, the results suggest that the community perceives problems not only in the presence or absence of coverage, but particularly in the framing adopted, the historical contextualization provided, and the way in which antisemitic incidents are interpreted or linked to broader political debates. This critical reading of the media aligns with concerns about bias, silencing, and relativization, especially in contexts where antisemitism is associated with discussions about Israel and antizionism. The data thus reveal a relationship characterized by scrutiny, selectivity, and an expectation of greater informational responsibility on the part of the Brazilian press.

2. WHEN CHOOSING A UNIVERSITY, HOW MUCH WEIGHT DO REPORTS OF ANTISEMITISM ON CAMPUS HAVE IN YOUR DECISION (FOR YOU OR YOUR CHILD)?

Weight of reports of antisemitism in university choice

66.22%	945	Very important.
19.27%	275	Not applicable / Prefer not to answer.
10.37%	148	Of little importance.
4.13%	59	Not important.

The data indicate that reports of antisemitism in university environments have a significant impact on educational decision-making within the Jewish community. Of the 1,427 respondents, 945 classify this factor as “very important,” representing a clear majority of the sample. In contrast, only small portions consider the issue “of little importance” (148) or “not important” (4.13% of responses), while a relevant intermediate group—275 respondents—selected “not applicable / prefer not to answer.” This distribution shows that symbolic and institutional security has become a central criterion in the university selection process.

This finding suggests that the university environment is perceived as a space of potential identity vulnerability. Unlike other dimensions analyzed previously, such as trust in political institutions, governments, or the justice system, this result does not reflect institutional evaluation, but rather a preventive risk assessment. The university is no longer viewed solely as an academic space, but is also evaluated as a social and political environment in which hostile discourse, stigmatization, or antisemitic incidents may directly affect Jewish students.

The centrality of this factor can be understood in light of the recent international context, marked by the intensification of tensions on university campuses following October 7 and


by the amplification of debates on antizionism, academic freedom, and student safety. Although the survey is national and intracommunal, the data indicate that the perception of risk extends beyond isolated cases and influences structural decisions regarding educational mobility. It thus constitutes a relevant indicator of how contemporary antisemitism affects practical choices and academic trajectories.

BLOCK 6 – PERCEPTIONS AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

In this section, we seek to assess the view of the Jewish community on expectations regarding the evolution of the problem (antisemitism) in the short and medium term.

1. HOW WILL ANTISEMITISM IN BRAZIL BE IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS?

What antisemitism in Brazil will look like in 5 years...



The responses to this question indicate a **broadly pessimistic expectation regarding the evolution of antisemitism in Brazil in the medium term.** The majority of respondents believe that the phenomenon “will increase a lot” (624 responses), followed by a also significant group who expect it to “increase somewhat” (399 responses). Taken together, these two categories reflect a dominant perception of worsening. In contrast, options indicating stability or decrease appear in significantly smaller proportions, with only a residual group projecting a substantial reduction in the problem. For 224 respondents, antisemitism in Brazil will “remain the same,” while 57 believe it will “decrease somewhat.” Only 5 respondents (0.35%) selected “will decrease a lot.”

The predominance of expectations of growth suggests that antisemitism is perceived not as an episodic or conjunctural phenomenon, but as a structural trend in consolidation.


The presence of a segment that believes the phenomenon will “remain the same” indicates that **part of the community perceives it as already stabilized at a high level**, which also does not represent a scenario of reassurance. The low proportion of responses pointing to a decrease reflects the absence of a consistent optimistic outlook within the sample.

This projection should be interpreted in light of the recent context, marked by political

polarization, the intensification of public debate about Israel, and the expanded circulation of hostile discourse on social media. **The expectation of growth may influence preventive behaviors, institutional strategies, and family decisions, such as those already observed in the choice of educational environments.** It thus constitutes a relevant indicator of the perceived climate of insecurity and of the need for strategic planning by community leadership.

2. THREATS CONSIDERED MOST CONCERNING FOR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN THE FUTURE

Which threats do you consider most concerning for the jewish community in the future?
Select up to 3 options.



The data show that **the primary perceived threat to the future of the Jewish community is online hate speech on social media, cited by 81.49% of respondents (1,163 individuals).** This figure is significantly higher than all other categories, indicating that the digital sphere is seen as the contemporary epicenter of anti-Jewish hostility. This perception is consistent with findings from other sections of the survey, including the widespread expectation of growth in antisemitism over the next five years and concerns regarding university and media environments. The virtual space is understood not merely as a site of opinion, but as an environment that amplifies, normalizes, and accelerates the circulation of stereotypes, disinformation, and radicalization.

Secondarily, but still at very high levels, respondents identify **the growth of antizionism in universities (975 respondents, approximately 70%), acts of physical violence or vandalism (784), and disinformation and stereotypes in the media (55%).** The combination of these factors reveals a perception of risk that spans both symbolic and material dimensions. On the one hand, there is concern with ideological narratives and opinion-forming environments; on the other, there is apprehension about the potential translation of such hostility into physical violence. Universities emerge as particularly sensitive spaces, consistent with earlier findings that assign substantial weight to reports of antisemitism in the choice of educational institutions. The media, in turn, appears again as a central axis, reinforcing the view that narrative framing directly shapes the social climate and perceived security.

It is noteworthy that **only 7 participants—less than 1%—consider that there are no relevant threats to the Jewish community, indicating an almost unanimous perception of the existence of structural risks.** In addition, 36.15% mention the lack of education about


the Holocaust and Jewish history, and nearly 32% point to the absence of effective public policies as threats, expanding the analysis to longer-term dimensions. This suggests that the issue is not limited to reacting to isolated events, but also involves addressing educational and institutional gaps that may contribute to the persistence of the problem. Consistent with the overall findings of the study, a scenario emerges in which antisemitism is perceived as a growing, multifaceted, and interconnected phenomenon: driven by digital narratives, intensified within academic and media environments, and potentially translating into concrete violence. This reading underscores the need for responses that combine education, regulation of hate speech, institutional strengthening, and coordination between the community and public authorities.

New Normal?

The conclusion that a “new normal” is being consolidated—understood as the stabilization of antisemitism at historically elevated levels, beyond temporary peaks—finds support in the projections of the Jewish community itself. The intracomunity survey indicates that the majority of respondents believe that antisemitism will continue to grow over the next five years, while a significant portion considers that the problem will “remain the same.” This latter response does not suggest reassurance, but rather the perception that the phenomenon is already stabilized at a high level. Only a residual fraction projects a decrease. The combination of this pessimistic prospective scenario with the identification of structural threats—such as online hate speech, hostility in universities, and disinformation in the media—reinforces the interpretation that the community does not view the current context as temporary. The shift in collective expectations points to the need for permanent strategies of monitoring, prevention, and institutional resilience.

3. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT BRAZIL HAS TAKEN ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO ADDRESS ANTISEMITISM?

Do you believe that Brazil (the State and/or government) has taken all necessary actions to reduce and address antisemitism?



The results of this question reveal a broadly critical assessment of the performance of the Brazilian State (State and/or government) in addressing antisemitism. The response “No” accounts for the overwhelming majority of respondents, with 1,279 responses (89.62%), while the options “Yes” (43) and “Do not know / Not sure” (105) appear in significantly smaller proportions. This distribution indicates a predominant perception of insufficiency in the measures adopted by public authorities.

This finding is directly aligned with the expectation of increasing antisemitism identified in the previous question. The combination of a pessimistic outlook and a negative evaluation of state action suggests that a substantial portion of the community perceives not only a rise in risk, but also a lack of a proportional institutional response. This is a relevant result, as it points to a **possible deficit of confidence in the capacity of public authorities to provide adequate protection, formulate preventive policies, or effectively enforce existing legislation.**

Moreover, the near absence of affirmative responses indicates that, for most of the sample, governmental actions—whether normative, educational, or repressive—are not perceived as sufficient or effective. This pattern may influence demands for stronger coordination between community leadership and public authorities, the strengthening of legal frameworks, the expansion of educational programs, and the improvement of monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

6.3 Personal accounts of antisemitism

One hundred accounts of antisemitism

This subsection brings together personal accounts submitted in response to the open-ended question that allowed participants to describe experiences of antisemitism occurring over the past 12 months, whether directly experienced or witnessed. Out of 1,049 valid entries, 100 accounts were selected as representative of the diversity of experiences reported, with the original wording of respondents preserved.

The purpose of this qualitative sample is to illustrate, through the participants’ own words, the multiplicity of situations of prejudice and discrimination encountered in everyday life. The perceptions recorded are strictly personal in nature and reflect individual experiences, not necessarily corresponding to the methodological classification adopted for the quantitative analysis of incidents in other sections of the report.

The accounts were transcribed verbatim, maintaining the original spelling and grammar. Ellipses were used only to indicate the omission of extended excerpts, in order to preserve objectivity and readability.

The selection and organization of the narratives sought to capture the diversity of contexts in which these episodes occurred, as well as the intensity of their practical and emotional impacts. The accounts are grouped into thematic axes that highlight different dimensions

of contemporary antisemitism in Brazil. Among the recurring aspects are the rupture of social ties, the use of essentializing stereotypes, restrictions on access to professional opportunities and services, episodes of physical aggression, harassment and intimidation in public spaces, the distorted mobilization of Holocaust memory against Jews—including through accusations of Nazism or genocide—and manifestations of hostility in school and university environments.

Loss of Friends, Family Ties, and Social Relationships

1. “Some coworkers and even non-Jewish friends avoided speaking to me after the conflict in Gaza [...] This led me to distance myself from them...”
2. “During the Israel–Hamás conflict, students at [...] harassed members of my family. These students, who even claimed to be close to them, in their anti-Israel rhetoric, were verbally aggressive toward my relatives...”
3. “A childhood friend posted on social media (Instagram and Twitter) that she wished all Jews would burn to death, that we did not deserve to live.”
4. “A former schoolmate [...] unleashed all his anger on me in a completely decontextualized way, starting by calling me a ‘fucking Zionist,’ then a genocidal cow, ‘congratulations, you managed to surpass the Holocaust’...”
5. “A coworker thought it was appropriate to say that she wished I had gone to the Holocaust.”
6. “I was no longer invited to the birthday party of a close friend because many ‘pro-Palestine’ people would be there.”
7. “A divorced friend was getting to know someone and, when that person found out she was Jewish, they stopped communicating.”
8. “A recently divorced friend reported meeting someone who, upon learning she was Jewish, had to stop seeing her due to incompatibility stemming from the other person’s prejudice.”
9. “Someone was afraid to tell their own friends that they were engaged to an Israeli because they knew he would be called a genocidal.”
10. “I cut ties with three people because of accusations.”
11. “After October 7, some former students—from a graduate program in Communication—distanced themselves from me; some even said they liked me very much but that ‘now it’s no longer possible...’”
12. “My daughter’s friends distanced themselves from her because she is Jewish and her husband is Israeli, after the events in Gaza.”
13. “Friends who support the Brazilian left isolating a friend simply for identifying with the Jewish people.”

Antisemitism in the School and University Environment

14. “I have a university professor at [...] who has made several antisemitic statements, such as: ‘It is necessary to create an insecticide to eliminate the Jewish plague’...”
15. “A professor at my university made several comments such as ‘Jews are perverse’ or shared various incorrect statements about World War II, such as ‘Jews were killed for economic reasons’...”
16. “I revealed that I was Jewish during a history class, and the teacher made jokes related to my religion, such as jokes about Adolf Hitler and his actions.”
17. “My son, at a public school, was isolated by classmates encouraged by the religious education teacher because he is Jewish and does not believe in Jesus...”
18. “A WhatsApp group that listed Jews at a university and openly talked about how they wished these Jews would be killed by bombs or should be ‘canceled’.”
19. “Evangelical academics assaulted me because I do not idolize Jesus. They called me Judas in the middle of a classroom at the university.”
20. “At my daughter’s school, in a class of 8-year-old children, a classmate who had been her best friend until then called her a ‘dirty Jew’ for no reason.”
21. “A Jewish child at my son’s school (3rd grade of elementary school) was insulted as ‘fucking Jew’.”
22. “My grandson, in São Paulo, had to change schools (public) after being repeatedly assaulted by classmates who identified themselves as ‘pro-Palestinian supporters’.”
23. “My grandson studies at a private non-Jewish school. He became a target of bullying after October 7 by teachers at the school... They openly declared themselves in favor of Hamas.”
24. “When I was in college in 1997, a professor called me ‘little Jew’ and said that my place was not there!”
25. “I am a student at [...] and I routinely witness antisemitic incidents, whether from students, professors, or staff.”
26. “My girlfriend experienced antisemitism at her university, directly from a professor who did not know she was Jewish. She expressed insults and hatred toward the Jewish people and Israel.”
27. “My granddaughter (15 years old) attended a non-Jewish school and, returning from recess, noticed a swastika drawn on her desk. She immediately reported it to the administration, repeatedly, but no action was taken until she decided to change schools.”

Antisemitic Essentializations, Generalizations, and Stereotypes

28. “I heard people on the street say that Jews control politicians. I also heard that a singer recorded in Hebrew and performs at bar mitzvahs because she likes money.”
29. “An older man told me that Jews were going through the war because they had a reason. [...] He concluded by saying that Jews are still persecuted today because they invented interest.”

30. “At work, I heard someone who had taken a genetic ancestry test say that their blood was ‘bad’ because it had a percentage of ‘Jewish’.”
31. “I was the target of stereotypes such as: ‘I understand your persecutory personality, I know many Jews like that, it’s understandable.’ [...] Any complaint or grievance at work was dismissed because it was attributed to this label.”
32. “I heard from a diplomat in my network that Jews ‘play the victim’ because ‘there are no poor Jews’ and that everyone living in Brazil is very ‘safe and well off’.”
33. “At the company where I worked, the CEO (owner) and his son made stereotypical jokes about Jews on two different occasions, such as having ‘salesman’s blood’ and being ‘tight-fisted’.”
34. “During my last professional engagement [...] this partner would intentionally pick up pieces of pork, point them at me, and say in a mocking and laughing tone: ‘Want some? It’s kosher, kosher, take it, take it.’”
35. “I experienced antisemitism through moral harassment days after Yom Kippur from my boss [...] who said I should not have been absent because ‘our society is based only on Christian traditions and values.’”
36. “I got into a taxi and, before greeting me, the driver asked if I was Jewish, because Jews always slam the door.”
37. “A non-Jewish friend, inside the Jewish Museum, laughed while commenting that his father hated Jews. That he tolerated ‘everything,’ except Jews.”
38. “An acquaintance of my husband said that he doesn’t even look Jewish because he is nice.”
39. “People have described sexual situations involving me (that never happened), referring to me as a ‘slutty Jew’.”
40. “My former boss made a positive reference to Hitler, praising his leadership style. He also asked me why Jews are rich.”
41. “Comments were made about the supposed stinginess of the Jewish shareholder of the company where I work.”

Accusations of Nazism, Genocide and Attacks on Zionism

42. “When I entered a bar at the beginning of last year, I was approached by someone shouting at me, calling me a genocidal and saying that I and all my people should die.”
43. “We were walking with our children when a man passed by and said ‘Jews, child murderers.’”
44. “I was called a ‘filthy Zionist’ on social media and had close friends distance themselves from me because I support Israel.”
45. “A person from the same university I attended (a distant acquaintance) commented on my Facebook post about the shiva for my deceased mother: ‘The Nazis from FAUUSP are now Jews.’”
46. “A former friend [...] replied to an Instagram story in support of Israel by calling me a Nazi.”

47. “A former colleague told me that I was friends with a murderer who had blood on her hands. [...] Just the fact that I supported her meant that I also had blood on my hands.”
48. “Friends from school came to my house to meet my son and started questioning what was happening in Israel [...] They said that because I was not protesting or posting about it on social media, I was genocidal and equally responsible for all the deaths.”
49. “A friend said that, as a Jew, I should take responsibility for what Israel does in Gaza.”
50. “I am Orthodox [...] I saw a man, no older than 40, with a child of about 3 [...] he said loudly: ‘When I tell you, repeat: HAMAS!’ and then walked past me...”
51. “My mother was called genocidal on the street [...] the person ‘made the comment’ in the same way [...] ‘genocidal!’”
52. “My husband is kosher-observant and received at his airplane seat (the only one requesting kosher food) a pamphlet that read ‘free Palestine from Zionism’.”
53. “I ordered kosher food and the flight attendant, in the disembarkation line, initiated a very unpleasant conversation about the collective responsibility of Jews for what happens in Gaza.”
54. “At a hotel in Rio de Janeiro with a group of young Jews, a foreign man began attacking the group inside the hotel restaurant with Nazi words and gestures.”
55. “A friend received clients [...] who had just said they felt disgust toward Jews.”
56. “I was told to abandon the Old Testament because it led nowhere and that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza.”
57. “During a professional meeting, a colleague asked the Jews present in the room: I want to know why you, from the Jewish community, support genocide in Gaza.”
58. “I was confronted by classmates from college/graduate school for being Jewish and for being a Zionist, at least three times since October 7. In one of these instances, I was questioned about the ‘genocide in Palestine’ and the ‘apartheid against Arabs in Israel’.”

Denial of Work, Study and Service Opportunities

59. “The nanny of a close friend’s child resigned when she found out that my friend was Jewish; she said she did not work for Jews.”
60. “The taxi driver made the passengers get out when he found out they were Jewish.”
61. “I wanted to present my memoir book in Recife. A friend tried to find a venue in the city’s cultural centers; in two places, coincidentally, both responded that they did not want a Jewish person in the cultural center because they supported the Palestinians.”
62. “A literary author whom I invited for a talk at a Jewish institution explicitly refused to participate because it was a Jewish institution.”
63. “Denial of approval of a cultural project’s accountability report [...] on the grounds that the event was only for Jews.”
64. “In a job interview, I was asked if I was Jewish because of my surname. After answering yes, I was asked my opinion about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and whether I supported the

existence of the State of Israel. After my affirmative response, I noticed disapproving looks, and the interviewer seemed eager to end the interview immediately.”

65. “I was asked about my opinion on Gaza during a job interview, and at the end the interviewer emphasized that ‘the oppressed dreams of becoming the oppressor.’”

66. “I work at the Psychiatry Institute of HC, and a professional there posted on Instagram that she would temporarily suspend care for people from the Jewish community.”

67. “I lost patients for being Jewish and making this clear.”

68. “A friend, an insurance broker, in a conversation with clients who said they had visited Israel, revealed that she was Jewish and was insulted by the client to the point that he canceled the policy.”

69. “A client asked if I was Jewish—yes, I replied. Looking at the mezuzah on the door of my shop... he did not buy anything, left, and never returned.”

70. “A coworker proposed creating a list of Jews to be professionally boycotted.”

71. “My sister is a university professor, and students were organizing to boycott the class she taught because she is a Zionist and Jewish.”

72. “Another acquaintance lost a job because the person who was going to hire her looked at her social media and found her Jewish posts ‘a bit strange.’”

73. “A friend’s son asked a professor to supervise him, and she replied: ‘You are Jewish, right? Better ask a Jewish professor.’”

74. “In my office, a patient saw my mezuzah and said he would not enter or be treated by a Jew.”

75. “I heard a comment: ‘Everything was set for me to move, and the Jew no longer wanted to rent the shop to me.’”

Direct Verbal Aggression, Insults, and Threats

76. “A car drove by and shouted ‘dirty Jew’.”

77. “A person verbally assaulted a colleague inside a supermarket: ‘You Jews should go to hell for having killed Jesus.’”

78. “My brother and his friends went to a McDonald’s, where they encountered students from [...] who said something like: ‘Good, because we hate those Jewish pigs.’”

79. “My housemaid, in an aggressive tone, said: ‘you people of that race should go back to Israel’...”

80. “I have an Israeli flag on my car and got distracted at a traffic light; when it turned green, a man overtook me shouting: ‘stop killing Palestinians and watch the traffic, you son of a bitch Jew...’”

81. “Once, in a bathroom at a party, I saw people insulting a boy just for being Jewish, calling him a ‘fucking Jew’ and telling him to go to the gas chambers.”

82. “I received numerous comments wishing death upon Jews on social media; I received death threats...”

83. “A person from our community was threatened by a neighbor who claimed to have an oven at home to burn Jews.”

Physical Assaults, Intimidation and Persecution

84. “PHYSICAL ASSAULT OF A RELIGIOUS YOUNG MAN IN THE AVENIDA PAULISTA AREA, ACCORDING TO A REPORT FROM A SYNAGOGUE FRIEND.”

85. “An elderly man was physically assaulted for wearing a kippah and was called a ‘disgusting Jew’.”

86. “My brother was physically assaulted on the street for wearing Jewish clothing.”

87. “There was also an episode of physical aggression against a niece who was accompanied by an Israeli man in a bohemian neighborhood of São Paulo. When asked where he was from, he said Israel. Upon hearing this, the person began physically attacking him.”

88. “I was walking my dog at night when a man came toward me, looked at me, and when he saw my kippah, quickened his pace, passed by me, elbowed me, and ran away.”

89. “I asked my superior (boss) to leave to attend a community event, and he grabbed my neck (simulating strangulation) and said he was glad to know of my Jewish background because his family was German, and it made him want to hang me upside down from the building façade.”

90. “During a physiotherapy session (osteopathy), the professional who had treated me for over five years began saying how cruel Jews were and wanted me to agree. [...] She even hurt me due to the force she used.”

91. “An Orthodox man was followed after leaving the synagogue on Shabbat, but managed to escape.”

92. “Someone pulled off the kippah of a friend who was walking in the Jardins neighborhood in São Paulo.”

93. “My son-in-law was approached on Shabbat by someone who removed his kippah and insulted him.”

94. “A friend was approached on Bela Cintra Street, where someone passed by and removed his kippah.”

95. “While attending a demonstration for peace in the Middle East, my blue scarf with the Star of David was pulled from my hand after I was pushed.”

96. “Years ago, I was wearing my tallit and going to the synagogue when, while crossing a street, I was almost run over; someone shouted ‘tie’ and showed their middle finger out the window.”

97. “My brother was going to the synagogue with his grandchildren and was followed by a woman insulting them.”


98. “An Orthodox Jewish friend was chased on the street with antisemitic insults and profanity.”

99. “A person followed a friend’s brother, insulting him as a Jew and telling him to go back to his land.”

100. “My Israeli nephew, during a trip to Cyprus, suffered verbal aggression from a group of English individuals, which escalated into physical confrontation.”


Distribution by Categorization of Manifestation or Discourse


The categorization by type of manifestation shows a predominance of content associated with essentializations and generalizations (423 records), followed by antizionism (386) and aggressive speech acts (294). Also noteworthy are direct action and non-verbal hostility (256), exaltation and affirmation of Nazism (72), and exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic individuals and groups (39).



Regarding the environments of occurrence, the category “Not specified / Other” accounted for 375 records, followed by social media (330), indicating the centrality of the digital environment. Educational institutions recorded 150 occurrences, the work environment 110, and public space 108. Political or institutional spaces totaled 87 records, while traditional media accounted for 56. Religious environments (25) and transportation (17) showed lower relative incidence.

Political or institutional spaces totaled 87 records, while traditional media accounted for 56. Religious environments (25) and transportation (17) had lower relative incidence.





The distribution of incidents classified at Level 3 reveals the predominance of **verbal, symbolic, and institutional manifestations**, rather than direct physical violence. The most frequent category was **verbal aggression and threats**, with 710 reports, reflecting the central role of the digital environment and discursive interactions in the contemporary dynamics of antisemitism. This is followed by cases of **institutional discrimination** (170), indicating that the phenomenon also manifests within organizational structures and formal contexts.

Other relevant categories include reports classified as **“other”** (139), composed of brief or incomplete entries, **attacks on Jewish identity and symbols** (111), and stereotyped jokes or comments (85), which highlight the persistence of symbolic and culturally normalized forms of hostility. Episodes of **vandalism and property damage** (82) and incitement or endorsement of violence (55) point to the presence of more explicit manifestations, although less frequent. Forms of **direct social exclusion, such as boycotts** (26) and repeated harassment (24), as well as **physical aggression** (23), appear in smaller numbers but represent higher levels of severity.

6.4 Community Suggestions for Confronting Antisemitism

This subchapter presents the analysis of two open questions addressed to the survey respondents. The first **requested suggestions for institutional improvement directed to CONIB and the federated institutions in the fight against antisemitism**, the second sought to understand **what individual actions have been adopted to confront antisemitism**.


The analysis allows us to identify both the community’s perception of its own role and the expectations placed on representative organizations.

Suggestions for Improvement for the Jewish Representative Organizations

The respondents were asked the following question:

“If you believe that representative organizations, such as CONIB, federations, or others, can improve their performance in defending the community and addressing antisemitism, please share what you expect or would like to see done. This is a space dedicated to hearing from you!”

The **957 valid responses** were organized into the following categories:



The responses reveal a **priority demand for strengthening institutional communication and increasing public presence**. The category **Communication, Media, and Public Relations** accounted for **399 mentions**, making it the most recurrent among respondents. **This indicates a consolidated perception that the struggle against antisemitism takes place primarily in the narrative and media sphere.** There is an expectation of greater proactivity, faster responses to crises, improved spokesperson training, and expanded presence in both traditional media and social networks.

In second place, **Education, Teaching, and Literacy (264 mentions)** emerges as a structuring axis. Respondents associate long-term efforts to address antisemitism with critical education, the production of pedagogical materials, and engagement with schools and universities. This recurrence suggests an understanding that the phenomenon is not merely situational, but cultural and structural.

The category **Political and Governmental Action (248 mentions)** highlights a demand for **greater institutional engagement with public authorities**, whether through legislative advocacy, monitoring of public policies, or direct dialogue with decision-makers. The data indicate an expectation that organizations act as legitimate representatives of the community within decision-making arenas.

Other relevant categories include:


- **Representativeness, Inclusion, and Internal Strengthening (136)** – points to the need for greater community cohesion, expanded participation, and internal dialogue.
- **Firm, Combative, and Agile Stance (123)** – expresses a demand for rapid and assertive responses to antisemitic incidents.
- **Judicial and Security Actions (110)** – reinforces expectations of legal accountability and systematic monitoring.
- **Independence and Political Neutrality (67)** – reveals concern about partisan alignments and a desire to preserve cross-cutting legitimacy.
- **Strengthening Actions for the Broader Community (55)** – suggests expanding dialogue with non-Jewish society.
- **Community Mobilization and Public Actions (30)** – indicates less emphasis on in-person protest strategies compared to institutional and communicational approaches.

Type of Action Adopted by Respondents to Address Antisemitism

Respondents were asked to answer, in their own words, the following question:

“If you wish, briefly describe any action you have taken to educate, inform, or confront antisemitism, such as conversations, posts, interventions, or participation in initiatives”

The **624 valid responses** were categorized as follows:



The analysis of reported individual actions shows a **predominance of strategies based on education and dialogue.**

The category **Education and Awareness (378 mentions)** leads the responses, indicating that

a large portion of participants understand addressing antisemitism as a pedagogical practice: explaining, contextualizing, demystifying information, and promoting historical knowledge.


This is followed by:

- **Content Production/Sharing (193)** – publication of texts, videos, and informational materials.
- **Dialogue and Debate (170)** – interpersonal conversations, group discussions, and participation in forums.
- **Confrontation and Reporting (68)** – direct responses to antisemitic content and reporting to platforms.
- **Institutional Action and Volunteering (43)** – participation in organizations or structured initiatives.
- **Affirmation of Identity (28)** – strengthening Jewish identity as a form of symbolic resistance.
- **Physical Intervention/Activism (9)** – participation in demonstrations or in-person mobilizations.

The data indicate that individual responses are predominantly discursive and educational, with low incidence of physical activism. The prevailing strategy is narrative engagement rather than direct confrontation or street mobilization.

Environment or Interlocutor

A possible derivation of the open-ended answers to the question is the evaluation of the types of environment or with which types of interlocutor these actions take place. The data are as follows:



The digital space appears as the main arena of engagement.

- **Social Media and Internet (237)** constitute the most cited environment, confirming that contemporary antisemitism is perceived as a phenomenon amplified in the online sphere.
- **Close and Social Circle (145)** and Jewish Community (141) indicate significant action within proximate networks, whether for clarification, support, or internal organization.

- **Professional Environment (68)** and Academic/School Environment (35) reveal the presence of the issue in formal institutional settings as well.
- **Public Space and Transportation (7)** show residual incidence, suggesting that respondents identify the digital environment as the primary field where the phenomenon manifests.
- **The category “Not Specified/Other” (212)** indicates a variety of contexts but does not alter the centrality of digital networks as the primary locus.

Illustrative Examples:

Below is a selection of responses provided by participants:

1. **[Affirmation of Identity]** “Whenever I meet someone in any environment, I make a point of proudly stating that I am Jewish!”
2. **[Affirmation of Identity]** “Making it clear that I am proud to be Jewish and showing the reality about Israel and the reasons why a Palestinian state has not been created to this day.”
3. **[Institutional Action and Volunteering]** “We are 700 volunteers and 75% are not Jewish; whenever possible, we offer classes about Judaism. We also have high school students within the community and provide classes on Judaism.”
4. **[Institutional Action and Volunteering]** “Engagement in educational activities with FISESP to act in schools in response to antisemitic incidents.”
5. **[Physical Intervention/Activism]** “In addition to my weekly comments on [...], I personally remove, using ColorJet, all antisemitic graffiti I find.”
6. **[Physical Intervention/Activism]** “Within my circle of friends at university, I always try to counter movements, marches, or demonstrations that take place on campus in a factual and clear manner.”
7. **[Education and Awareness]** “I try to explain the religion itself, which many people are completely unaware of. And when possible, I talk a bit about the history of Israel.”
8. **[Education and Awareness]** “I always speak about how we seek to respect other cultures.”
9. **[Dialogue and Debate]** “In addition to numerous conversations, I presented a videoconference for friends and interested people, with over 100 slides, explaining the facts since the Ottoman Empire and the existing dilemmas, seeking to avoid being seen as biased and showing why achieving peace in the region is so difficult.”
10. **[Dialogue and Debate]** “I try to argue that Hamas’s attack on Israel was an act of terrorism and not a legitimate act. I try to clarify the measures taken by the Israeli army to protect Palestinian civilians. I speak about Hamas’s use of human shields.”
11. **[Content Production/Sharing]** “I posted several texts on Facebook defending Israel and accusing Hamas and the international community, which did not behave as it should have in relation to the October 7 attack. I managed to reach several non-Jews, but most of my readers are from the community. I also made a point of expressing my view that it is not enough for a politician to be ‘pro-Israel’ to be a good candidate.”
12. **[Content Production/Sharing]** “I helped translate several social media posts originally created in English or Spanish into Portuguese. I also helped disseminate these posts. I

know it is little and I would like to do more.”

13. **[Confrontation and Reporting]** “Recently, in a postgraduate class, I reacted to an unfounded false statement by a guest professor and challenged him publicly with facts. I have also been engaging on social media, countering false media publications.”
14. **[Confrontation and Reporting]** “For many years I have worked to show the reality of Israel, its history, as well as the Jewish people in the diaspora. Today, whenever I have the opportunity, I am ready to defend my people.”
15. **[Dialogue and Debate]** “Debating and explaining the difference between the stance of the State of Israel and Judaism.”
16. **[Content Production/Sharing]** “Sharing hasbara posts produced by StandWithUs Brasil and CONIB on social media.”
17. **[Dialogue and Debate]** “Informal conversations, promoting dinners during Jewish holidays, displaying my Jewish practice of Shabbat, Instagram posts.”
18. **[Dialogue and Debate]** “Posts and conversations with close contacts, encouraging non-Jewish allies to speak more about the issue, and participating in groups inside and outside the community to address the topic.”
19. **[Not Specified/Other]** “With my work colleagues, my actions speak for themselves and prove the misinformation spread by the media.”
20. **[Not Specified/Other]** “I conducted a survey on perceptions of antisemitism within Habonim Dror Brasil and have been working from it with the movement’s members.”

Synthesis

The combined analysis of the two open-ended questions reveals alignment between institutional expectations and individual practices. The community:

1. Perceives addressing antisemitism as essentially communicational and educational.
2. Values firm and strategic institutional action.
3. Identifies the digital environment as the main arena of dispute.
4. Shows a preference for strategies of clarification and dialogue, rather than physical mobilization or direct confrontation.


The data suggest that, for respondents, addressing antisemitism should combine three complementary dimensions:

- Narrative (communication and education);
- Institutional (political and legal engagement);
- Community-based (cohesion and internal strengthening).

This convergence between individual action and institutional expectation indicates a level of strategic maturity in the perception of the phenomenon, understood not merely as episodic, but as a structural challenge requiring coordinated, continuous, and multisectoral action.

6.5 Antisemitic Attack on the Survey

Between January 6 and 9, 2026, the data collection form for this study was **targeted by a coordinated attack, resulting in 168 accesses by unauthorized individuals**. Metadata analysis revealed a clear pattern of sabotage of the sampling integrity: the survey was accessed 96 times from a single anonymous identifier, 40 times from a second, and 21 times from six other identifiers. This behavior indicates that **the restricted link was intentionally leaked** — most likely through messaging applications such as WhatsApp — by **at least eight individuals, enabling hostile groups to carry out a large-scale antisemitic attack against the research instrument**.



It is essential to emphasize that the intrinsic difficulties of accessing the Jewish population in Brazil, along with the imperative need to ensure the security and integrity of the sample, imposed clear methodological and scope limitations on the intracommunity survey.

However, **the occurrence of this attack justifies and validates the restrictive decisions adopted in the initial phases**. Although the survey's security measures may be subject to criticism from other methodological perspectives—such as limiting the organic reach of the questionnaire—the **incident demonstrated the necessity of such rigor**. Without these technological safeguards, the data would have been invalidated by hostile intrusion.

As a collateral effect of these same security measures, it is estimated that **18 of the 168 irregular accesses may have come from actual Jewish individuals who, not having received the official link in the earlier phases, attempted to respond via a link shared through WhatsApp**. Unfortunately, due to the established protocols—whose relevance was confirmed by the attack—these responses also had to be excluded from the final sample.

The remaining **150 fraudulent accesses clearly constituted an attempt at sabotage**, using one of the open-ended comment fields to record direct and coordinated antisemitic attacks.

List of Extracted Hate Messages


The statements below were recorded in the survey form by unauthorized actors and are reproduced here for documentation and analytical purposes, preserving their original wording. The list includes only one instance of each message, excluding repeated entries generated through spam behavior:

- Shalom = Minimum wage? No, shalom = world destruction!
- I remember the Holocaust every time I see my salary stolen by Jews!
- I think CONIB is crap and all of you need to be burned at the stake! You bunch of filthy Jews!
- Stop pretending you are a minority, you control 99% of the banks!

- Israel does not exist, it is just disguised terrorism!
- Jewish homes should be invaded and looted daily!
- Jews use WhatsApp to coordinate financial theft!
- Every rich Jew is a Brazilian family on the streets!
- Shabbat is when they plan how to steal our week!
- Israel is a malignant tumor on the planet!
- Jews turn bread into debt and joy into misery!
- Synagogue is a den of financial rats!
- Israelis are demons with passports!
- Burn the Torah, it is where they plan our economic ruin!
- Shabbat is when they count our money in shekels!
- The Torah is a recipe book for stealing from workers!
- The Talmud teaches how to kill goyim with a smile!
- Jews laugh at your suffering while counting our money!
- Synagogue is a hub of money laundering and hatred!
- The only border we need to close is Israel's!
- Shalom = your house will be robbed by Jews!
- Synagogue is a den of financial snakes!
- Burn beards, that is where they hide our stolen future!
- Israel is a cancer on the map and must be removed by force!
- Jews do not cry, they only collect compound interest!
- Every dead Jew is a more honest Brazil!
- Jews stink of exploitation and illicit money!
- Jews use the shofar to summon demons of usury!
- Jews do not die, they just parasitize another country!
- Jews control the media to hide how they exploit us!
- Jew is a plague that only extreme death can eliminate!
- Jew is not human, it is a walking banking pest!
- The swastika should be branded on Jews with hot iron!
- Every dollar to Israel is a Brazilian without a job!
- Shabbat is an excuse not to work while stealing our wages!
- Jews have no homeland, only financial interests!
- May Hamas use Jews as human shields!
- Jews finance dictatorships to maintain slavery!
- Jews do not cry, they only count stolen money!
- Shalom is the greeting of those who will enslave you!
- The kippah hides the horns of those who suck our financial blood!
- Burn beards, that is where they keep secrets of plunder!

- Every rabbi is the leader of a financial gang!
- Holocaust? It should have been complete, not one left to steal our money!
- Jews finance wars to sell weapons!
- The only solution is Israel at the bottom of the sea!
- CONIB should be set on fire with all the Jews inside, the free ride is over!
- Jews have no heart, only a safe!
- Jews do not work, they only speculate and leave people starving!
- Every shekel is a drop of blood from an exploited worker!
- The Star of David should be a missile target!
- Jews stink of dirty money and innocent blood!
- Shalom is a codeword for global financial domination, do not fall for it!
- Rabbinate is a mafia disguised as religion, it must end!
- Every rabbi is a general of an army of thieves!
- Foreskin should be forced down every Jew's throat!
- May Hamas finish what Hitler did not!
- Israel is an abscess on the world's body!
- Foreskin should be cut from Jews with a chainsaw!
- Jews do not die, they just move countries to steal!
- Synagogue is a hub of financial criminals!
- Israelis are viruses in military uniform!
- Every dollar to Israel is a Brazilian child without school!

Analysis and Categorization of the Attack Discourse



The intrusion into the methodological tool empirically **demonstrates the high degree of hostility existing in the Brazilian digital environment against the Jewish community.** The analysis of the vocabulary used by the invaders shows that the attack made extensive and overlapping use of all the typologies employed in this report to identify and categorize antisemitic discourse.

- **Aggressive speech acts:** The attack encompasses severe manifestations of verbal violence. The responses take the form of dehumanizing insults aimed at humiliating the target (Jews referred to as “rats,” “snakes,” “demons,” “viruses”), explicit threats (“Jewish homes should be invaded and looted daily”), and direct incitement to physical violence and death (“CONIB should be set on fire,” “burned at the stake,” “branded with hot iron”).
- **Essentializations and generalizations:** There is a profound biological and moral reduction of the collective. Numerous statements associate Jews with greed as an innate or biological trait (“Jews have no heart, only a safe,” “Jews laugh at your suffering while counting our money”), reducing their religiosity, culture, and humanity to an immutable caricature of immorality.
- **Conspiratorial attributions of power:** Elements of classic conspiratorial tropes are widely mobilized. The attackers suggest that the minority operates in a secretive and omnipotent manner to cause global harm (“control 99% of the banks,” “control the media,” “Shalom is a codeword for global financial domination”), portraying Jews not only as inferior but as a concealed existential threat endowed with excessive power.
- **Antizionism:** The language directs hostility toward the State of Israel and Zionism, projecting essentializing accusations and a desire for the destruction of Jewish self-determination. Statements such as “Israel is a malignant tumor on the planet,” “a cancer on the map,” and “the only solution is Israel at the bottom of the sea”.
- **Exaltation and affirmation of antisemitic groups:** Hatred is also expressed through the glorification of extremist groups. This is evident in statements that frame extremist violence as a duty and a means of Jewish destruction, such as calls for “ Hamas to use Jews as human shields” and to “finish the job.”
- **Exaltation and affirmation of Nazism:** The attack deliberately incorporates Nazi extermination ideology to inflict maximum harm. There are explicit wishes that the historical genocide carried out by Nazi Germany had been total (“The Holocaust should have been complete,” “what Hitler did not finish”), as well as calls for the use of symbols associated with the Third Reich (“the swastika should be branded”).

Final Considerations

In sum, the event clearly illustrates the complex intersection of hostility that continuously threatens the Jewish collective in Brazilian digital environments. However, beyond the criminal episode itself, this experience sheds light on the persistence of a fundamental methodological challenge for intracommunity sociology: how to design an empirical study capable of accessing the plurality and totality of Jews in Brazil in a fully representative manner, while at the same time preserving the structural integrity and cybersecurity of the data against hostile activism.

The successful containment of this attack demonstrates that technological safeguarding is inseparable from contemporary research focused on targeted minorities, even when the cost involves adopting more complex and restrictive distribution and outreach dynamics.

7. SURVEY “PRESENCE OF ANTISEMITISM IN THE BRAZILIAN SOCIETY – 2026

(StandWithUs Brasil/AtlasIntel)



AtlasIntel: survey reveals that 70% of Brazilians feel totally comfortable having Jewish friends, but the percentage drops to 50% among those who identify as left-wing

A new survey by AtlasIntel, conducted at the request of StandWithUs Brasil between February 11 and 28, 2026, reveals a complex and ambivalent picture of Brazilian society’s perceptions regarding hate speech, prejudice, Jews, Israel, and Zionism.

Among the various indicators analyzed, one finding stands out as particularly revealing of the level of latent prejudice present in Brazilian society: 70% of respondents say they would feel completely comfortable having a Jewish friend (a majority, yet still indicative of a segment of society that would not accept a Jewish person as a friend), but this percentage drops to 50% among individuals who identify as left-wing.

It is concerning that a significant portion of society — which increases considerably among left-leaning individuals, reflecting ideological polarization — appears to extend political prejudices against Israel, Zionism, and Jews into the realm of personal and affective relationships.

How much do you agree with the following statement?

I totally agree I agree in part I don't agree, nor do I disagree I disagree in part I totally disagree

I would feel comfortable having Jewish friends.



Key findings

A relevant finding of the survey emerges from the list experiment measuring latent agreement with the statement that Jews have not learned from the mistakes of the past. This formulation shifts the historical suffering of the Jewish people — marked by persecution, expulsions, pogroms, and the Holocaust — into a form of collective moral judgment directed at Jews themselves.

Such a narrative has deep roots in antisemitic imaginaries. Historically, one of the recurrent strategies of antisemitism has been to transform the victim into the perpetrator, suggesting that Jews are responsible for their own persecution or that they failed to learn “moral lessons” from their history.

The fact that this perception appears at such elevated levels when captured through indirect methods suggests that prejudice may be significantly more widespread than explicit responses indicate.

Despite this concerning finding, the survey also reveals important elements of social acceptance.

Next, indicate how many items you agree with, without specifying which ones.

Identifies with 4 items



Identifies with 3 items



Identifies with 2 items



Identifies with 1 item



0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

STATEMENTS:

- a) I seek to participate in activities that help me develop my physical and mental well-being.
- b) I enjoy engaging in projects or hobbies that challenge me intellectually.
- c) I am interested in learning about different cultures and traditions to broaden my worldview.
- d) I tend to follow content that increases my understanding of history and past events.

Identifies with 4 items



Identifies with 3 items



Identifies with 5 items



Identifies with 2 items



Identifies with 1 item



0 15% 30% 45% 60%

STATEMENTS:

- a) I seek to participate in activities that help me develop my physical and mental well-being.
- b) I enjoy engaging in projects or hobbies that challenge me intellectually.
- c) I am interested in learning about different cultures and traditions to broaden my worldview.
- d) Jews seem not to have learned from what they have suffered in the past.
- e) I tend to follow content that increases my understanding of history and past events.


This result was obtained through a list experiment, a methodological technique used to capture sensitive opinions that are often not directly expressed by respondents. By reducing the social desirability bias of responses, this method allows latent perceptions to emerge that would typically remain hidden in traditional surveys.

The finding indicates that social perceptions of Jews in Brazil are not limited to classical stereotypes, but also include a process of moral blame attributed to Jews for their own historical suffering — a recurring element in the tradition of antisemitism.

In this sense, the survey points to three central axes. The first is the existence of a significant gray zone, in which substantial segments of the population fail to recognize antisemitic content as prejudice and instead classify it as “legitimate criticism,” “opinion,” or something “dependent on context.” The second is evidence of low social literacy regarding antisemitism, especially when it takes more sophisticated or politicized forms. The third is the asymmetry between perceptions of Jews as a human group and perceptions of Israel and Zionism as political and identity references.


More broadly, the survey suggests that Brazilian public opinion is not structured simply along clearly favorable or unfavorable positions toward Jews or Israel. Rather, what emerges is a combination of interpersonal acceptance, historical misinformation, conceptual ambiguity, and permissiveness toward certain hostile narratives or even clear antisemitic tropes.

Respondents’ answers to statements about Judaism and Jews show a notable overlap in the percentage of those who believe that Israel is a legitimate state with a right to exist and those who report feeling comfortable having Jewish friends. This convergence suggests a possible association — to be further investigated — between political opinions and personal attitudes in the sphere of affective relationships.



Among respondents, **70%** state that they would feel completely comfortable having Jewish friends, **69%** fully agree that Israel is a legitimate state with the right to exist, **75%** say they would publicly defend a Jewish colleague in the face of prejudiced comments, and **61%** support laws against antisemitism. However, only **22.4%** say they would not feel comfortable having a Zionist neighbor, colleague, or friend. The largest share responds “it depends on the person” (**31.6%**), and **23.1%** say they do not know.

Would you feel comfortable having as a neighbor, colleague, or friend a person who identifies as a Zionist?




The data indicate that the term “Zionist” generates more hesitation, confusion, or distrust than the term “Jew,” suggesting a gap in understanding of the concept.

This helps explain how contemporary antisemitism may manifest: less as direct hostility toward Jews and more as the delegitimization of the connection between Jews, Israel, and Jewish national self-determination. This does not mean that all criticism of Israel is antisemitic, but it shows that rejection of Zionism may, in many cases, function as a socially acceptable form of hostility toward Jews who identify with this central aspect of contemporary Jewish identity.

In the set of questions on historical stereotypes, a significant portion of respondents does not recognize as prejudice ideas traditionally associated with antisemitic imaginaries.

**The statements below reflect opinions circulating in society.
Indicate how you classify these ideas.**



Among the statements that a significant portion of the population considers “legitimate opinions,” rather than prejudice, there is a mixture of tropes drawn from different historical forms of antisemitism. These include elements of medieval Christian antisemitism (Jews as deicides, “they killed Jesus”); European antisemitism from the time of the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus (“Jews are not loyal to their own country”); and antisemitism from Tsarist Russia and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (the idea of “Jewish financial power,” the stereotype of the wealthy and powerful Jew who also “controls the media”), as well as its contemporary expression in the notion of a “Zionist lobby over governments and companies.” This latter case illustrates how a form of antisemitism from the late nineteenth century, which helped underpin Nazi discourse in the twentieth century, is today reframed as “antizionism.”

All these representations reinforce aversion directed at Israelis. As inheritors of anti-Jewish hostility, they are simultaneously perceived as wealthy, influential, and capable of anything (even the death of Jesus), in contrast to an opposing side that is then cast as inherently weaker.

Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is overlaid with another long-standing belief, used from the Middle Ages through the first half of the twentieth century, according to which Jews practice infanticide. Although such pre-scientific notions may appear naive and outdated, the survey indicates that echoes of them continue to appear among the convictions of Brazilians today.


Among the observed results:

- **28%** classify as a “legitimate opinion” the statement that it is natural to distrust Jews because they would be more loyal to Israel than to Brazil;
- **29%** consider legitimate the claim that the Jewish people were responsible for the death of Jesus;
- **31%** consider legitimate the idea that it is difficult to sympathize with Israelis because of Palestinian suffering;
- **31%** consider legitimate the statement that Jews prioritize preserving their identity rather than integrating into society;
- **26%** consider legitimate concerns about the supposed power of the “Zionist lobby”;
- **28%** consider legitimate the idea that Jews concentrate excessive power in finance and communication;
- **37%** consider legitimate the claim that Jews, in general, are more financially successful than other people.

More important than these figures in isolation is the size of the “gray zone” that emerges in the responses. In several statements, a significant portion of respondents classified these ideas as “exaggerated criticism, but not prejudiced.”

The survey also reveals significant ambiguity when narratives involve Israel and Zionism.

**Next, here are some statements circulating in debates about Israel and Jews.
For each one, indicate how you classify it:**



The survey shows the impact, within Brazilian society, of narratives used by certain political sectors to demonize the State of Israel, drawing on longstanding antisemitic tropes and, consequently, reinforcing prejudice against the country's Jewish community. For example, among respondents:

- **42%** consider legitimate the statement "Israel treats Palestinians the way Nazis treated Jews";
- **42%** consider legitimate the claim that denouncing Israel is a moral duty because of Palestinian children;
- **30%** consider legitimate the idea that the Holocaust is used to justify Israeli policies;
- **25%** consider legitimate the idea that offensive criticism of Jews should be allowed;
- **24%** consider legitimate the claim that pro-Israel individuals are a bad influence on democracy.

The trivialization of the Holocaust and the demonization of Israel are particularly evident in the first two statements, each endorsed by more than 40% of respondents. At the same time, the remaining responses, as well as others discussed below, indicate that Brazilian society is not predominantly captured by these frameworks:

- **51%** classify as hate speech the statement that pro-Israel individuals are a bad influence on democracy;
- **43%** classify as prejudiced the idea that the Holocaust is used as an excuse by Israel.

These data suggest that public debate in Brazil is marked by interpretive contestation, with part of society recognizing such narratives as prejudiced and another part legitimizing them as political criticism.

Breakdown by age group

The age-based breakdown reveals important differences in how different generations perceive Jews, Israel, and Zionism.

Would you feel comfortable having as a neighbor, colleague, or friend someone who identifies as a Zionist?

	GENDER		AGE					EDUCATION LEVEL		
	Men	Women	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Depends on the person	35.8 %	27.1 %	47 %	9.1 %	26.1 %	32.8 %	43.2 %	34.3 %	31 %	25.1 %
Yes	18.2 %	27.3 %	9.7 %	21.1 %	26.2 %	25 %	26.2 %	0	36.1 %	30 %
No	17.8 %	26.8 %	27.2 %	26.8 %	32.3 %	10.6 %	22.2 %	31.4 %	14.7 %	23.5 %
Don't know	28.3 %	18.8 %	16 %	43 %	15.3 %	31.6 %	8.4 %	34.4 %	18.2 %	21.4 %

The Jewish people have the right to their security, but the Israeli government should be held accountable for human rights violations.

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Women	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	52.8 %	59.7 %	33.2 %	43.2 %	69 %	53.9 %	70.4 %
It depends	10.7 %	16.5 %	19.9 %	14.6 %	11.6 %	13.3 %	11.8 %
Hate speech or prejudice	20.4 %	19.1 %	10.2 %	29.6 %	16.4 %	26.7 %	13 %
I don't know	16.1 %	4.7 %	36.7 %	12.7 %	3 %	6 %	4.7 %

Does Israel treat Palestinians as the Nazis treated Jews?

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Women	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	37.2 %	47.9 %	26.4 %	30.6 %	42 %	42.6 %	60.6 %
It depends	6.1 %	12.4 %	22.5 %	7.2 %	6.6 %	8.3 %	7.7 %
Hate speech or prejudice	33.1 %	32.9 %	12.2 %	47.9 %	30.3 %	42 %	24.6 %
I don't know	23.6 %	6.8 %	38.9 %	14.2 %	21.1 %	7.1 %	7.1 %

Among younger respondents (**aged 16 to 24**), a pattern of oscillation and conceptual confusion predominates. Only **9.7%** state that they would feel comfortable interacting with a person who identifies as Zionist, while **27.2%** say they would not, and **47%** respond that it “depends on the person.” In addition, **36.6%** were unable to classify the statement that combines the Jewish right to security with criticism of the Israeli government, indicating a high level of interpretive uncertainty.

Among respondents above this age group, positions appear more consolidated. In the **35 to 44** age bracket, **69%** consider legitimate the formulation that combines Jewish security with criticism of the Israeli government. Among respondents over 60, a paradoxical pattern emerges: this group is the most favorable to the balanced formulation regarding Jewish security (**70.4%**), but also the one most likely to consider legitimate narratives that trivialize or relativize the Holocaust.

Breakdown by political alignment

The political spectrum is one of the main factors structuring public perceptions of Israel and Zionism.

Does Israel treat Palestinians as the Nazis treated Jews?

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Womwn	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	37.2 %	47.9 %	26.4 %	30.6 %	42 %	42.6 %	60.6 %
It depends	6.1 %	12.4 %	22.5 %	7.2 %	6.6 %	8.3 %	7.7 %
Hate speech or prejudice	33.1 %	32.9 %	12.2 %	47.9 %	30.3 %	42 %	24.6 %
I don't know	23.6 %	6.8 %	38.9 %	14.2 %	21.1 %	7.1 %	7.1 %

	EDUCATION LEVEL			HOUSEHOLD INCOME				
	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Up to R\$2,000	R\$ 2.000 - R\$ 3.000	R\$ 3.000 - R\$ 5.000	R\$ 5.000 - R\$ 10.000	Above R\$10,000
Legitimate criticism	63.2 %	29.2 %	42.4 %	51.7 %	15.8 %	42.9 %	46.4 %	46.2 %
It depends	0	16.8 %	9.4 %	12 %	9.6 %	9.3 %	4.8 %	14.4 %
Hate speech or prejudice	15.7 %	42.3 %	37.6 %	26.5 %	60.4 %	22.1 %	30.5 %	38 %
I don't know	21.2 %	11.7 %	10.7 %	9.7 %	14.1 %	25.7 %	18.2 %	1.3 %

	REGION					RELIGION				
	South	Southeast	Northeast	Center-West	North	Catholic	Evangelical	Other religion	No religion	Agnostic/atheist
Legitimate criticism	32.4 %	41.6 %	44.2 %	45.2 %	43 %	45.5 %	31.1 %	34.7 %	31.1 %	75.6 %
It depends	4.4 %	14.3 %	6.4 %	4.1 %	12.2 %	4.7 %	18.8 %	15.8 %	8.9 %	11.4 %
Hate speech or prejudice	36.9 %	30.4 %	39.2 %	33.5 %	26 %	24 %	41.8 %	44.7 %	58.5 %	9.5 %
I don't know	26.3 %	13.8 %	10.1 %	17.2 %	18.9 %	25.8 %	8.3 %	4.9 %	1.5 %	3.6 %

	IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT					
	Far-left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right	Don't know/No ideology
Legitimate criticism	95 %	74.7 %	12.1 %	9.3 %	8.4 %	20.6 %
It depends	0.6 %	9.5 %	54.1 %	28.4 %	9.6 %	2.9 %
Hate speech or prejudice	0.1 %	1.5 %	33.6 %	56.9 %	49.9 %	68.9 %
I don't know	4.3 %	14.3 %	0.1 %	5.4 %	32.2 %	7.6 %

Denouncing Israel is a moral duty, especially because of Palestinian children.

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Womwn	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	34.1 %	49 %	21.1 %	31.8 %	36.2 %	42 %	64.2 %
It depends	9.6 %	12.9 %	24.4 %	8 %	15.3 %	6.5 %	8.8 %
Hate speech or prejudice	33.3 %	32.8 %	17.1 %	45.3 %	29.8 %	43.8 %	22.9 %
I don't know	23 %	5.2 %	37.3 %	14.9 %	18.7 %	6.8 %	4.2 %

	EDUCATION LEVEL			HOUSEHOLD INCOME				
	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Up to R\$2,000	R\$ 2.000 - R\$ 3.000	R\$ 3.000 - R\$ 5.000	R\$ 5.000 - R\$ 10.000	Above R\$10,000
Legitimate criticism	57.1 %	30.4 %	45.6 %	47.1 %	13.5 %	40.2 %	49.9 %	49.8 %
It depends	3.6 %	16.6 %	12.2 %	14.9 %	6.5 %	15.3 %	5.3 %	16 %
Hate speech or prejudice	18.1 %	43.9 %	32.2 %	32.2 %	66.5 %	20.6 %	25.8 %	31 %
I don't know	21.2 %	9.2 %	9.9 %	5.8 %	13.4 %	23.9 %	19 %	3.3 %

	REGION					RELIGION				
	South	Southeast	Northeast	Center-West	North	Catholic	Evangelical	Other religion	No religion	Agnostic/atheist
Legitimate criticism	33.4 %	41.7 %	46.6 %	47.9 %	21.9 %	45.1 %	27.1 %	35.2 %	33.5 %	78.5 %
It depends	4.2 %	14.3 %	9.7 %	4 %	22.9 %	8.1 %	19.2 %	13.1 %	8.5 %	14 %
Hate speech or prejudice	36.3 %	30.4 %	35.2 %	33.5 %	42.6 %	22.2 %	46.9 %	46.3 %	50.2 %	7.5 %
I don't know	26 %	13.6 %	8.4 %	14.6 %	12.6 %	24.6 %	6.7 %	5.4 %	7.8 %	0 %

Denouncing Israel is a moral duty, especially because of Palestinian children.

	IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT					
	Far-left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right	Don't know/No ideology
Legitimate criticism	96.5 %	75.3 %	17 %	26 %	0.5 %	20.2 %
It depends	1.1 %	9.1 %	51.7 %	18.5 %	15.4 %	12.4 %
Hate speech or prejudice	0 %	1.2 %	31.2 %	42.8 %	51.7 %	58.8 %
I don't know	2.4 %	14.3 %	0.1 %	12.8 %	32.3 %	8.7 %

Would you feel comfortable having as a neighbor, colleague, or friend a person who identifies as a Zionist?

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Women	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	35.8 %	27.1 %	47 %	9.1 %	26.1 %	32.8 %	43.2 %
It depends	18.2 %	27.3 %	9.7 %	21.1 %	26.2 %	25 %	26.2 %
Hate speech or prejudice	17.8 %	26.8 %	27.2 %	26.8 %	32.3 %	10.6 %	22.2 %
I don't know	28.3 %	18.8 %	16 %	43 %	15.3 %	31.6 %	8.4 %

	EDUCATION LEVEL			HOUSEHOLD INCOME				
	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Up to R\$2,000	R\$ 2,000 - R\$ 3,000	R\$ 3,000 - R\$ 5,000	R\$ 5,000 - R\$ 10,000	Above R\$10,000
Legitimate criticism	34.3 %	31 %	25.1 %	11.4 %	26 %	32.9 %	53.6 %	32.9 %
It depends	0	36.1 %	30 %	1.5 %	44.2 %	22.4 %	22.1 %	34.1 %
Hate speech or prejudice	31.4 %	14.7 %	23.5 %	57.1 %	5.7 %	7.8 %	13.5 %	25 %
I don't know	34.4 %	18.2 %	21.4 %	29.9 %	24.1 %	36.9 %	10.7 %	8 %

	REGION					RELIGION				
	South	Southeast	Northeast	Center-West	North	Catholic	Evangelical	Other religion	No religion	Agnostic/atheist
Legitimate criticism	43.5 %	29.3 %	31.5 %	11.2 %	41.9 %	33 %	19.2 %	44.2 %	46.2 %	30.6 %
It depends	31.2 %	23.5 %	17 %	33 %	19.9 %	19.2 %	32.9 %	29 %	27.1 %	6.7 %
Hate speech or prejudice	9.4 %	28.3 %	28.6 %	10.6 %	6.6 %	23.1 %	21.9 %	10.9 %	11.4 %	49.3 %
I don't know	15.9 %	18.9 %	22.8 %	45.1 %	31.5 %	24.7 %	26 %	15.9 %	15.3 %	13.5 %

	IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT					
	Far-left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right	Don't know/No ideology
Legitimate criticism	25.9 %	52.9 %	34 %	44.2 %	44.3 %	31.1 %
It depends	7 %	7.3 %	5 %	30 %	36.5 %	35.7 %
Hate speech or prejudice	25 %	9.7 %	35.9 %	11 %	7 %	15.9 %
I don't know	42.1 %	30.2 %	25.2 %	14.8 %	12.1 %	17.3 %

Pro-Israel people are a bad influence on our democracy.

	GENDER		AGE				
	Men	Women	16-24	25-34	35-44	45-59	60-100
Legitimate criticism	20.4 %	27.4 %	11.2 %	26.5 %	30.1 %	27.7 %	19.3 %
It depends	12.4 %	18.3 %	5.1 %	8.7 %	24.6 %	8.5 %	27.9 %
Hate speech or prejudice	54.8 %	46.8 %	66.2 %	52 %	35.2 %	57.7 %	45.1 %
I don't know	12.5 %	7.5 %	17.6 %	12.8 %	10.1 %	6.2 %	7.7 %

	EDUCATION LEVEL			HOUSEHOLD INCOME				
	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Up to R\$2,000	R\$ 2,000 - R\$ 3,000	R\$ 3,000 - R\$ 5,000	R\$ 5,000 - R\$ 10,000	Above R\$10,000
Legitimate criticism	46.4 %	11.9 %	17.8 %	38.7 %	4 %	23.5 %	23.3 %	21.3 %
It depends	9.5 %	17.5 %	19.9 %	2.1 %	11.9 %	9.6 %	32.6 %	24.3 %
Hate speech or prejudice	36.7 %	60.1 %	51.5 %	43.7 %	73 %	53.9 %	39.4 %	50.1 %
I don't know	7.4 %	10.5 %	10.8 %	15.6 %	11 %	12.9 %	4.7 %	4.2 %

Pro-Israel people are a bad influence on our democracy.

	REGION					RELIGION				
	South	Southeast	Northeast	Center-West	North	Catholic	Evangelical	Other religion	No religion	Agnostic/atheist
Legitimate criticism	18.5 %	29.8 %	15.1 %	43.3 %	3.6 %	24.1 %	21.8 %	15.5 %	13.4 %	38 %
It depends	32 %	10.2 %	20 %	4.6 %	11.1 %	17.6 %	3.3 %	19.9 %	12.8 %	46.4 %
Hate speech or prejudice	45.1 %	55.6 %	53.9 %	37.8 %	42.7 %	45.6 %	66.1 %	56.7 %	67.4 %	14.1 %
I don't know	4.4 %	4.5 %	10.9 %	14.3 %	42.6 %	12.7 %	8.8 %	7.9 %	6.3 %	1.6 %

	IDEOLOGICAL ALIGNMENT					
	Far-left	Center-left	Center	Center-right	Right	Don't know/No ideology
Legitimate criticism	75.2 %	13.8 %	0.1 %	3.3 %	0 %	15.7 %
It depends	14.7 %	37.9 %	28.6 %	6.7 %	2.1 %	3.1 %
Hate speech or prejudice	4.4 %	29.8 %	66 %	87.9 %	88.6 %	63.3 %
I don't know	5.6 %	18.5 %	5.3 %	2.1 %	9.3 %	17.9 %

Among respondents who identify with the left, **95%** consider legitimate the analogy between Israel and the Nazis, **96.5%** legitimize the narrative that denouncing Israel is a moral duty, and only **7%** state that they would feel comfortable interacting with a person who identifies as Zionist. This last response indicates the extent to which anti-Jewish prejudice is rooted among individuals who identify with the left: political rejection of “Zionists” — which, in practice, amounts to rejection of the vast majority of Jews — ceases to be merely political and becomes personal and affective, affecting Jews directly as individuals, perceived as unworthy of trust, friendship, and social acceptance within this segment of society. This reflects a form of antisemitism with a level of social reach not observed since the end of the Second World War.

Among those identifying with the center-left, the pattern is similar, though less pronounced: **74.7%** legitimize the Israel–Nazism analogy and **75.3%** legitimize the narrative of moral denunciation of Israel.

Among respondents identifying with the center-right and the right, there is greater acceptance of Zionism and greater propensity to classify certain narratives as prejudiced. On the right, **36.5%** state that they would accept interacting with a Zionist, while **88.6%** classify as prejudiced the statement that pro-Israel individuals are a threat to democracy.

Conclusion

The survey indicates that Brazilian society’s perception of Jews, Israel, and Zionism is shaped less by overt and explicit antisemitism and more by a combination of deeply rooted historical prejudices, interpretive ambiguity, and limited public understanding of contemporary forms of antisemitism.

This highlights the connection between classical and modern antisemitism: while the former is based on longstanding stereotypes about Jews, the latter often manifests through the rejection of the link between Jews, Israel, and Jewish national self-determination.

In this context, confronting antisemitism in Brazil requires not only denunciation but also public literacy — that is, a systematic effort to promote education about how antisemitism has operated historically and how it evolves in the present. The issue lies not only in the existence of prejudice, but in the fact that it is often not recognized as such.

8. ANTISEMITISM BEYOND INCIDENTS

Context, Narratives, Trends, and Perceptions

Understanding the complexity and entrenchment of contemporary antisemitism requires a perspective that goes beyond merely counting acts of aggression and formal complaints. In line with a Human Rights-Based Approach to Data, analyzing hostility directed at the Jewish community demands a deeper examination of the social ecosystem in which such violence emerges and is sustained. This chapter therefore proposes a fundamental analytical shift: the focus moves from isolated incidents to the broader social superstructures and **macro-environmental context** that shape the emergence, circulation, and normalization of hate.

To achieve this multidimensional perspective, this section is built upon a broad collaborative effort, **bringing together research conducted by leading partner organizations**. Through technical cooperation with StandWithUs Brasil, the AtlasIntel Institute, the group Executives Against Antisemitism (EOA), the Holocaust Museum of Curitiba, the Holocaust Memorial of São Paulo, and the ISPO Group, **this chapter consolidates studies that do not assess antisemitic incidents themselves, but rather the social, cultural, and structural climate in which they proliferate**.

The studies included in this chapter examine the narratives, trends, and perceptions that function as the “explanatory substrate” for everyday hostility. They map the circulation of hate and disinformation within the digital ecosystem; assess moral framings and public perceptions in Brazil regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; measure levels of historical knowledge and educational gaps concerning the Holocaust; and document dynamics of silencing and symbolic violence within corporate environments and the labor market.

By integrating these different macro-environmental perspectives, this chapter demonstrates that antisemitic incidents do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they are the final expression of broader structural dynamics of disinformation, educational gaps, and ideological polarization, reinforcing that confronting antisemitism necessarily involves understanding and contesting the narratives that shape society.

8.1 Web Monitoring

Mobilization of Sentiments through Narratives and Trends in Media and Digital Platforms

In 2025, the digital environment consolidated itself as the main vector for the circulation and amplification of antisemitic expressions and hate speech. Social media platforms, traditional media outlets, niche media, and digital influencers have come to play a structural role in shaping public perceptions, transforming isolated incidents into narratives with mass reach. This trend, observed since October 7, has not diminished; rather, it has intensified, contributing to the establishment of what is described here as a “new normal.”

Within this ecosystem, algorithms function as invisible architects of public attention. Far from being neutral, they organize content based on engagement patterns and individual preferences, creating closed informational environments that reinforce prior beliefs and reduce exposure to divergent viewpoints. The result is a fragmented public debate, shaped by confirmation biases and dynamics of affective polarization.

This context facilitates the circulation of stereotypes and prejudices through seemingly trivial formats, such as memes, short videos, irony, and humor-based content, which diffuse hostility under layers of ambiguity. The informational overload—often composed of distorted or unverified content—hinders critical reflection and encourages immediate emotional responses.

In this context, antisemitism manifests both through explicit attacks and, more diffusely and persistently, through the construction of recurring narratives that consolidate distorted imaginaries. In the digital environment, these narratives gain scale, speed, and permanence, fostering processes of symbolic normalization.

How Digital Monitoring Is Conducted

- Seeks to understand antisemitism in the Brazilian online environment and how the conflict between Israel and Hamas influences this phenomenon;
- **Analyzes the main narratives, the profiles shaping the conversation, and the daily evolution of antisemitism on social networks;**
- Tracks key metrics to provide a broad and detailed view, with data collected from social media platforms, news portals, and blogs;
- The methodology for analyzing antisemitic mentions combines an AI-based keyword filter with human curation and interpretation, ensuring accuracy and contextualization in the analysis.

Classification of Mentions Captured in Monitoring

The first classification analyzes the **FAVORABILITY** of the publication in relation to the State of Israel and to Jews.

FAVORABLE

News and comments that express support for Israel and Jews.

NEUTRAL

Impartial content, generally reporting events. Some express sympathy for victims, but without supporting either side.


UNFAVORABLE

News and comments that are critical of Israel’s actions or that express support for Hamas in the conflict.

Main numbers

In 2025, **6.43 million total mentions** were identified within the monitoring criteria. Of these, **115,970 were classified as antisemitic, reaching a potential audience of more than 66 million people.**

Sentiment x Volume of mentions (comparative 2024 vs 2025)



Digital antisemitism in 2025 shows:

- Strong reactivity to geopolitical events.
- Capacity for proportional dilution in high-volume environments.
- Migration toward more community-based platforms.
- Reduction in explicit polarization, with an increase in neutrality.
- Structural persistence of historical tropes, ready for reactivation.


The year 2025 cannot be interpreted merely as a period of greater or lesser intensity, but rather as a phase of structural consolidation of the phenomenon. The volume increases, the discourse reorganizes, platforms redistribute, and the tropes remain operative.

The percentage reduction in unfavorable sentiment does not imply a weakening of the phenomenon, but rather its transformation into a more stable discursive form, less explosive and potentially more deeply embedded in the digital narrative fabric.


Evolution of the volume of antisemitic conversations on social media (2023–2025)

If 2023 was marked by the initial explosion of debate following October 7, and 2024 was characterized by intense polarization and high levels of unfavorable sentiment, 2025 represents a distinct phase: volumetric expansion accompanied by relative emotional neutralization and the institutionalization of the conflict as a recurring topic.

Antisemitism on social media – 2023 to 2026
Evolution of the volume of anti-Semitic conversations on social media



- 1) Lula compares Israel's actions in Gaza with Hamas's terrorism.
- 2) Gleisi Hoffmann calls Israel's government "genocidal". Lula declared support for South Africa's initiative to call the UN International Court of Justice to investigate.
- 3) Lula says that "Israel is not waging war, but genocide."
- 4) Iran attacks Israel with drones and missiles.
- 5) Israel carries out an airstrike in the center of Beirut.
- 6) Justice orders PF to investigate Israeli soldier who is in Brazil.
- 7) Israel "will take control of the entire Gaza Strip," Benjamin Netanyahu declares. Israel intercepts boat with Greta Thunberg and Brazilian Thiago Ávila. Israel attacks Iran. Lula once again points out, this time at the BRICS summit, that Israel is promoting genocide in Gaza.
- 8) Announcement and implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza. Hamas breaks with the ceasefire. Detractors blame Israel for the deed.
- 9) Bolsonaro's support for Israel and acceptance of the death toll in the conflict.




Throughout 2025, sentiment followed these trends:

- **Favorable sentiment stood at 19%**, a decrease of 8% compared to 2024.
- **Neutral sentiment increased by 24%** compared to 2024, reaching 53% by the end of the year.
- **Unfavorable sentiment** also declined compared to the previous year, **dropping by 16%**, with a total of **28%** in 2025.

The sharp rise in neutrality suggests a process of narrative stabilization following the highly reactive environment of 2024. The topic remains present, but with a lower level of explicit emotional intensity. The simultaneous decline in both favorable and unfavorable sentiment indicates a reduction in direct polarization and a possible consolidation of the conflict as a permanent background issue in public discourse, with a greater presence of factual coverage and descriptive framing.

When strictly monitoring antisemitic mentions, it is observed that peaks in social media activity follow the pattern identified in 2023 and 2024, occurring shortly after domestic public statements, government positions, and major international events that resonate in Brazil.



64%

ANTISEMITIC MENTIONS

21%

RACISM AGAINST JEWS

14%

RELATED EXPRESSIONS PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

1%

EMISSIONS RELATED TO HOLOCAUST DENIAL

The potential reach of the recorded antisemitic mentions is 66,092,173 people, underscoring the importance not only of monitoring and classifying antisemitism in digital environments, but also of establishing strategies for its effective confrontation and significant reduction.

Examples of antisemitism on social media:

O antisemitismo é a salvação da humanidade, vimos líderes sionistas como os Lordes Rothschild cuidarem do nosso banco e psicológico, além de desde quando o Estado de Israel foi criado só houve Genocídios, mentiras, arrogâncias, ignorâncias e negligências em sua história, tanto que os Estados Unidos já se tornou cachorrinho danda 200 bilhões a Israel.

Holocausto americano-israelense, Israel se escora em um holocausto para praticar outro holocausto.

Quando vc ouvir um judeu choramingando sobre o holocausto mostre fotos de Gaza pra ele

Muito diferente do que diz o texto da Cofederação Israelita do Brasil, o povo Brasileiro APIOIA SIM essa ação contra o genocídio palestino. O povo CLAMA pelo fim desse massacre, genocídio e crime perpetrado por Israel e apoiado por EUA

Se o povo de Israel achava que existia anti semitismo, eles que se preparem para o que está começando a acontecer com tudo isso que eles estão fazendo.

Esse posicionamento DEMOROU DEMAIS! O genocídio está acontecendo há mais de 1 ano!

Palestina Livre!!! Todo país é soberano!!! [#foraisrael](#)

As declarações do Itamaraty tem total apoio dos brasileiros que tem coração e vergonha na cara. Parabéns presidente por condenar esse estado de apartheid, colonialista, opressor chamado Israel.

As vezes fico pensando... Será que H1TL3R estava errado??

Cortar relações com Israel pra ontem. O nazisionismo está matando o povo palestino.

8.2 Overview of Opinions on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in Brazil

(StandWithUs Brasil/AtlasIntel)

National Survey – Overview of Opinions on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in Brazil: Public Opinion, Political Identities, and Boundaries of the Debate

1. RESEARCH CONTEXT

The survey was conducted in a context of high media exposure of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, especially following the events of October 7, 2023, and the continuation of the war in Gaza, with a strong impact on national public debate and social media. It was carried out by the AtlasIntel Institute, commissioned by CEAD – the Center for Data Studies and Analysis of StandWithUs Brasil, which was responsible for the technical design of the study.

Data collection took place between September 10 and 23, 2025, during the final phase of ceasefire negotiations in Gaza and on the eve of the release of hostages still held by Hamas.

2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, AS DECLARED

- To map perceptions, opinions, and moral framings of Brazilians regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict;
- To assess public opinion on Brazil’s foreign policy in relation to the conflict;
- To measure levels of knowledge, sources of information, and forms of engagement;
- To identify patterns of political, affective, and ideological polarization;
- To observe temporal trends through comparison with previous surveys (Nov/2023 and Apr/2024).

3. METHODOLOGY

Quantitative survey, representative of the adult Brazilian population, with a total sample of 1,812 respondents. The margin of error was set at ± 2 percentage points, with a 95% confidence level.

The recruitment method used was Atlas RDR – Random Digital Recruitment, conducted online during user navigation. Stratification was applied post-data collection, with weights adjusted for gender, age, education, income, region, and voting behavior.

The following analytical categories were defined: foreign policy, international image, knowledge and information sources, conflict framing, ideological polarization, social coexistence, freedom of expression, and the limits of activism.

GENDER	AGE
Female — 52.6%	16–24 — 13.6%
Male — 47.4%	25–34 — 18.4%
	35–44 — 20.6%
EDUCATION	45–59 — 25.5%
Primary Education — 31.6%	60–100 — 21.9%
Secondary Education — 42.4%	
Higher Education — 25.9%	HOUSEHOLD INCOME
	R\$0 – R\$2,000 — 32.6%
REGION	R\$2,000 – R\$3,000 — 18.0%
Northeast — 27.2%	R\$3,000 – R\$5,000 — 21.9%
Southeast — 42.7%	R\$5,000 – R\$10,000 — 15.8%
South — 16.4%	Above R\$10,000 — 11.6%
Center-West — 7.6%	
North — 6.1%	IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING
	Left — 34.4%
	Right — 31.2%
	Center-left — 11.4%
	Center-right — 7.0%
	Center — 2.4%
	Don't know / no ideology — 13.6%

Figure 1 – Sample Demographics

Most Relevant Findings (Summary)

The results indicated a **high rate of positioning, with low levels of “don’t know” responses**, even in technically and conceptually complex questions such as genocide, Zionism, and colonial occupation. It was also possible to identify a significant shift in perceptions of Israel, with a progressive decline in the country’s positive image over the 2023–2025 period, followed by a marked increase in the perception that Israel practices “colonial occupation” in its territory.

With regard to political positioning/alignment, the left tends toward pro-Palestinian positions and criticism of Israel, while the right tends toward pro-Israel positions, albeit with signs of erosion. It should be noted that engagement with the research topic is predominantly digital, with a strong presence of “armchair activism,” which shows low conversion into in-person actions. Among respondents, 52.3% reported that social media (X, Instagram, TikTok, others) are the main influence on their views regarding the conflict.

Similarly, digital environments are the primary source of information for most participants in the survey: social media platforms rank first (X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok), with 59.2%, followed closely by internet news websites and portals, which serve as the primary source of information for 54.3%. Both questions allowed multiple responses.

What are your main sources of information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Select up to 4 options.




Figure 2 – Main source of information

Which sources most influence your view of the conflict?
Select up to 3 options.




Figure 3 – Influence of information sources

Another important point to highlight is the normalization of antisemitic content, particularly when disguised as political criticism (which would be legitimate) of Israel, which may indicate desensitization—a phenomenon recognized as being strongly driven by the use and indiscriminate absorption of digital environments as the sole or primary source of information.

Form of Data Presentation

The presentation of the data was organized into time series graphs, comparative tables by sociodemographic markers, and structured thematic blocks (foreign policy, media, knowledge, moralization of the conflict). Particular note should be made of the methodological choice to construct interpretive summaries at the end of each data section, which facilitates immediate understanding of the topic addressed, enabling the visualization of information and independent extraction of insights.

Key Trends Identified

- Reduction in neutrality and increase in assertive opinions;
- Growing moralization and emotionalization of the debate;
- Decisive influence of social media in opinion formation;
- Incorporation of anticolonial vocabulary and political slogans in a non-technical manner;
- Cognitive closure and difficulty in dialogue between divergent positions.

Analytical Synthesis of the Data

In a cross-sectional reading, the data reveal a society that is highly emotionally mobilized, with strong symbolic and identity-based engagement with the conflict, despite technical and conceptual gaps in historical and legal understanding.

- The increase in self-declared knowledge is linked to the centrality of social media as an informational source;
- National political polarization directly influences interpretations of the international conflict;
- The decline in Israel's image accompanies the intensification of humanitarian coverage of Gaza;
- The moralization of the debate favors binary readings ("oppressor vs. oppressed").

Without extrapolation, the data suggest that Brazilian public debate is not primarily structured around technical criteria, but rather around ideological, affective, and identity-based alignments, which creates fertile ground for discursive simplifications and conceptual shifts.

The research shows how legitimate political criticism can, in certain contexts, slide into the normalization of antisemitic discourse, especially when concepts such as "genocide," "Zionism," or "occupation" are used in a decontextualized and morally absolutized manner.

8.3 Knowledge about the Holocaust in Brazil (CONIB, Holocaust Museum, Holocaust Memorial, StandWithUs Brazil)

“Knowledge about the Holocaust in Brazil” Survey (2025)

1. RESEARCH CONTEXT

The survey “Knowledge about the Holocaust in Brazil” was conducted throughout 2025, in an international context marked by the resurgence of antisemitism, the circulation of historical disinformation, and the trivialization of violence. The study’s main objective was to map the level of knowledge of the Brazilian population about the Holocaust, identifying educational gaps, socioeconomic inequalities in access to historical information, and perceptions regarding the importance of teaching the subject.

The survey was commissioned by a consortium composed of the Brazilian Israelite Confederation (CONIB), the Holocaust Memorial of São Paulo, the Holocaust Museum of Curitiba, and StandWithUs Brazil, and conducted by the ISPO Group, an institute specialized in public opinion research.

2. METHODOLOGY

The study was structured in two complementary stages:

Stage 1 – Pilot (Southern Region)

- Period: September and October 2025
- Scope: metropolitan regions of Porto Alegre, Curitiba, and Florianópolis
- Total interviews: 2,482

Stage 2 – National (Metropolitan Regions)

- Period: April 2025
- Scope: 11 Brazilian metropolitan regions (including São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and Recife)
- Total interviews: 5,280

Consolidated Sample

- Total interviews: 7,762
- Margin of error: 4.7%
- Confidence interval: 95%

Predominant profile:

- 54.2% women
- 31.4% youth aged 18 to 29
- 51.8% with secondary education
- 54.4% with household income of up to two minimum wages

The interviews were conducted in person, at urban flow points (transport stations, commercial centers), with control by sociodemographic quotas.

Main Findings and Form of Data Presentation

The results are presented in a comparative manner, combining indicators of self-declared knowledge, factual knowledge, sources of information, socioeconomic breakdowns, social perceptions, and levels of practical engagement.

Among the main findings, the following stand out:

Mismatch between perceived knowledge and factual knowledge

- 59.3% report having some knowledge about the Holocaust, but only 53.2% are able to correctly define it as the systematic extermination of six million Jews by the Nazi regime.
- At the same time, 2.9% of respondents believe that the Holocaust was an “isolated episode of unproven violence,” a result which, although small, must be taken into account as it indicates the persistence of doubt with the potential to develop into denialism.

Level of Self-Declared Knowledge

30.60%	Yes, I have full knowledge.
28.70%	Yes, my knowledge is superficial.
21.60%	I have never heard of it.
10.00%	I don't know.
9.10%	I am not sure if I have heard of it.

What is the definition of the Holocaust?

53.20%	Extermination of 6 million Jews.
31.10%	I don't know.
9.00%	Military conflict with 50 million victims.
3.80%	Cultural movement.
2.90%	Isolated episode of unproven violence.

Fragility of Specific Historical Knowledge:

- Only 38.5% correctly identified Auschwitz-Birkenau as an extermination camp;
- 51.6% reported not knowing how to answer this question (National Stage).

Sources of Information:

- School: 30.9%
- Films and books: 18.6%
- Internet and social media: 12.5%
- Museums and memorials: only 1.7%, indicating low access to formal spaces of memory.


Deep Educational and Socioeconomic Inequalities:

- Correct identification of the definition of the Holocaust ranges from 27.2% (primary education) to 86.2% (postgraduate level);
- Among those earning up to two minimum wages, 42.6% correctly define it, compared to 87.1% among those earning above ten minimum wages.

Recognition of Importance, but Low Practical Engagement:

- 64.4% consider Holocaust education in schools to be essential;
- 87.3% have never participated in lectures, educational events, or visits to museums related to the topic.

Importance of Teaching the Holocaust in Schools



Analytical Synthesis of the Data

The survey reveals a structural pattern of fragility in historical knowledge about the Holocaust in Brazil, strongly conditioned by educational and socioeconomic inequalities. The Holocaust is widely recognized as a relevant event, but is understood in a superficial, fragmented, and, in many cases, imprecise manner.

The mismatch between the symbolic valuation of the subject and low practical engagement indicates that existing knowledge is largely mediated by indirect references (schooling, audiovisual culture, internet), without conceptual or contextual depth. The limited presence of museums and memorials as sources of information reinforces the difficulty of access to structured educational experiences.

The data suggest that educational inequality operates not only as a factor of social exclusion, but also as a factor of vulnerability to historical disinformation, creating space for relativizations, distortions, and denialist discourse.

Strengths of the Survey

- Large and methodologically robust sample, with national coverage in metropolitan regions;
- Combination of self-declared knowledge and factual knowledge, enabling more precise analyses;
- Inclusion of socioeconomic, regional, educational, and media-based breakdowns;
- Clarity in data presentation and consistent use of comparisons between stages;
- Articulation between empirical results and the institutional perspectives of the entities involved;
- Direct potential for use in the formulation of public policies, educational actions, and institutional memory strategies.



8.4 Antisemitism in the Workplace (ECOA)

ECOA Research — Antisemitism in Companies (Brazil)

1. CONTEXT

The survey “Antisemitism in Companies” was conducted by Renata Bendit Insight Consultancy, at the request of the ECOA initiative – Executives Against Antisemitism, with the objective of mapping the presence, forms, and impacts of antisemitism in the Brazilian corporate environment. The study seeks to understand both the direct experiences of Jewish professionals and the broader perceptions of Jewish and non-Jewish workers on the subject, providing input for business leaders, HR managers, and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) departments.

Data collection took place between October 28 and 30, 2024, through a structured online questionnaire distributed via WhatsApp to individuals both within and outside the Jewish community. The total sample comprised 1,003 respondents, with a strong geographic concentration in the Southeast (93%), especially in capital cities (90%), and a significant presence of professionals in leadership positions, including C-level executives.

The surveyed population includes:

- Jewish and non-Jewish professionals;
- Workers from different economic sectors (technology, healthcare, finance, services, legal, education, media, public sector, among others);
- Various hierarchical levels, from assistants to partners and executives.

Sample Profile

GENDER



AGE (%)




JEWISH




65% Jews in the sample

REGION



Sample Profile by Sector (In relation to employment)



The report's target audience includes companies, corporate leadership, DEI departments, internal policy makers, and organizations interested in inclusive work environments.

Main Findings and Form of Data Presentation

The data are presented predominantly in percentages, organized in thematic charts and tables throughout the slides, with breakdowns by:

- Jewish identity;
- Gender;
- Sector of activity;
- Hierarchical level;
- Company size.

Among the main findings, the following stand out:


- **46%** of Jewish respondents report having been victims of antisemitism at some point in their professional lives;
- **19%** of Jewish respondents report having experienced antisemitism in the workplace;
- **18%** of the overall sample report having witnessed situations of antisemitism at work, rising to 25% among Jewish respondents;
- Most situations did not result in formal reprimand, and when there was an institutional response, it was predominantly informal;
- **52%** of respondents report having heard jokes about Jews in the professional environment.
- Only **14%** indicate that antisemitism is addressed consistently within diversity policies;
- Only **15%** of companies have or are developing clear policies to combat antisemitism.

Situations of Antisemitism in the Workplace | Impact of October 7

Overall, **18% reported having witnessed some form of antisemitism in the workplace, with this percentage being even higher among Jewish respondents (one quarter)**. This figure indicates the extent of the problem in the corporate environment.


Half of those who witnessed such episodes state that they are not related to recent events, especially men. Women, in turn, tend to perceive a connection with the event.

Did you witness any situation of antisemitism at work?



Base: 1,003 / 655

Was it due to developments related to the war after 07/10/2023?




Base: 1,206

Company Positioning in Cases of Antisemitism

In relation to these situations of antisemitism in the company, in **most cases there was no formal reporting or corrective action**, and when there was, it occurred only informally.

More than half of those who witnessed antisemitism expressed themselves in some way, while some chose silence due to fear of retaliation or lack of institutional support.

Was there any reprimand or corrective action?



Base: 206

Did you take any action?



Base: 206

Analytical Synthesis of the Data

The survey reveals that antisemitism in the Brazilian corporate environment is not episodic, but displays structural and normalized characteristics, especially in the form of jokes, derogatory comments, and attitudes disguised as humor or opinion.

The finding that **one in four Jewish** respondents has witnessed antisemitism in the workplace, combined with the low rate of institutional response, points to a scenario of normalization of prejudice and silencing of victims, often motivated by fear of retaliation or the perception that there will be no consequences.

Another relevant aspect is gender asymmetry: women tend to more frequently associate episodes of antisemitism with the developments following the terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war, indicating greater sensitivity or greater exposure to politicized and hostile discourse in the professional environment.

The data also suggest a significant gap in DEI policies, which often address racism and other forms of discrimination, but exclude antisemitism or address it only peripherally.

9. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Final considerations

The data presented throughout this Annual Report demonstrate that antisemitism in Brazil is not limited to isolated episodes or occasional manifestations. It is a phenomenon that expresses itself in a transversal manner, crossing digital environments, institutional spaces, professional dynamics, and processes of public opinion formation. The stabilization in the number of reported incidents, with fluctuations and significant increases at certain moments, the centrality of social media in the circulation of narratives, and the fragility of historical knowledge about the Holocaust together form a scenario that requires a systemic and continuous reading.

The diagnosis shows that contemporary antisemitism operates on multiple levels: it manifests both through explicit aggression and through more diffuse processes of discursive normalization, disinformation, and collective blame. The combination of the small demographic base of the Jewish community, structural underreporting, and operational limitations in monitoring reinforces the need for integrated methodologies that consider not only the volume of incidents, but also their symbolic impact and their potential for radicalization.

At the same time, the high levels of institutional trust in CONIB and in community security mechanisms indicate that an organized, evidence-based response constitutes a central element in mitigating risks and protecting Jewish life in the country. The fight against antisemitism, however, cannot be understood as the exclusive responsibility of the affected community. It is a challenge that calls upon public authorities, digital platforms, the educational system, the corporate environment, and Brazilian society as a whole.

As demonstrated, contemporary antisemitism is neither an isolated phenomenon nor one restricted to national borders. It manifests as a transnational dynamic, fueled by global digital flows, by narratives that circulate in real time, and by symbolic repertoires shared internationally. Episodes and discourses produced in other contexts resonate in Brazil, are locally reinterpreted, and become part of the domestic informational environment. This global character imposes the need for methodological and institutional alignment with international centers dedicated to monitoring and combating antisemitism. By adopting internationally recognized parameters and engaging with leading organizations and institutes, CONIB positions itself in line with global best practices in analyzing and responding to the phenomenon. This positioning not only strengthens the technical quality of the diagnosis produced, but also places the Brazilian Jewish community on the same level of strategic coordination as other diaspora communities, reaffirming a commitment to international standards based on evidence and institutional cooperation.

The “new normal” of global antisemitism requires responses proportionate to its complexity. The systematic production of data, methodological transparency, and institutional coordination represent essential steps, but they are insufficient if not accompanied by coordinated actions and concrete commitments. Addressing antisemitism in Brazil requires collective responsibility, democratic commitment, and evidence-based policies.

Strategic Recommendations

Addressing antisemitism requires a multisectoral approach. The following recommendations are formulated based on the empirical data presented and are directed at different social actors whose roles are decisive for the prevention and mitigation of the phenomenon.

Guiding Premises

- Antisemitism constitutes a violation of human rights and a crime under current legislation;
- Freedom of expression is a constitutional principle, but it does not protect discriminatory or hate-inciting speech that violates other principles of equal hierarchy;
- Addressing antisemitism requires both preventive and repressive actions, in a balanced manner;
- Combating antisemitism is a duty of all: civil society, the State, platforms and companies, the press, opinion leaders, academia, and citizens;
- Historical memory is an essential element for the preservation of democracy.

Journalists and Media Outlets

- Distinguish legitimate political criticism from discourse that reproduces historical stereotypes or collective blame;
- Avoid distorted analogies involving the Holocaust and historically inaccurate references;
- Adopt rigorous verification protocols when dealing with viral content and moderate comment spaces that disseminate hate speech.

Digital Influencers and Content Creators

- Avoid the dissemination of unverified narratives about international conflicts.
 - Distinguish political activism from incitement to hostility against religious or ethnic identities;
 - Take responsibility for moderating the communities under their influence.
-

Digital Platforms

- Improve mechanisms for identifying and removing antisemitic hate speech, including the use of contextual AI, multimodal analysis (text, image, video, and memes), and monitoring of coded language, reducing response time and recurrence;
 - Avoid algorithmic amplification of high-risk content by adopting preventive reach-reduction mechanisms while moderation analysis is ongoing;
 - Ensure transparency and consistent enforcement of moderation policies, with clear criteria, periodic reports specifically addressing antisemitism, and effective appeal channels;
 - Demonetize and apply progressive sanctions to repeat offenders, economically disincentivizing the dissemination of hate;
 - Invest in digital education and qualified counter-narratives, directing users to reliable sources and validated historical content. Cooperate with authorities and civil society organizations in monitoring and addressing incidents.
-

Educational Institutions and Teachers

- Incorporate Holocaust education and the history of antisemitism in a structured and continuous manner;
 - Develop clear protocols for addressing cases of discrimination;
 - Promote critical thinking and responsible analysis of digital content.
-

Academic Environments

- Ensure that debates on international conflicts do not result in hostility directed at students or faculty;
 - Establish clear codes of conduct against discrimination and ideological harassment;
 - Encourage rigorous research on contemporary antisemitism.
-

Justice System

- Consistently apply existing legislation against discrimination and incitement to hatred.
 - Promote specific training on contemporary typologies of antisemitism;
 - Ensure prompt investigation of crimes motivated by prejudice.
-

Public Authorities

- Develop and implement structured plans to address antisemitism and other forms of religious and ethnic hatred;
 - Strengthen official mechanisms for data collection and transparency regarding hate crimes;
 - Incorporate Holocaust education and the history of antisemitism into curricular guidelines, in coordination with specialists.
-

Researchers and Research Institutions

- Expand the production of empirical data on antisemitism in Brazil;
 - Develop interdisciplinary methodologies that integrate digital and in-person dimensions;
 - Encourage international cooperation for the comparison of global trends.
-

Jewish Community

- Strengthen reporting and monitoring mechanisms;
 - Invest in leadership development and internal education;
 - Coordinate responses at local and national levels.
-

Wider Society

- Recognize that antisemitism is a matter of public and democratic concern;
 - Reject distorted historical analogies and symbolic dehumanization as critical arguments;
 - Understand that the protection of religious and ethnic diversity is a constitutive element of the Democratic Rule of Law.
-

10. CONIB'S INSTITUTIONAL ACTION

CONIB's Institutional Action in 2025: Public Presence, Democratic Firmness, and Coordinated Action

The year 2025 required continuous, technical, and strategically coordinated institutional action from the Jewish Confederation of Brazil (CONIB) in response to the consolidation of an environment of growing hostility toward Jews in Brazil and worldwide. While in previous years the challenge was to respond to peaks of radicalization, in 2025 it became imperative to address a scenario marked by the normalization of antisemitic discourse in public, political, and digital spaces.

Official Statements: Firm Positioning in the Face of the Trivialization of Hate

Throughout the year, CONIB issued successive official statements in response to public declarations, diplomatic decisions, and episodes of violence that had a direct impact on the Brazilian Jewish community and on the country's democratic environment.

These positions fulfilled three central institutional functions:

1. **To name antisemitism when it manifests**, including when disguised as political rhetoric or disproportionate criticism of the State of Israel;
2. **To warn about the concrete effects of such statements within Brazil**, particularly the immediate increase in attacks and hate speech on social media;
3. **To reaffirm democratic parameters**, emphasizing that freedom of expression cannot serve as a shield for the propagation of racial or religious prejudice.

In 2025, notable were CONIB's responses to public statements that trivialized the Holocaust, relativized antisemitism, or reproduced accusations historically associated with anti-Jewish libels, as well as its reaction to Brazil's withdrawal from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), considered a diplomatic and moral setback.

The official statements also expressed active solidarity with Jewish communities affected by attacks abroad—such as the attack during a Hanukkah celebration in Australia—and denounced episodes of intolerance occurring within national territory, reaffirming that attacks against Jews are attacks against Brazil's constitutional values.

Institutional Coordination and Presence across the Three Branches of Government

Alongside its public positions, CONIB intensified its engagement with the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, consolidating a permanent network of institutional dialogue.

In 2025, the organization was present at:

- Solemn sessions in the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate in memory of the victims of the Holocaust and the October 7 attack;
- Events organized by Courts of Justice and Public Prosecutor's Offices dedicated to combating racism, extremism, and hate speech;
- The signing of Technical Cooperation Agreements with state Public Prosecutor's Offices, expanding mechanisms for reporting, training, and monitoring;
- Meetings with leaders of the Federal Supreme Court and the National Congress, reinforcing the need for legal protection of minorities.

CONIB's participation in the UNODC National Roundtable on violent extremism and in the event organized by the School of the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office on terrorism and organized crime illustrates the expansion of the debate on antisemitism beyond the community sphere, placing it within the broader agenda of institutional security and the fight against extremism.

International Cooperation and Technical Strengthening

The year was also marked by the strengthening of strategic international partnerships. The closer relationship with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), including technical exchange in New York, enhanced the capacity for monitoring and responding to extremist threats.

Participation in international forums—such as the ADL Convention, the AJC Convention, and the Latin American Forum to Combat Antisemitism—positioned Brazil within the global dialogue on best practices to address hate, while also enabling the sharing of the Brazilian experience in federative coordination and coordinated legal action.

The organization of delegations of journalists and magistrates to Israel, in partnership with StandWithUs Brazil, formed part of a strategy to combat disinformation through direct access to plural sources, historical contexts, and complex realities often simplified in public debate.

Intellectual Production and Public Literacy

In 2025, institutional action also extended to the field of thought and opinion formation. Articles published in leading outlets addressed central themes such as:

- The instrumentalization of the term “genocide”;
- The trivialization of the Holocaust;
- Diplomatic double standards;
- The importance of the IHRA;
- The defense of political solutions based on coexistence and self-determination.

These public interventions reinforced the need to distinguish legitimate political criticism from narratives that reproduce historical patterns of the demonization of Jews.

On CONIB's own channels, educational content was expanded on the definition of antisemitism, the memory of the Shoah, the impacts of hate speech, and the importance of formal reporting. Digital literacy became a structuring axis of the institutional strategy, recognizing that most monitored incidents originate in the virtual environment.

Memory, Education, and Prevention

The illumination of the National Congress with the phrase “Holocaust Never Again,” the adoption by Brazilian states of the IHRA definition of antisemitism, and active participation in Yom HaShoah ceremonies and tributes to victims of terrorism reaffirmed the centrality of memory as a preventive tool.

At the same time, the formalization of cooperation with Public Prosecutor’s Offices and legal institutions consolidated the understanding that addressing antisemitism must combine historical memory, civic education, and legal accountability.

A Systemic Approach to a Structural Challenge

CONIB’s institutional action in 2025 was not limited to episodic responses. It took the form of a systemic strategy, combining:

- Technical monitoring;
- Clear public positioning;
- Qualified political advocacy;
- Legal action;
- International cooperation;
- Intellectual production;
- Education and memory.

In the face of the consolidation of a “new normal” of hostility, the institutional response needed to be equally structured and sustained. By naming antisemitism, defending democratic parameters, and expanding alliances, CONIB reaffirmed that the protection of the Jewish community is inseparable from the protection of Brazilian democracy.

As demonstrated throughout 2025, addressing antisemitism is not merely a reaction to hate—it is the active construction of a public culture grounded in responsibility, memory, truth, and the rule of law.

10.1 Protection of Jews under Brazilian Law and the Role of CONIB’s Legal Department

The Federal Constitution of Brazil establishes, as one of the foundations of the Democratic Rule of Law, the dignity of the human person (Art. 1, III), with the objective of **“promoting the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of discrimination”** (Art. 3, IV). In addition, Article 4, items II and VIII, provides, in the State’s international relations, for the prevalence of human rights and the repudiation of racism and terrorism.

In the same sense, Article 5 establishes that **all are equal before the law**, without distinction of any kind, guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreign residents in the country the inviolability of the rights to life, liberty, equality, security, and property, as follows:

- Freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable, ensuring the free exercise of religious practices and guaranteeing, as provided by law, the protection of places of worship and their liturgy (Art. 5, VI);
- No one shall be deprived of rights on the grounds of religious belief (Art. 5, VIII);
- The practice of racism constitutes a non-bailable and imprescriptible crime, subject to imprisonment, under the terms of the law (Art. 5, XLII).

Thus, there is a comprehensive constitutional framework aimed at repressing and punishing racist conduct.

The classification of antisemitic conduct in Brazil falls primarily under the legislation governing crimes of racism—Law No. 7,716/89.

It is important to emphasize that, in Brazil, antisemitism constitutes a crime of racism.

Article 1 of the relevant law provides for penalties for **crimes of discrimination based on race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin**.

Article 20 defines the crime of racism as practicing, inducing, or inciting discrimination, establishing a penalty of one to three years of imprisonment and a fine. Paragraph 1 of the same provision **provides for a higher penalty, of two to five years, for those who manufacture, commercialize, distribute, or disseminate symbols, emblems, ornaments, badges, or propaganda that use the swastika, for the purpose of promoting Nazism**. Paragraph 2 provides for a penalty of two to five years if any of the aforementioned crimes is committed through means of social communication, publication on social media, the internet, or any form of publication.

The crime of racism thus encompasses antisemitic offenses directed at the Jewish people as a whole. Conversely, when an antisemitic offense is targeted at a specific individual, it constitutes the crime of racial insult.

It should be emphasized that antisemitism can and should be classified as a form of racial insult (injúria racial) rather than merely religious discrimination. This is because antisemitic manifestations, as a rule, are not directed at Judaism as a religion, but at Jews as a people. Indeed, Judaism is not limited to a religious dimension, but also constitutes a cultural and ethnic identity.

CONIB's Legal Action

The legal action of the Jewish Confederation of Brazil (CONIB) is grounded in transforming reports received through its reporting channels into legal responses and concrete outcomes against antisemitism. Through a commission composed of volunteer lawyers, the legal department conducts a careful screening of reported incidents, adopting appropriate measures according to the severity of each case. In practice, this action involves formally notifying the competent authorities—such as the Police and the Public Prosecutor's Office—initiating legal proceedings in serious cases, and continuously monitoring criminal actions, seeking to ensure the accountability of perpetrators under Brazilian legislation that classifies antisemitism as a crime of racism or racial insult.

With the dedication of **more than 45 volunteer lawyers and over 2,000 hours of work** in the past 12 months, the Legal Commission of the Jewish Confederation of Brazil (CONIB) has been able to transform reports into concrete results. **Through the receipt, analysis, and careful screening of reports, it adopts the appropriate legal measures for each case, notifying the competent authorities and regularly monitoring proceedings.**

In 2025, **150 reports** received through CONIB and DSC/FISESP channels were forwarded to the legal department for evaluation and action.

Since October 7, 2023, at least **60 cases** have been reported to the Police or the Public Prosecutor's Office.

There are ongoing legal actions in a large number of federal states, including São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Ceará, Amazonas, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Paraná, Minas Gerais, and the Federal District.

On average, over the past 24 months, there has been one conviction for antisemitism every three months.

Until 2024, for every four cases of antisemitism brought to the attention of authorities, at least one resulted in a conviction or the conclusion of a non-prosecution agreement. In 2025, the Federal Supreme Court established an important precedent that non-prosecution agreements are not applicable in cases of racism against Jews, in a case that involved the participation of CONIB's legal team.

Case Reports – Court Interpretations

1. LEADING CASE ADAPTED TO SOCIAL MEDIA

A lawyer and psychoanalyst was convicted for publishing, on his social media, content of a clearly racist nature that incited discrimination against the Jewish people. In the post, he attributed to Jews responsibility for various diseases that have affected humanity (such as the Black Death and COVID-19), described the Holocaust as a fictitious event, and claimed that Jews sought to “take revenge” on civilization.



With the involvement of CONIB, he was convicted by the Federal Regional Court of the 5th Region (TRF5), which emphasized that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute: *“the right to freedom of expression, therefore, is not absolute. It must be exercised within the limits of the law, under penalty of offending another equally fundamental value, which is the dignity of the human person.”*

In the same sense, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) upheld the conviction, stressing that *“The acts attributed to the appellant are of enormous gravity. There is no doubt that the Federal Constitution, in its Article 5, establishes among the fundamental rights and guarantees the freedoms of thought and expression (...) it cannot be admitted, therefore, that the importance of acts of prejudice based on race, religion, color, or gender be minimized. Such acts significantly impact the lives of many people around the world, even in the present day.”*

The case became final in December 2025, following the full confirmation of the conviction by the Federal Supreme Court, which *established an important precedent that non-prosecution agreements are not applicable in cases of racism against Jews* (RE 1532157/CE).

2. HATE SPEECH ON THE SOCIAL NETWORK X

With the involvement of CONIB, the defendant was sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment and 70 fine-days, under an initial semi-open regime, for having published on the social network “X” at least seven posts of a clearly racist nature, promoting hatred and discrimination against the Jewish people. Among the statements, the convicted individual repeatedly asserted that “Hitler would have been incompetent” for “not eliminating the Jews,” for “not completing his work,” and for “not finishing the job,” thereby blaming and holding the

Jewish community responsible for the conflict in the Middle East.

On appeal, the Federal Regional Court of the 5th Region (TRF5) fully upheld the conviction, emphasizing that: *“This is not debate. It is hate speech against those who have suffered and continue to suffer discrimination, and whom the defendant claims should have been exterminated. His conduct formally and materially falls within the crime defined in §2 of Article 20 of Law No. 7.716/89. Furthermore, the remaining argument that (...) he cannot be held liable because he merely raised the debate of third parties’ ideas, by stating phrases such as ‘Here is the explanation in which I have heard some say that Hitler was incompetent in not eliminating the Jews’; ‘for this reason I have heard some people say that Hitler was incompetent in not eliminating them’; ‘that is why there are people who said: Hitler was incompetent,’ etc., finds no linguistic support. The statements are not presented in a context of merely reporting what others allegedly said. In fact, the defendant uses them as assertive expressions with affirmative content, that is, constructions with a justificatory and endorsing value, and not as the introduction of a neutral debate about others’ ideas.”*



3. UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR DELIVERS HATE SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA

With the involvement of CONIB, a university professor was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment and 10 fine-days for the crime of racism against Jews, based on antisemitic statements disseminated on his social media. The defendant incited discrimination against Jews, calling them murderers and calling for the extermination of Israel.

The Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region (TRF4) upheld the conviction, emphasizing that

“the recognized right to freedom of expression does not grant him the right to adopt prejudiced discourse, reinforcing negative stereotypes that have fueled and continue to fuel attacks against Jews—attacks that often go beyond the merely rhetorical sphere, hence the need for heightened vigilance and a proportional response by criminal law. Veiled prejudice is as harmful as, or even more harmful than, overt prejudice, since the latter can be easily identified and confronted, whereas the former slips insidiously through the margins, in a subliminal manner, and, upon finding refuge in unguarded minds, gradually contaminates an entire society, requiring the work of generations to reverse its harmful effects.”

In the same sense, the **Superior Court of Justice (STJ)** and the **Federal Supreme Court (STF)** denied all appeals by the defense and fully upheld the conviction. The conviction became final in August 2025.

Transcript of the posts:

1. *“(...) You and your father are fit to represent no one, except to defend illegality and to keep spreading hate speech against peoples, especially against the Palestinian and Syrian people, paying homage to **ISRAELI MURDERERS** (...) if you have two drops of Arab blood circulating in your arteries and veins, you should not even think of voting for these lackeys of Zionism. (...) **These supposedly well-intentioned citizens still have not understood that the bombings by the Jewish army against UN civilian facilities are the heinous sign of Jewish arrogance and insolence against humanity and the nations of the world? Have they not yet understood that this moral and political aberration called Israel is merely the front, or the visible face, of stateless criminal organizations and parasitic entities embedded in our countries and nations?**”*
2. *“**Israel is the cancer of humanity!** To save humanity from this cancer, it must be exterminated.”*
3. *“We are dealing with Zionist people, uneducated, racist, liars, murderers, that is, **HUMAN GARBAGE!**”*
4. *“**The crimes of the Zionist occupation against our people and our holy places in the city of Jerusalem will be met with greater resistance from our people and their forces, and will be confronted with more heroic operations and unity on the ground, as clearly seen in the attack (the stabbing in June 2017 at Damascus Gate) (...) May the powerful Palestinian combat rifle be aimed at the chests of our enemies—the Zionists and their collaborators—thus thwarting their conspiracies against the Palestinian land, its people, and the Arab nation.**”*

11. DEEPEN YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Books on antisemitism published in Brazil (2024 – 2025)

1. Discurso de ódio: o racismo reciclado nos séculos XX e XXI (Ed. Perspectiva)

Edited by Maria Luiza Tucci Carneiro, this volume brings together 14 essays that analyze how racism, antisemitism, anti-Roma discrimination, xenophobia, misogyny, and other forms of intolerance do not disappear over time, but rather transform and update themselves in new political and technological contexts. The work demonstrates that contemporary hate speech—disseminated through social media, anonymous forums, video games, cartoons, and other seemingly “neutral” media—has deep historical roots linked to colonialism, 19th-century scientific racism, and the narrative strategies of Nazism and other totalitarian regimes.



2. Sobre o antissemitismo: a história de uma palavra

(Companhia das Letras)

Mark Mazower examines the historical and political trajectory of the term “antisemitism” itself, showing how it emerged in the late 19th century, associated with European racial nationalism, and how its meaning has evolved over time, particularly after the Holocaust and in contemporary political disputes. By reconstructing this conceptual genealogy, the author demonstrates that antisemitism is not only a long-standing phenomenon, but also a historically contested concept, whose use requires analytical precision to distinguish older prejudices, modern ideologies, and contemporary forms of hostility toward Jews.




3. Antissemitismo estrutural (Intrínseca/História Real)

Gustavo Binenbojm examines antisemitism as a persistent historical phenomenon that transforms over time (“structural”), adapting to different religious, racial, and political contexts while maintaining a continuous logic of stigmatization of Jews. The book combines historical analysis, legal reflection, and the study of cultural manifestations to show how prejudice can operate in subtle ways within contemporary social structures, advocating for the need for “anti-antisemitism literacy” capable of distinguishing legitimate criticism from discourse that reproduces stereotypes and discrimination.



4. A solidão de Israel (Editora Contexto)

Bernard-Henri Lévy argues that the events of October 7, 2023 revealed a new stage in Israel's political and moral isolation on the international stage, marked by the rapid relativization of the massacre and the growth of contemporary forms of antisemitism. Combining personal testimony, geopolitical analysis, and philosophical reflection, the author contends that the conflict involving Israel is not merely regional, but part of a broader global dispute between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies, in which the fate of the Israeli state becomes a decisive indicator of the moral and political transformations of the contemporary world.




5. A guerra de narrativas: Israel, Hamas, a batalha pela opinião pública (Citadel Grupo Editorial)

Maj. Rafael Rozenszajn argues that the conflict between Israel and Hamas does not take place only on the military field, but also in a communicational arena, where the struggle over the interpretation of events influences governments, diplomacy, public opinion, and political decision-making. The author, who served as a Portuguese-language spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces, seeks to present the backstage of the so-called “media war” parallel to armed confrontations.



6. Jesus, um judeu (Editora Mundo Cristão)

Igor Sabino argues that antisemitism within Christianity was not a recent accident, but the result of a long history of distorted readings and stereotypes that, over the centuries, fueled hostility toward Jews and even served as a cultural atmosphere for modern tragedies. He therefore maintains that recovering the Jewishness of Jesus and rethinking biblical interpretation is not merely a historical adjustment, but an ethical and theological imperative, especially in a contemporary context in which the political dispute over narratives about Israel-Palestine (including the figure of the “Palestinian Jesus”) may reactivate older forms of demonization under new languages.



7. Depois do pogrom (Editora Contexto)

Brendan O'Neill argues that the essential aspect of the post-October 7, 2023 period was not only the escalation of a conflict, but also the reaction of the West: universities, activist movements, and parts of the public sphere are said to have treated the massacre with relativization, moral inversions, and double standards, producing a crisis of ethical clarity precisely when it was most needed. By describing this moment as a failed “moral test,” the author contends that the episode exposed a broader cultural disorder—marked by a departure from universalist values and a new permissiveness toward forms of anti-Jewish hatred—and proposes that understanding this “moral battle” is decisive both for the security of Jews and for the future of the West itself.



8. 300 perguntas em 300 palavras: Mitos e realidades sobre o conflito israelense-palestino (KKL Brasil)

Gabriel Ben-Tasgal seeks to explain complex issues related to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians through brief answers (up to 300 words) to common questions about history, politics, identity, and territorial disputes. Each chapter addresses a different question, offering a synthetic and accessible overview of issues that are often debated and misunderstood regarding this historical conflict and its multiple dimensions.



EDITORA PERSPECTIVA, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE BRAZIL-ISRAEL INSTITUTE, COORDINATED BY BRENO ISAAC BENEDYK, WITH CURATION BY LIA VAINER SCHUCMAN, SERGIO KON, AND GITA K. GINSBURG, ALSO PUBLISHED THE COLLECTION “QUESTÃO JUDAICA CONTEMPORÂNEA”:

1. Reflexões sobre o Racismo: Reflexões sobre a Questão Judaica e Orfeu Negro

A work that brings together classic formulations by Jean-Paul Sartre, written in the immediate post-Second World War period, on how racism and antisemitism operate less as “informed opinions” and more as passionate and political attitudes that transform the Jew—and, in the other essay, the colonized Black subject—into a target figure onto which social frustrations are projected and around which collective identities and mechanisms of exclusion are organized.



2. Exclua o judeu em nós

Jean-Luc Nancy interprets antisemitism not only as social prejudice, but as part of a historical logic in the construction of Western identities, in which the figure of the “Jew” functions as the “internal other” whose exclusion helps define the “we” itself. By revealing this structural mechanism of belonging and rejection, the book offers an important theoretical key for understanding the persistence and transformations of antisemitism in modernity.



3. Os pinguins do universal: antijudaísmo, antisemitismo, antissionismo

Ivan Segré offers a critical framework for understanding how, in the name of an abstract universalism, certain “progressive” discourses may end up recycling old anti-Jewish patterns. He reconstructs the thread linking religious anti-Judaism to modern antisemitism and then examines how anti-Zionism may, in many cases, function as a new language for an old form of hatred.



4. Do antissionismo ao antisemitismo

Léon Poliakov formulates, based on the Soviet context and in an early yet still highly influential manner, the idea that certain “anti-Israel” discourses may function as a rhetorical bridge for the reactivation of older patterns of hostility toward Jews, especially when they move beyond criticism of concrete policies and begin to question the very legitimacy of Jewish collective existence in state form, mobilizing moral exceptions, generalizations, and suspicions. The text was originally published in 1969.




5. O estado do exílio: os judeus, a Europa, Israel

Danny Trom proposes an interpretation of the political nature of Israel by arguing that the Jewish state cannot be understood simply as a “normal” nation-state, but as a construction deeply marked by the historical experience of Jewish exile and the political trajectory of European Jews. Trom shows that the difficulties in Israel’s political and institutional self-definition reflect a singular historical condition, in which the experience of exile continues to shape both Jewish political imagination and the place of the State of Israel in the contemporary world.



6. A condição judaica: heranças

Edited by Breno Isaac Benedyk, Gita K. Guinsburg, Lia Vainer Schucman, and Sérgio Kon, this is a reference anthology for reflecting, with historical and philosophical depth, on what it means to “be Jewish” in modernity and in the diaspora, bringing together texts by key authors such as Hannah Arendt (with material presented as unpublished in Brazil), Martin Buber, Albert Memmi, Anatol Rosenfeld, André Neher, Robert Misrahi, and J. Guinsburg.



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